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ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses on the Combined Service, a five ship
scheduled breakbulk shipping operation, managed by the
Military Sealift Command, Pacific. The object is to define
the operation within the context of U.S. breakbulk require-
ments and worldwide breakbulk assets so as to provide a
broader perspective to military decision makers. The
research effort is directed at identifying major internal
and external environmental factors impacting the Combined
Service. Once these factors are addressed from a general
perspective, their significance is specifically related to
the Combined Service. The conclusion notes five trends
observed throughout the analysis that should be considered
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Aircraft Cargo - Whole aircraft or complete fuselage
whether or not engines are installed. Does not include
spare parts, engines, aircraft repair supplies or boxed
aircraft.
Ammunition/Hazardous Cargo - Includes explosives projec-
tiles, bombs, mines, inflammable liquids, radioactive waste,
powder, dynamite or any other hazardous commodity which
requires specialized handling or stowage.
Barrels - Forty-two (42) gallons, 5.615 cu. ft. in volume.
Bulk - Unpacked dry or liquid cargo such as coal, grain,
ore, sulphur, fertilizer and edible oil.
Deadweight - The total lifting capacity of a ship,
expressed in tons of 22 40 lbs. It is the difference between
the displacement light and the displacement loaded. Cargo
Deadweight capacity is determined by deducting from total
deadweight the weight of fuel, water, stores, dunnage, crew,
passengers, and other items necessary for use on a voyage.
Displacement, Light - The weight of the ship excluding •
cargo, fuel, ballast, stores, passengers, crew, but with
water in boilers to steaming level. (Often used in a U.S.
Navy ship description.)
Displacement, Loaded - The weight of the ship including
cargo, passengers, fuel, water, stores, dunnage and such
other items necessary for use on a voyage, which brings the
ship down to her loaded draft.
Draft - The draft of a vessel is indicated in fleet and is
the vertical distance between the waterline and the keel.
The draft shown in this thesis is full-load draft.
Dunnage - Any materials, such as boards, mats, planks,
blocks, pallets, etc., used to protect and secure cargo or
for convenience in handling and stowage of cargo.
Flags of Convenience - Such flags under which there exists
no genuine link between the state and the ships, and, in
particular, under which the state does not effectively
exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative,
technical, and social matters over ships flying its flag.
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General Agency Agreement (GAA) Ships - Those government-
owned ships which are in the custody of the Maritime
Administration (MARAD) , and which have been activated from
the National Defense Reserve Fleet or requisitioned for
title on bareboat charter and which are operated by General
Agents and crewed by merchant mariners, per agreement with
riARAD, for account of MSC.
Gross Tonnage - The entire internal cubic capacity of the
ship expressed in tons of 100 cubic feet to the ton, except
certain spaces which are exempted, such as: (1) peak and
other tanks for water ballast; (2) spaces above the upper-
most continuous deck, such as: open forecastle, bridge and
poop, certain light and air spaces, domes of skylights,
condenser, anchor gear, steering gear, wheel house, galley
and cabins for passengers. (Also Gross Registered Tonnage.)
Knot - The speed of a ship is expressed in knots; one knot
is one nautical mile (6,080,27 feet) per hour.
Long Ton (Weight Ton) - 2,240 lbs.
Measurement Ton - Bale cubic in units of 40 cubic feet to
the ton. A capacity of 10,000 MT is the same as 400,000
bale cubic.
Net Tonnage - The tonnage most frequently used for the
calculation of tonnage taxes and the assessment of charges
for wharfage and other port dues. Net tonnage is obtained
by deducting from the gross tonnage, crew and navigating
spaces and an allowance for the space occupied by the
propelling machinery. (Also Net Registered Tonnage.)
Manifest (Cargo) - A detailed listing by type of all cargo
loaded into one conveyance.
MSC Chartered Ships - Privately owned ships of the U.S.
Merchant Marine or, occasionally, foreign flag ships
chartered by MSC and crewed by merchant mariners. The
contractual agreement may be Time Charter (TC) , Voyage
Charter (VC) , or Consecutive Voyage Charter (CVC)
.
MSC Nucleus Fleet Ships - Those United States Naval Ships
(USNS) owned by the U.S. Government or bareboat chartered to
MSC and permanently assigned to MSC for administration and
operation. These USNS ships are active status in-service
ships, which are either civil service manned or contract-
operated with union crews.
16

Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) - A vehicle belonging to
an individual rather than a government agency.
Radioactive Material - Radioactive material cargo moved in
special containers.
Reefer - Perishable commodities such as meats, vegetables,
fruits, butter, eggs, and poultry which require refrigera-
tion (chill or freeze) storage.
Shipping Contract, Berth Term Ships, Shipping Agreement and
Container Contract - MSC Shipping Contracts are agreements
between MSC and common carrier steamship companies for the
ocean transportation of cargo in less than shipload quan-
tities. The carriers are paid on a basis of so much per
cubic foot or on the weight of the cargo, whichever is the
greater. In many instances new pates have to be negotiated,
for the lifting of specific items.
Short Ton (Net Ton) - 2,0 00 lbs.
Special Cargo - All commodities which weigh more than
10,000 pounds or measure more than 35 feet in any dimension.
It includes wheeled and tracked vehicles unless they are
readily identified; then they will be classified as Special
Cargo Vehicle. Does not include privately-owned vehicles,
uncrated aircraft, or stake/van type cargo-carrying trailers
loaded on MSC "roll-on/roll-off" type ships.
Special Cargo Vehicles - Readily identified wheeled and
tracked vehicles regardless of weight or dimensions. Does
not include privately-owned vehicles, uncrated aircraft, or
stake/van type cargo-carrying trailers loaded on MSC
"roll-on/roll-off" type ships.
Trailers, Cargo Carrying - Van, stake, or platform type
trailers loaded on MSC controlled "roll-on/roll-off" type
ships.
Voyage Chartered Ships - This type of charter calls for
the carriage of such cargoes as bulk grain, coal, etc., from
the point of origin to a final discharge port. These ships
are chartered from various steamship companies throughtout
the country. COMSC pays the owners a lump-sum for these
lifts. Upon completion mf discharge the ships revert back
to the owners at that point and are used for a commercial
lift homebound if available, or sailed in ballast.
Voyage Number - A consecutive three character, zero filled
number assigned for MSC controlled ships. It is used to





The Combined Service (CS) was created to meet a specific
set of needs within a specific set of constraints. The
mission requirements for an outbound and inbound East Coast
- Gulf Coast - West Coast - Far East (including the mid-
Pacific islands) scheduled breakbulk shipping operation were
defined as early as 1973. The primary Military Sealift
Command (MSC) participants in the evolution of the Combined
Service include:
a. Commander, Military Sealift Command (COMSC)
,
b. Commander, Military Sealift Command, Atlantic
(COMSCLANT)
,
c. Commander, Military Sealift Command, Gulf Sub-Area
(COMSCGULF)
d. Commander, Military Sealift Command, Pacific
(COMSCPAC), and
e. Commander, Military Sealift Command, Far East
(COMSCFE)
.
In any Department of Defense (DoD) environment, deci-
sions are often implemented long after they were originally
justified. The original decision makers may no longer be
available to explain how or why a program developed as it
did. In such situations, it is not unusual for the managers
that inherit an operational entity to continue justifying
the organization and operations by resurrecting, as
required, the earlier justifications that had proven
18

successful. However, times change and a reasonable justi-
fication five years ago may no longer be reasonable today.
The Combined Service, because it is a small, v/ell-
defined operation, lends itself to periodic scrutiny to
ensure it is still viable and justifiable within the context
of breakbulk shipping as a national and international asset
in peacetime as well as various mobilization scenarios.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is threefold. Firstly,
because history does have a tendency to repeat itself and
recurring problems are seldom unique, an attempt has been
made to gather together a history of recent MSC breakbulk
operations. By showing the evolutionary process that
culminated in the establishment of the Combined Service,
many of the early decisions can be clarified by being shown
in context. A review of the organizational structure of the
CS management as well as the early problems that had to be
addressed helps to show how the managers perceived the
Combined Service mission as part of a much larger set of
responsibilities.
The second purpose is to describe the related environ-
ment external to the Combined Service. The environment
includes the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) as
cargo coordinator and port operator, the shipper services as
demanders of service, and the U.S. and world oceanborne
19

shipping as alternate providers of shipping services.
Significant U.S. and international legislation is also
included as part of this environment as well as domestic
transportation as an intermodal competitor. The rapidly
changing technology base and mobilization strategies also
significantly impact demand. Once this external environment
is developed, the Combined Service can be related to each of
the major components.
As the Combined Service is discussed with respect to its
internal and external environments, the third purpose of
this thesis becomes clear. Trends can be pointed out that
can impact long range decisions concerning the Combined
Service. The world shipping markets change, political
strategies change, and cargo handling techniques change
which necessitates a continual reevaluation of operational
goals and objectives. By putting the Combined Service into
context, hopefully decision makers will be provided with a
less insular view so that better decisions, both active and
passive, will be made.
C. ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis is not an operational analysis. The volumes
of computerized data concerning the Combined Service avail-
able to MSC managers present the operations in a detail far
beyond the analytical scope of this thesis. Although a
considerable amount of operational data were reviewed, the
20

deductions of professional MSC analysts concerning the oper-
ational effectiveness of the Combined Service were accepted
and used, where appropriate.
Because the Combined Service was the focus of this
thesis, analysis of breakbulk cargoes and shipping patterns
was the primary emphasis. When data could not be broken
down into strictly breakbulk cargo information, the dis-
cussion was expanded to dry general cargo or even to dry
cargo depending on the level of detail available. Ammuni-
tion and other hazardous cargo was ignored whenever possible
as they present an entirely different set of shipping
problems.
The most current data available to the author was used.
Potential confusion due to the use of information from
differently dated sources has been reduced as much as
possible by the clear representation of source dates on
tables and figures or in the text, as appropriate.
D. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into an introduction, four
research chapters, and a final chapter of summary and
conclusions. The four research chapters were organized to
be read from the specific, to the general, and then back to
the specific. Chapter II provides an historical overview of
the Combined Service. Chapters III and IV describe signi-
ficant factors in the external environment of the Combined
21

Service as well as potential impacts. Chapter V integrates
information from the previous three chapters to help define
and evaluate the current role of the Combined Service and
its potential as a resource in the future.
Three appendices are also included. Appendix A provides
a comparison of actual dry cargo moved by MSC in the post-
Vietnam year of 1975 and in a more current year of 19 81.
Appendix B is included to display, in detail, the respon-
sibilities of both the government (MSC) and the contractor
in every agreement to time charter a commercial vessel.
Appendix C provides an example of the level of detail to
which the Combined Service manager monitors voyage costs.
22

II. THE COMBINED SERVICE
A. SOURCES
One of the purposes of this thesis is to gather together
in one location a recent history of Military Sealift Command
(MSC) breakbulk shipping operations preceding and including
the Combined Service (CS) . To obtain information to support
a history of this type, over one hundred documents including
messages, letters, briefing packages, point papers, reports,
internal and external studies, organizational data, and
operating files were reviewed. These documents came prima-
rily from MSCPAC (3T) and MSC (3T) files and spanned the
time frame of 1973 through 1983. Discussions with numerous
MSCPAC and MSC headquarters staff personnel have updated
these documents and provided additional information.
Information that the author considers to be of a general
historical nature and/or commonly available within the MSC
organization will not be referenced specifically. Partic-
ularly important decisions or issues may be quoted directly
and will be referenced appropriately. Contextual refer-
encing will be used to display sequencing of time frames and




The Combined Service, as it was approved on 15 June
1979, was not so much a new idea as a result of a lengthy
evolutionary process. A worldwide scheduled breakbulk
shipping operation, established by MSC in the early 1969' s,
had been allowed to lapse and a more typical tramp shipping
service had taken its place. Serious difficulties encoun-
tered in moving cargoes, specifically breakbulk, from and to
ports under MSCPAC cognizance prompted RADM Guest, COMSCPAC,
in December 197 3, to recommend to COMSC the reinstatement of
a scheduled worldwide service to improve service on the
following routes:
West Coast to East Coast,
West Coast to Europe,
Hawaii to East Coast,
Hawaii to Far East,
Hawaii to U.S. Gulf Coast, and
Coastwise (West Coast) .
COMSCPAC envisioned the utilization of .controlled ships
plying between Europe and the Far East touching the U.S.
East Coast/Gulf and U.S. West Coast/Hawaii in each direction
on a regularly scheduled basis. A roundtrip voyage would
take about four months, allowing an east-bound and west-
bound sailing each month. He expected that a reliable
"worldwide" service would be well received and patronized by
the shipper services.
In response to this request, COMSC initiated an analysis
based on projected breakbulk requironents, recommended ports
24

of call, and a four C-4 ship simulation at 21 knots using
1 July 1973 fuel costs. The conclusions were that the
proposed service appeared feasible. Comments and recom-
mendations were elicited from the area commands.
For unknown reasons, the recommendation lay dormant for
over two and one half years. It was reintroduced in the
summer of 197 6 when efforts were being made to implement a
program designed to productively employ MSC controlled ships
in full operational status (FOS) . At that time, COMSC, in a
confidential letter (since declassified) , stated to his in-
house staff and area commanders:
"In recent years due to a number of factors including
troop reductions overseas, more impetus on containeriza-
tion and constraints placed on transportation dollars by
the Congress, MSC is facing a crisis in maintaining a
readiness posture sufficient to meet future contingencies.
Choices must be made on how best to maintain an acceptable
readiness posture in the form of ship capability during
periods of reduced cargo requirements. In recognition of
the critical size question for the MSC Fleet, the Chief of
Naval Operations convened the Navy Decision Panel (NADEC)
chaired by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations on
25 July 1975 to explore the minimum force acceptable for
adequate responsivness and flexibility to provide support
of fast reaction military operations and other emergency
activities in the national interest. The Navy and the
Department of Defense have affirmed the need for an "in
house" sealift capability under direct and immediate
control; this capability is to be provided by MSC.
Analysis has indicated that an MSC Controlled Dry Cargo
Fleet of 27 ships can provide an aggregate average early
assets availability of approximately ten ships in ten
days. This capability can be regarded as the minimum
acceptable, and to preserve this capability the Navy has
programmed FY 77 readiness funding for the MSC Fleet. The
funds made available for this purpose will only provide
for a relatively few ships to be maintained in a Ready
Reserve Status, thus requiring that the remainder of the
27 ships be productively employed." [Ref. 1]
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This statement became the cornerstone for the policies that
emerged over the next four years beginning with the recom-
mendation by COMSCFE on 7 September 197 6 to further increase
the effective utilization of the MSC controlled dry cargo
fleet by "instituting a Far East - Gulf/East Coast dedicated
service in addition to the present MID-PAC service."
It is appropriate at this time to specify what services
did exist at that time and what exactly was being recommend-
ed. COMSCLANT was then providing extensive East Coast to
Europe/Med shipping as well as three ships every two months
from the East Coast/Gulf directly to the Far East and back.
Since 1972, an operation called MID-PAC (or PAC SKED)
,
managed by COMSCPAC, had also existed. It provided regular
service from the California and Northwest Coasts to Hawaii/
Guam (MID-PAC), then to the Far East and back. There was no
direct East Coast-Gulf-West Coast service. Of particular
concern was cargo from the Far East to the Gulf Coast and
POV's from Hawaii to the East Coast/Gulf. Consequently,
there was a substantial amount of transshipment required
that was both costly and time consuming. The method of
transshipping breakbulk cargo was that cargo was booked for
the movement to a transshipping port, then reoffered and
rebooked to the final destination. The shipper was billed
shipping charges from loading port to the transshipment
port, transshipment port to destination port, and the
discharging/holding/loading costs at the transshipping port.

The shipper had to pay the extra cost for the handling at
the transshipping port plus the difference in the trans-
shipped cost as compared to a direct lift. Correspondence
from this period indicated customers were not happy. What
was being proposed was a three coast to Far East route to
alleviate some of the transshipment problems.
The suggested itinerary for this "Tri-Coast" service, as
it came to be called, was Oakland-Yokohama-Pusan-Naha-Subic-
Hawaii-New Orleans-Norf olk-Bayonne-Oakland, totalling
approximately 89 days. An informal cost study was prepared
by MSC in September 197 6 that indicated revenue for the
monthly average tonnages from the four Far East ports to
Gulf and East Coasts would cover 40 percent of the ship cost
for one round trip. It was anticipated that the 60 percent
deficit could be covered by other opportune cargo.
After much discussion and general concurrence that the
scheduled service would reduce costs by being a more
controlled and consequently cheaper way to get cargo to
out-of-the-way Pacific destinations, the Tri-Coast service
concept was approved in March 1977. It would use four C-4
Challenger class ships, operating at 16 knots and scheduled
to maintain a 30 day sailing frequency. Sixteen knots was
chosen to reduce fuel costs and to keep the ships at sea
longer. MSC was over-capacitied with 27 ships; therefore
slowing them down helped keep them productively, if not
efficiently, employed. Each voyage would commence in
27

Bayonne and last about 100 days roundtrip. Upon completion
of the voyage, the just returned ship would be placed in
Reduced Operating Status (ROS) , about 20 days, until
commencement of the next scheduled voyage, assuming no
opportune lift was available. The basic route would be East
Coast-Gulf Coast-Canal Zone-West Coast-Hawaii-Far East-
Hawaii-West Coast-Canal Zone-Gulf Coast-East Coast. Slight
changes to the itinerary within command area would be
acceptable depending on cargo availability. Cost analyses
indicated a profit of $1,884,000 per ship per year.
Additional justification was stated as follows:
"Such a scheduled service would offer several advantages
over the present tramp- type operation. It is axiomatic
that scheduled voyages attract cargo. When the shipper
can rely on a ship being available at published times he
can better plan his cargo movements. Ship operating time
is maximized, although ROS periods are planned to ensure
schedule integrity. During periods of low cargo gener-
ation the ships continue to operate; whereas, with the
tramp system a ship would be layed up unless ship-load
lots of cargo are available. Providing ships to the Far
East on a regular basis enhances MSC's contingency respon-
siveness by stabilizing the lift capability into that
area. From an administrative viewpoint, both budget
planning and cargo lift planning are enhanced since vessel
operation's are well defined.
"Regarding peacetime cargo movement between the three
CONUS coasts and the Far East, scheduled voyages will
improve lift capability for traditional hard-to-lift cargo
for which even commercial service is difficult to arrange.
This includes cargo moving between the Far East and the
Gulf Coast, and POV's from Hawaii to the Gulf and East
Coasts. Such cargo becomes either very "old" awaiting
controlled fleet lift, or is finally shipped commercially,
if service is available, at higher costs. An example of
the foregoing would include small lots of cargo from
Subic where regular MSC controlled lift to the East Coast
is not now available and commercial calls require an
inducement. Also, POV's moving from Hawaii and California
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to the East Coast are a continuing, heavy requirement now
being lifted commercially at substantial cost. Finally,
there is a steady, reasonably heavy movement of New
Orleans destined cargo, mostly POV s from Hawaii, for
which the only available shipping is the occasional East
Coast or Gulf controlled ship returnee. Lack of any
regular service in this direction has generated frequent
shipper service complaints," [Ref. 2]
A third justification, based on an impact analysis, caused
considerable discussion in MSC headquarters as some felt
that Lykes and Waterman, two major U.S. Flag shippers in the
Far East trade, could lose as much as 50 percent of their
current DoD Gulf Coast to Far East business if the Tri-Coast
service were instituted.
There was not enough concern on this point, however, to
alter plans and a six-month test of the Tri-Coast service
was instituted in May 1977. The primary ports of call were
Bayonne, Norfolk, New Orleans, Mobile, Oakland, Pearl
Harbor, Subic Bay, Keelung, Naha, Pusan, and Yokohama.
COMSCLANT was tasked with assigning the ships, publishing a
voyage schedule, coordinating MSC Continental United States
(CONUS) loading activities, and assigning specific cargo
spaces for subsequent loads. Problems typical to this type
of service in the past included no space for cargo booked at
final loading port, overstows, and cargo frustration.
Complete coordination, astute management and free communi-




The six month test proceeded with little comment from
the Pacific area commanders except some minor itinerary
changes to better interface with the MID-PAC service and to
institutionalize some speed flexibility. However, a serious
complaint was voiced by COMSCLANT on 9 September 197 7 when
he stated in a message to COMSC:
"Prior to the initiation of the present Tri-Coast service
COMSCLANT/COMSCGULF were sending approximately three ships
every two months directly to the Far East. At the present
time, because of the reduced frequency of sailings (one a
month) and the requirement to reserve space for the West
Coast, COMSCLANT/COMSCGULF routinely shut out available
Far East cargo which in turn must be booked commercially
to meet cargo requirements.
"All available information indicates future cargo gener-
ation will continue at present levels. Accordingly, with
the expected winter decline in West Coast cargo generation
indicated by COMSCPAC, rather than cancelling or delaying
the MID-PAC service, it is recommended that the Tri-Coast
ship by-pass the Pacific Coast outbound since there is
adequately East/Gulf Coast cargo to fill out the ship
directly for the Far East. When West Coast cargo gener-
ation dictates, routing via the West Coast could be
resumed on a case by case basis. Deletion of the West
Coast ports would reduce the ship's transit time to the
Far East and thus provide more timely service from East/
Gulf Coast ports." [Ref. 3]
This request for a deviation to the schedule, even
though appearing reasonable, was deemed to be inappropriate
as it would risk the "advertised" reliable nature of the
service which in turn was considered by many to be its major
selling point in influencing cargo generation, accumulation,
and routing. MSC headquarters personnel stated more than
once that while adherence to the promulgated schedule might
incur additional costs, such costs were for a predetermined
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purpose and, until the overall concept was validated, the
costs would continue to be knowingly incurred.
By 2 December 1977, a complete review had been made of
the Tri-Coast service and several substantive issues were
put forward by COMSCPAC for consideration and/or resolution
at the next area commander's conference. These issues
related to:
a. Resumption/assumption of normal facets of ship
operating responsibilities associated in providing ocean
transportation and berth line service including:
(1) Individual voyage planning and associated
requirements for cargo cut offs, cargo storage planning and
approval of ship following by individual shipboard cargo
planner for continuity, and space allocation versus voyage
cargo planning.
(2) Cargo plans relative to required distribution
and some system for ensuring proper distribution, contents,
size, labeling, etc.
(3) Requirements for individual MSC representatives
to be aboard loading ships continuously during cargo
operations at various ports and the associated personnel
requirements.
b. Scheduling of berth line service and guidance
concerning patterns and controls, adherence to schedules,
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' normal calls versus inducement calls, frequency of service,
influence/effect of Tri-Coast/MID-PAC service on each other.
c. Method of accounting/budgeting for operational costs
defining what is a loss/profit in view of contingency fleet
and alternatives for routing ships. How should budgeting be
accomplished? What impact would this have on monthly
summary data and voyage analysis reports?
d. Feasibility of influencing cargo flow to controlled
ships/terminals through increased schedule service; the
consequent improvement of ship/terminal utilization with
possible resultant reductions in excessive overhead costs.
e. Factors influencing the reestablishment of MSC as a
fully participating member with MTMC in the overall trans-
portation effort so that planning responsibilities were
distributed to both organizations.
f. Providing active supervision over ship operations
versus administrative reporting with consequent personnel
impact.
On 17 February 197 8, the Tri-Coast service was declared
both desirable and necessary and was fully approved by COMSC
as a permanent dedicated service.
In May 1978, integrated area command block scheduling of
both the MID-PAC and Tri-Coast services was initiated to
prevent duplication of port calls. Significant improvements




However r problems continued with the operations.
Analyses performed upon completion of each voyage showed a
profit of $170,000 on the first one and each subsequent
voyage losing money. In fact, in October 1978, after twelve
complete voyages, an average loss of $322,500 per voyage was
reported with an average utilization of 42 percent outbound,
19 percent intra-area, and 41 percent inbound [Ref. 4],
Note that there was no broken stowage factor applied at that
time. Currently a factor of .4 is used to account for
broken stowage meaning only 60 percent of the space below
decks represents "real" capacity. Consequently, if the
broken stowage factor had been applied, these utilization
factors would increase to 70 percent, 32 percent, and 68
percent respectively.
V7hile COMSC was prepared to send a message to shipper
services requesting fuller utilization of scheduled MSC
service, he was also aware that an intra-MSC management
review was appropriate first. By this time, headquarters
staff level personnel had perceived several possible problem
areas including:
a. East Coast outbound cargo being shut out, indicating
a review of allocations.
b. Ships sitting idle at overseas ports in order to




c. Inbound voyages reported full, but only 41 percent
(68 percent) utilized, indicating possible poor prestows.
These and other problems were discussed at length and on
2 November 197 8, COMSCLANT proposed to combine the Tri-Coast
and MID-PAC services utilizing five ships with a 30 day
frequency and a voyage length not to exceed 15 days. There
would be two voyage variations that would be routinely
alternated.
At an operations management conference on 11 December
1978, it was agreed to combine the two services into one
with departures on alternate coasts, e.g., the Far East
voyage would terminate on the East Coast and vice versa.
Sailing frequency was to be approximately 29 days with ships
proceeding at 16 knots but minimizing port time. The serv-
ice would be provided by six instead of seven ships and the
block schedule characterized by scheduled arrival/departuEe •
times would be replaced by a slightly more flexible
scheduled itinerary known as a "spread" schedule. In
January 1979, COMSC approved the merger of the two services
and on 27 April 1979, the results of the 24 April 1979
operations management conference were promulgated naming the
newly merged service the "Combined Service" and assigning
overall single voyage management to COMSCPAC on a trial
basis. On 25 May 1979, COMSCPAC documented its policy
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and procedures for managing the Combined Service and on
15 June 1979 officially assumed responsibility.
C. MANAGEMENT
!• Qrgapj.gat;4Qp
The MSCPAC Transportation Office (P-3T) performs the
function of Combined Service manager through an extensive
process of scheduling and continuous evaluation. As
reflected in Figure II-l, the department has two major
divisions. The Cargo Traffic Division (P-3T1) prepares long
and short range schedules incorporating projected cargo
requirements, adhering to a 30 day sailing frequency from
the East and West Coasts, and a maximum utilization of cargo
space available. Cargo lift requirements are referred to
the Cargo Traffic Division where they are assigned to
specific voyages and input to the Military Traffic
Management Command, Western Area (MTMCWA) for the
development of stowage plans.
The Dry Cargo Ship and Point-to-Point Tanker
Operations Division (P-3T2) monitors ongoing voyages as
closely as possible and incorporates schedule changes when
necessary due to the changing requirements or upon receipt
of validated recommendations from other area commanders.
This division also maintains detailed statistics concerning
cargo flow among various ports, costs and revenues for each
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continuously analyzed in an attempt to identify improvements
for the Combined Service.
2. Functions and Responsibilities
MSCPAC, upon assumption of responsibilities, stated"
that it would approach the Combined Service management from
the viewpoint of a functional loss control center which was
responsible for achieving required cargo movements at the
least overall cost to the government. In other words, while
the goal of MSC as a Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) activity is
to break even overall, it was understood that the nature of
the CS mission and the rate structure would rarely produce
profitable voyages. Within these overall guidelines, all
individual movements would, in-so-far as practicable, be
accomplished so that the costs to MSC would be reduced to
the absolute minimum. This "absolute minimum" has never
been defined and for that matter, does not appear to be of
particular concern as long as the mission is accomplished.
To support this objective, MSCPAC, as the Combined
Service manager, would perform the following functions:
a. Publish a monthly Combined Service schedule.
Individual voyage itineraries and subsequent voyage planning
will be based on inputs received from MSC activities and CS
vessels.
b. Monitor individual voyage progress and modify
published schedules as deemed necessary.
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c. Designate bunkering ports,
d. Act as the singular clearance authority for planned
overstows.
e. Continuously review overall cargo planning with a
view towards implementing improvements.
f. Monitor recommendations to COMSC for improvements to
the overall operation of the Combined Service.
COMSCLANT and COMSCFE were directed to:
a. Operate ships in accordance with published schedules
while in their geographic areas of responsibility in order
to achieve the best balance of overall cost and revenue.
b. Vary ship itineraries as required for circumstances
and/or requirements which would in essence have a net
positive effect on earnings or which were dictated by
critical DoD lift requirement. Changes to the itinerary
which could have a negative effect on earnings would not be
made without the CS manager's approval unless such changes
are required by unusual circumstances such as weather,
medical emergency, etc. The CS manager would query changes
when overall cost effectiveness appeared questionable.
c. Coordinate with MTMC Combined Service cargo bookings
and oversee terminal cargo stowage/planning in accordance
with normal operational procedures.
d. Forward cargo stowage plans to the next scheduled
port for planning purposes by the fastest means available
for all CS vessel port calls.
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e. Submit CS related reports as required.
f. Clear planned overstows with the CS manager,
g. Evaluate overtime, fuel, port changes, and other
costs for each voyage in order to minimize costs to the U.S.
Government,
To support these functions and responsibilities,
reporting requirements from the field provide detailed
information related to cargo lift requirements, cargo load-
ing and discharging, and port performance. Because port
performance constitutes a major portion of the overall
voyage costs, both cost data and cargo information are
required within five days after departure of the ship from
each port. Cost data include estimated port costs (i.e.,
pilotage, tugs, wharfage), estimated MSCVAN costs for
required staging and loading/discharging, bunkering informa-
tion, and estimates of any special costs. Cargo information
includes such things as cargo utilization below decks,
availability of deck space after discharge, and empty space
blocked by overstowing. Similar data are provided for the
weather decks. Additional cargo information relates to
overstows, heavy lift requirements, security problems
encountered or anticipated, cargo shut-outs. Speed of




Another major component of voyage cost is fuel. In
view of worldwide fluctuations of prices and availability
confronted by MSC, the bunkering schedule is required to be
reviewed continuously as data on current costs and avail-
ability of fuel are provided by the area commanders. The
ability to change bunkering plans represents a highly
visible opportunity to cut costs. On the day-to-day
decision making level the other major fuel opportunity
relates to the flexibility of altering SOA's. Impacts on
fuel cost by SOA is reflected in Table II-I which should be
used for relational purposes only as fuel at the current
average price of $26/BBL is not reflected on this 1979 Table
[Ref . 5] . When the Tri-Coast and MID-PAC operations were
both functioning, their optimum SOA was approximately 16
knots. When the Combined Service was initially operated
with six ships, it was at a recommended SOA of 15.5 to 16
knots. Now that the CS is down to five ships, the SOA is
closer to 18 knots. Note also that overcapacity is no
longer a problem.
3. External OrganizatiQnal Intgrf^ggg
Because MSC in general and the Combined Service
manager in particular, control only the sea leg of any cargo
movement, there are major organizational interfaces required
in both planning and executing to ensure the movement satis-
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I works closely with r4SCLANT, MSCGULF, and MSCFE who have
operational control of CS ships in their respective areas.
The primary CS management interface outside MSC is
with the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) or, more
specifically, with two of its West Coast subcommands, the
Military Export Cargo Offering and Booking Office (MECOBO)
and the Military Ocean Terminal, Bay Area (MOTBA) . MSCPAC
used to perform all of the booking functions for the
controlled fleet (including CS) . On 1 October 19 81 the
booking function was transferred to MECOBO along with
seventeen personnel and their ceiling points. MSCPAC still
receives breakbulk cargo offerings from MECOBO and assigns
CS shipping assets. This function is performed with in-
house personnel who used to be colocated with the personnel
performing the related booking functions assumed by MECOBO.
MOTBA performs all terminal functions related to
cargo including receiving, storing, staging, and providing
stevedoring services in loading and discharging. An
additional function of considerable importance to the CS as
a breakbulk operation is the development of prestow plans.
Specified expenses are paid in accordance with an Inter-
service Support Agreenent between MTMC and MSC.
Another major external interface is with the
steamship company and its agents worldwide. As will be
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discussed later, an MSC time charter is for a fully oper-
ational and crewed ship. MSCPAC fixes the itinerary and
manifests cargo and then lets the steamship company operate
as it sees fit within those constraints. If there are
repair parts needed or crew to be rotated, that is all
handled by the shipping agents.
Last but not least are the periodic interfaces with
the shipper services themselves. Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps logistics personnel as well as other DoD
shippers interested in CS service frequently contact MSCPAC
concerning schedules, cargo sizing issues, or cargo handling
#
r ecomme nda ti ons
,
4. Reporting Systems and ADP Support
The collection, recording and processing of CS
related data are vital facets of MSCPAC 's responsibility in
the management of this MSC cargo lift operation. The data
which are collected provide necessary inputs not only for
improvement analysis, but also for cargo lift projections,
financial projections, and general planning functions as
well. Data are received from the CS ships themselves, MSC
offices throughout the world, MTMC offices, COMSC, and
numerous other points of contact.
These data are input into several manual and
automated systems for report generation and historical data
collection purposes. Port performance data are collected,
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compiled into Port Performance reports and utilized in-house
to closely monitor port costs. A Cargo Space Available
Report is transmitted to the subsequent port of call of a
departing ship by the MSC loading activity. A model known
as PROFORMA accepts data concerning loading cargo, booked
cargo, and voyage data and generates reports that are
consequently used in comparative analysis of ship voyages.
These PROFORMA data are submitted upon completion of loading
at the last port in a voyage segment or five days prior to
the end of the month. The Cargo Ship Location, Status, and
Utilization Subsystem (CALSTAT) is probably the most
extensive management oriented system. This system provides
information in standardized report format concerning current
ship arrivals, departures, and fuel consumption. It also
stores in easily retrievable formats historical controlled
fleet usage data. Cargo load and discharge statistics are
taken from both PROFORMA and CALQTAT reports. Data on port
and at-sea costs, port charges, and bunkering operations are
extracted from the CS unique Port Performance Reports.
Various other pieces of information are extracted
from the Cargo Space Available Reports, Departure/Arrival/
Movement Reports, billing tables, and other internal
documents and recombined into periodic management reports.
Some of these include graphical displays of fuel consumption
at various speeds for hullcleaning requirement studies.
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revenue/cost studies based on cargo loads/discharges and
billing tables, graphical port charge distribution displays,
and cargo flow analysis for various port combinations.
Numerous types of historical information are stored and can
be displayed in formats suitable to current emphasis or
requirements.
Automated data processing (ADP) equipment available
to MSCPAC runs from small to large with the former spectrum
exemplified by two hand held programmable calculators, the
TI-58C and TI-59, which are used to tabulate port and at-sea
costs with a locally developed program. A self contained
Tektronics microcomputer located at MSCPAC is used to run a
locally developed fuel consumption curve program,
A major command ADP asset is a time sharing
operation with the CDC 6700 located at the Naval Surface
Weapon Center, Dalgren, Virginia. This system has been used
since September 1972 to run the PROFORMA model to obtain
ship status reports, model voyage studies and fuel
consumption projections. The turn around time for a
PROFORMA report from keyed input to hard copy output is
approximately 30 minutes and consequently is an effective
tool in daily decision making. PROFORMA Voyage Analysis




MSC and MTMC ADP departments are colocated at MTMC
Headquarters in Falls Church, VA. A shared Honeywell
mainframe is used to run, among other things, the CALSTAT
programs. This MSC command-wide system operates in an
interactive, real-time mode and accepts data from MSCPAC via
a Data Point 8200 "dumb" terminal and a Data Point 86 00
"smart" terminal. Various software packages are also
available that support MSC in-house data display require-
ments. A Data Point microcomputer at MSCPAC, Oakland
receives the local CALSTAT data which are output to tape and
then transmitted via the SYCOR computer link to Falls
Church. A direct link is currently being investigated.
MSCLANT and MSCPAC are hardwired to the Honeywell via its
SYCOR interface but overseas area commands must transmit
their data via the AtJTODIN network directly to the Virginia
SYCOR unit. Because this is a batch processing system, a
full input-to-output cycle for MSCPAC takes approximately 33
hours, thus reducing its utility as a day-to-day management
tool. The Unit Billing System is also run on the Honeywell
and it correlates terminal-inputted confirmed booked data
with ocean cargo manifest tapes.
An ongoing project that will consolidate and/or
upgrade existing ADP systems is the MSC Automated
Information System Architecture (AISA) which is being
developed incrementally with some subsystems completed and




1 • Ships, Captain, Crew
The current CS operation consists of five C-4 time
charter ships including:
SS MALLOY LYKES (C-4)
,
SS MASON LYKES (C-4)
,
SS AMERICAN MONARCH (C-4)
,
SS ELIZABETH LYKES (C-4) , and
SS DAWN (C-4)
.
All are in various stages of multi-year contracts to MSC
averaging approximately $16,500 per day base charter hire.
Descriptive data relative to the current CS fleet are
represented in Table II-II, "c-4" is simply a designation
for a cargo ship 500-600 feet in length. The ideal
situation would be to consistently operate the same class
ship in the CS. However, this has proven impossible and, in
fact, ships are rotated frequently to meet operational
requirements within the CS and MSC controlled fleet in
general. The LYKES ships being used are of the Clipper
Class.
The time charter approach to maintaining strength in
the MSC controlled fleet is one of the more flexible
arrangements. These contracts can be for one or more years
with or without options for follow-on years. Normally
contracts are written for two years with options to five
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Although, the average daily base charter hire for CS ships
is $16,500, actual operating costs including fuel and port
charges increase the cost to approximately $24,000 per day.
Reduced operating status costs are substantially lower
because crews can be reduced at least two-thirds to 5-10
persons.
The typical crew on a Clipper Class ship is
displayed in Table II-III, This crew is hired by the
steamship company through their respective unions. Their
primary point of contact ashore for personal and
professional matters is the steamship agent.
2. RQutg gtipuctMirg
The CS route structure is designed to meet the needs
of the shipper services with a consistent itinerary and
consistent port call frequency. It was felt that this type
of service would generate more business (revenues) than a
tramp operation and at the same time provide better service.
The CS was reduced from six ships to five in July 19 82 to
decrease operational costs, reduce ROS frequencies and
costs, and increase utilization of the remaining ships.
Current ports of call are listed in most common order in
Table II-IV. Certain low volume ports such as Midway, Wake,
Johnston Island, and Kwajalein are visited on a periodic, as
needed basis. An average voyage lasts 80 days and the
average SOA for the past year increased from 15.5 to 17.5.















2 1st Assistant Engineer
1 2nd Assistant Engineer
2 3rd Assistant Engineer
1 Electrician
1 Assistant Electrician
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then East/Gulf Coasts-Far East-West Coast. The outbound
legs (to the Far East) are the best utilized, with the
inbound leg less utilized and the intra-area (up/down/
between coasts) being utilized the least. FY82 summary data
examplifies this fact with a total of 185,509 measurement
tons (MT) carried outbound, 89,623 MT intra-area, and
110,061 MT inbound. Because the breakbulk billing rates did
not compensate for the cost of the Combined Service, there
was an estimated $408,318 loss per voyage [Ref . 6] . Table
II-V gives a good overview of voyage history with related
losses.
3. The Financial Structure
The Military Sealift Command operates as part of the
Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) . An industrial fund is a
working-capital fund providing working capital for
industrial-commercial type activities and to control and
account effectively for the cost of these Department
sponsored programs. MSA is included as one of the eight
activities within the NIF because it meets the criterion of
being an industrial or commercial type activity engaged in
producing goods or providing services, in response to
requirements of users and central management organizations,
that are common within and among DoD components.
The budget office at MSC headquarters (M-51) is
responsible for developing the billing rate tables which are
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stabilization policy required by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) , rates are not particularly representative
of projected costs. If losses are incurred within the
overall MSC budget in one fiscal year, the NIF absorbs those
losses and the rate structure is altered to "pay back" the
fund the following year so that Defense appropriations don't
require major additions one year and deletions the next.
There is generally an 18 month lag in these rate structure
accommodations.
Since MSC does charge the shipper services, i.e.,
the Navy, Marine Corps, etc., for its CS services, it is
appropriate in this section to briefly describe the billing
process supported by the computerized Unit Level Billing
System, Malifests are prepared when cargo is loaded in
accordance with Military Standard Transportation and
Movement Procedures (MILSTAMP) direction and forwarded as
expeditiously as possible to the discharge port. At the
same time, a copy is sent to the M-53 the statistical
analysis branch, at MSC headquarters, for preparation of a
detailed substantiation for billing which, in turn, is
passed to M-52 , the accounting branch. The accounting
branch actually prepares the bills sent to the shipper
services, MSC area commands are sent documentation
displaying billing data and they verify it against their
in-house records of cargo loading and discharging obtained
from the MSC offices worldwide.
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4.- Rggy^:.gj,ng X?gug g
The purpose of this section is to give an overview
of historical issues and/or problem areas. These problem
areas are categorized into four major areas with short
discussions concerning each. Chapter V will look again at
some of these issues and others from a more current
perspective.
The Tri-Coast operations initially, and the Combined
Service later, resulted in per voyage losses of $150,000 to
$500,000. Although the CS was generally expected to lose
money, pressure had always been applied to keep the losses
to a minimum. The problem had continually been a complex
one due to a large number of variables and to other factors
less subject to MSC control. Several of the more signifi-
cant factors were:
a, a large breakbulk service was anachronistic in terms
of cost effectiveness;
b. readiness requirements, which established the need
to employ breakbulk ships productively in peacetime, were
ill-defined;
c, responsibility for terminal operations and ship
operation was split between MTMC and MSC; and
d. current rate setting mechanisms and PROFORMA
algorithms made it:




(2) difficult to establish rate incentives to
increase cargo offerings; and
(3) impossible to consider "dead" costs in voyage
management or more specifically, those costs that were
associated with the ancillary functions of the operation
such as readiness.
The first issue refered to the fact that breakbulk
ships were being replaced rapidly by specialized dry cargo
ships with substantial operational economies of scale.
These newer designs include container ships, Oil/Bulk/Ore
(OBO) carriers, combination ships, Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO)
,
Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH) , and Sea Barge (SEABEE) ships.
The next chapter will cover in more depth the unrelenting
decrease in U.S. Flag and worldwide breakbulk ships as world
shipping continues to modernize to take advantage of new
cargo transportation and handling efficiencies.
The second issue concerned readiness objectives, to
be discussed at length later in this paper. Readiness had
always been a major justification for a MSC controlled fleet
breakbulk shipping operation. Unfortunately, peacetime
breakbulk handling requirements necessitated a quite
different ship configuration than would be necessary for a
wartime scenario. For example, the early Tri-Coast cargo
ship characteristics contributed directly to the losses
being experienced because the ships were not well suited to
the requirements of a multiple-port breakbulk service that
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required the carrying of vehicles, container unsuitable
cargo, and some containers. Experience proved that
Challenger Class ships in this type of service would rarely,
if ever, be able to carry more than 40-45 percent (with
broken stowage, 67-75 percent) of their cube "capacity." It
had been observed that if an ideal ship were designed for
the CS, it would resemble the American Hawaiian S.S, Company
C-4 once used in the intercoastal trade (i.e., small hatches
relative to deck area, many shallow tween decks, engines aft
to preserve parallel midbody area for cargo) [Ref. 7]. The
Challenger Class initially in Tri-Coast use, on the other
hand, had huge hatches, high tween decks, little deck area,
engines midships, and vertical ballast tanks that further
reduced deck area in the holds. Problems of overstowage and
the resultant rehandling costs seemed to be unavoidable when
these ships were used for a multiple port environment with
the type of cargo being offered. It should be noted that in
a mobilization scenario where all the cargo would be going
to one location, these ships would function quite satisfac-
torily. In fact, they are now part of the National Defense
Reserve Fleet (NDRF)
.
The Clipper Class ship that now predominates in the
CS fleet, is somewhat more appropriately designed with four
large holds forward of the machinery spaces and one large
and one small hold astern. The upper and lower tween decks
are still rather high ranging from nine feet to sixteen
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feet. The forward twin hatches average 27 feet by 40 feet
with some exposed deck area while practically the entire aft
deck is covered with hatches.
The third factor that made and continues to make
controlling costs difficult is the lack of control over
booking cargo and terminal operations, both currently per-
formed or coordinated with MTMC. Ship port calls are based
on cargo offerings which in turn are based on cargo routing,
MTMC routes cargo based solely on their expenses and MSC
shipping rates, not on MSC's overall expenses. Addition-
ally, there appears to be a contingency requirement to keep
at least three West Coast Defense Transportation System
(DTS) terminals operational (Tacoma, Oakland, and San Diego)
and, consequently, productively utilized. This results in
some inefficiencies from a MSC perspective [Ref. 8]. An
interesting comparison was made showing how the military
differed in its management philosophy from its civilian
counterparts. Table II-VI displays these differences with
the consensus from the commercial breakbulk carriers that
the government does not conduct its CS operations the
"right" way [Ref. 10]
.
The fourth factor relates to inefficiencies in the
current rate setting mechanisms that are too inflexible from
a management perspective. MSCPAC is held responsible for
the basic formula: Prof it/(Loss) = Revenue - Cost. In
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revenue (billing rates) and only incomplete control over
costs. The present rate structure and shipping cost infor-
mation causes cargo to flow to containers because the
minimal handling cost is reflected in lower overall rates.
Another example of rate inflexibility can be related to the
low utilization rates due to lack of suitable cargo for
"flooring off." If flooring cargo (i.e., canned or some
other small packaged goods) could be attracted by "loss
leader" rates, overall voyage costs could be reduced by
generating marginal income through use of currently unuse-
able space.
Another complaint concerned the management problem
of projecting and controlling CS "losses" when no one was
willing to state as a MSC budget line the "cost" of
maintaining specific cargo ships in the controlled fleet to
meet contingency requirements and other mission needs. This
was a real cost, and, without any firm direction, could only
be equated with the average historical voyage loss. Along
similar lines, what was the cost of providing for service
where no commercial service is available? What was the cost
of providing for heavy lift or oversized high priority items
that could not be accommodated in a timely manner by com-
mercial operators? In other words, it would have been
valuable for MSCPAC to know what portion of their losses was
acceptable and what portion was not. To help resolve this
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problem a "readiness" budget line is planned for the FY 85
NIF budget [Ref . 10] .
Delays in financial feedback or inappropriate feed-
back were also recurring problems. Consistent complaints
were noted concerning the heavy reporting requirements to
support voyage analyses. Even after waiting som.e time for
the receipt of the analyses, it was felt they were not ade-
quately highlighted to show specific enough costs during a
voyage to enable an area commander to draw conclusions and
make better operational decisions.
»
E. SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the subject
of the Combined Service, explain its antecedents, and
briefly describe how it is managed and operated today. This
perspective, including initial implementation issues and
early operational problems, should be valuable because it
helps provide a framework to evaluate later policy decisions
and operational changes.
The following two chapters will discuss in general the
external environment that has impacted military breakbulk ship-
ping. Chapter V will then return and relate the Combined
Service to that environment.
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III. U.S. FLAG BREAKBULK SHIPPING AS PART OF THE
INDUSTRIAL BASE; EXPECTATIONS VS REALITY
A, BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
One of the most important factors to be considered in
measuring the economic capability of any nation is its
ability to carry on foreign commerce and international
trade. Throughout history, the most powerful and influen-
tial governments have been those which have developed their
trade potentials and fostered policies designed to improve
their national position. One would think that the United
States, as the world's greatest trading nation, would
consequently have one of the world's greatest merchant
fleets. A brief historical overview of government support
(or non-support) of the U.S. Merchant Marine, that up until
the near past consisted primarily of breakbulk and tanker
assets can help explain this apparent disjunction. This
discussion is supported by Table III-I which shows increas-
ing U.S. oceanborne foreign trade tonnage coupled with
decreasing market share.
This country was colonized and maintained as a nation by
using sea transportation as the basic means of trade and
communication. However, as early as 1789, the need for
government assistance to the American merchant marine was




























































goods imported in American- flag vessels. As a result, the
period 1789-1817 saw the U.S. grow to become the second
largest maritime nation, with Britain keeping the number one
position. Cabotage laws were instituted in 1817 that
reserved domestic trade to U.S. flag ships. Another attempt
at promoting U.S. foreign shipping was the mail subsidy
program during 1847-1857. Unfortunately, because of manage-
ment inconsistencies and cries of "favoritism," these sub-
sidies proved ineffectual and there began a slow decline of
the maritime fleet.
The Civil War period was disastrous for the merchant
fleet during which a large portion was destroyed. At this
all time low, the mail subsidy concept was reinstituted and
operated for thirteen years with little, if any, practical
effect. The Ocean Mail Act of 1891 was a real attempt at a
reformed approach, but it was too little, too late. By
1900, only 9 percent of U.S. foreign trade was carried in
U.S. flag ships [Ref. 12:44]. The mail subsidy was replaced
with a defense subsidy in the 1904 Defense Cargo Preference
Act, This act basically required all defenqe cargo to be
shipped in U.S. flag vessels unless they were unavailable or
unless the President found the foreign rates charged by the
available vessels to be excessive or otherwise unreasonable.
This promoted some expansion, but, as the sounds of war
increased across the Atlantic, it became obvious more direct
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efforts were needed. The Shipping Act of 1916 was an emer-
gency measure to permit production of over 23 00 ships for
World War I.
The first attempt at a comprehensive overhaul of the
merchant marine and the first definitive statement of
government policy concerning aid was in the Merchant Marine
Act of 1920 which stated:
"It is necessary for the national defense and for the
proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that
the United States shall have a merchant marine of the best
equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to
carry the greater part of its commerce and serve as a
naval military auxiliary in time of war or national
emergency, . .and it is hereby declared to be the policy
of the United States to do whatever may be necessary to
develop and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant
marine,
"
In 1928, in an attempt to correct some of the weaknesses of
the 1920 Act and do something about the obsolescence problem
created by the then-excess World War I fleet, the Merchant
Marine Act of 1928 was passed. Its primary emphasis on
broadening the mail subsidy program had little effect on
construction of new ships and the merchant fleet continued
to decline.
By 1936, it was again obvious that the U.S, Merchant
Marine, like most U.S, post-depression industries, was in
terrible shape and minor tweaks to the system were just not
going to work. The positive legislative atmosphere with its
emphasis on getting the country back on its feet allowed the
passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 193 6, This Act formed
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the legislative foundation upon which today's merchant fleet
is based. It, incidentially, eliminated the ineffective
mail subsidy program and established the first independent
agency to handle maritime affairs, the Maritime Commission.
The Act concentrated on the U.S. foreign trade provided by
liner vessels and promoted U.S. shipbuilding and U.S. flag
operations by very specific Construction Differential
Subsidies (CDS) and Operating Differential Subsidies (ODS)
.
The ODS was further tied to a Capital Reserve Fund (CRF)
oriented toward replacement of ships as they reached obso-
lescence. It should be noted that the domestic trade was
ignored in this Act as it was felt the much earlier Jones
Act, reserving all domestic trade for U.S. flag vessels, was
sufficient to promote the domestic trade.
There had hardly been time to judge the effectiveness of
the Act of 193 6 when World War II arrived with its attendant
confusions. The War Shipping Administration was created in
1941 to oversee the building of approximately 56 00 merchant
ships. The fleet had once again reached healthy proportions
only to restart its decline at the end of World War II. To
dispose of the large number of excess ships in the U.S.
inventory and to support the rebuilding of foreign fleets,
the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 was passed. In addition
to managing ship sales, it also created the National Defense
Reserve Fleet (NDRF) v/hich retained and maintained, initial-
ly, 1421 merchant type ships for national defense purposes.
67

Table III-II is useful in showing the gradual but relentless
decline of the NDRF. The largest percentage of ships in the
NDRF at that time were versatile and flexible conventional
general cargo vessels that carried their own cargo handling
gear and were usable under almost any circumstances. As a
result^ the period of 1947-1950 saw little, if any, cargo
ship construction and a general decline in U.S. foreign
trade although there was considerable activity in Europe and
the emerging countries as they bolstered their war ruined
economies. The Reorganization Act of 1950 abolished the
independent Maritime Commission and transferred its duties
to the Maritime Administration (MARAD) housed within the
Department of Commerce where it remained until 19 81 when
MARAD was switched to the Department of Transportation,
War again acted as the impetus for the expansion of the
merchant fleet. The Defense Production Act of 1950 estab-
lished the National Shipping Authority under MARAD juris-
diction. The merchant marine asqumed a major role in
transportation of goods in the Korean War effort. Approxi-
mately 540 NDRF ships were reactivated and although old, the
active fleet reached major proportions again. The 1954
Cargo Preference Act modified the 1904 Preference Act to
include the additional restriction that at least 50 percent
of the defense cargoes must be shipped on privately owned
U.S. Flag vessels. This appeared to be a ploy to ensure the




NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET 1945-1982 [Ref. 11:48]




























































defense dry cargo business using the ships it had reacti-
vated for the Korean sealift. Nonetheless, the period of
1954-1962 was again one of decline for the merchant marine
and significantly, both commercial and NDRF ships were
beginning to reach block obsolescence as most had been built
to support World War II requirements.
The 1960 's saw the demand for merchant shipping again
rise to meet the heavy shipping requirements of the Vietnam
War. In the FY 1965 Annual Report of the Maritime
Administration, there were 1594 ships in the reserve fleet
of which 96 were under preservation. One hundred seventy-
six (176) ships were reactivated. The aging reserve ships
performed surprisingly well even though there are interest-
ing tales of retired ship's engineers being recalled to
active service because they were the only people left who
knew how to machine parts for these ships as the machinery
regularly broke down. Due to obsolescence and attrition
from the NDRF fleet over the years, the U.S. required the
services of over 33 shipping companies which included 73
foreign flag vessels to meet the Vietnam lift requirements.
These 73 ships represented almost 25 percent of all the
foreign flag ships serving U.S. commerce through non-liner
trade at the time [Ref. 13:2-14]. In other words, a sub-
stantial portion of worldwide shipping assets were needed to
support the U.S. military requirement in Vietnam.
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Figure III-l helps display the magnitude of the Vietnam era
shipping effort from a worldwide perspective.
The United States entered the seventies feeling that
without an immediate and massive fleet renewal program for
the merchant marine the U.S. shipping industry could cease
to be a world player and defense needs in time of emergency
would not be met. The Merchant Marine Act of 197 attempted
to rectify some of the more glaring problems of the 193 6
Act. It is generally credited with: (1) a substantial
increase in ship production; (2) fleet modernization and
increased efficiency in ship building and operation (and
hence increased effectiveness of ODS and CDS funds); (3)
increased attention to the development of domestic water
transportation; and (4) recognition of the importance of
bulk trades. However, most of these improvements had little
effect on the breakbulk fleet.
Of the 344 ships in the NDPF in December 1976, only 139
ships were general cargo ships. The remaining ships were
Navy-owned non-combatant ships not available for general
waterborne transport. This group of Navy ships was
comprised of mine-sweepers, tugs, and other miscellaneous
ship types which were not capable of carrying military
cargoes. One hundred thirty (13 0) of the general cargo
ships in the NDRF at that time were VICTORY Class ships
built by the government during World War II. These steel



































Figure III-l Total Sealift of Department of Defense Sponsored
Dry Cargo [Ref. 13:2-15]
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capable of sustained sea speeds of 15 and 17 knots. The
lift capacity of these ships is approximately 10,80
deadweight tons (DWT) and they are self-sustaining. The
remaining nine general cargo ships were relatively newer
SEATRAIN ships designed to carry locomotives and railroad
freight cars [Ref. 14:41],
B. GENERAL TRENDS IN WORLD BREAKBULK SHIPPING AND THE
DWINDLING U.S. FLAG ROLE
Trying to focus on breakbulk shipping trends over a
period of time is confused and confounded by the inconsis-
tent use of the term breakbulk to describe a type of cargo.
The terms general cargo and dry cargo are sometimes used in
analyses interchangeably with breakbulk and at other times
as larger categories encompassing breakbulk cargo as a
functional subcategory. For the purposes of this thesis,
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Most of the specialized and dry general cargo ships partici-
pate in the liner trade. Liners are ships that ply fixed
routes on published schedules. Most of the dry bulk
carriers, on the other hand, are either privately owned or
operated in the tramp (or for-hire) trade. The types of
cargo to be actually handled by a breakbulk ship in com-
mercial or military employ can be broken down into two main
categories. The fipst is general cargo consisting of
packaged, crated, bagged, or otherwise contained manufac-
tured and semi-processed goods. This "mark and count" cargo
is included under the category of general cargo moved
largely in liner service. Odd lot containerized and/or
unitized cargo (including MSCVANS and MILVANS) falls in this
category. The second type can be called miscellaneous dry
cargo and is defined as raw or processed commodities is the
primary type of cargo handled by general cargo ships not in
the liner service. This cargo is moved in quantities too
small to justify bulk movements and/or cannot be handled by
bulk transfer methods. This category includes cargo gen-
erally classed as neo-bulk (Ref. 15:21].
The post World War II period is a good place to start
looking at modern trends in breakbulk shipping. The years
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1945 through 1950 saw little total growth in oceanborne
foreign trade although, as discussed in the previous
section, the other industrial nations were expanding their
foreign commerce while the U.S. was slowing down. This
growth in foreign-to-foreign trade was facilitated by the
sale of approximately 20 00 ships of various types, including
680 Liberty ships, by the U.S. government to U.S. and
foreign shipping concerns. The Liberty ships were typical
breakbulk ships 427 feet in length. They had a draft of 28
feet, a speed of 11 knots and lifted 10,86 DWT. These
"tweendeckers" were suited to either liner or tramp trade
and could carry neo-bulk, as well as, more typical "mark and
count" general cargo [Ref. 16:86]. Countries whose merchant
fleets had been decimated by the war and newcomers into the
national flag business lured by the need for foreign
currency to support their fledgling economies were the
primary purchasers of these ships. The U.S. was carrying a
substantial portion of her waterborne foreign trade at this
time with much of the cargo generated by the liberal
economic aid provided by the Marshall Plan and growing
American fascination with foreign luxury goods.
This brings up the subject of what was being carried in
these numerous breakbulk ships that was so necessary for
U.S. commercial expansion. In looking at commercial cargoes
from the viewpoint of trends, an interesting statement by
the prominent economist Lester C. Thurow pointed out, "As
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late as the 196 0's, if international trade had been
abolished, the man on the street would barely have noticed
the difference. ...but by 1980, 25 percent of the economy
was involved in either exports (12.9 percent of the GNP) or
imports (12 percent of the GNP) , compared with 10 percent in
1960. The U.S. no longer exports to buy luxuries, we export
to buy necessities, including energy and strategic
minerals." [Ref. 17:13].
Major categories of import and/or export dry goods
include products of agriculture, forestry, fertilizer,
mining, iron and steel, and manufacturing. Through the
1950's all of this was handled as breakbulk cargo. However,
by the 1960's, the dry bulk carrier ton-miles were increas-
ing at a rapid rate. This shift was primarily due to the
penetration into the marke.t of the more productive bulk
carrier and related terminal handling equipment specifically
designed for certain cargoes. Competition for cargo came
from other transportation modes as well as foreign ocean-
borne sources. The 1950 's and 1960's also saw the develop-
ment of rail and motor competition for the landbridge trade.
Cutthroat price cutting on the part of these industries is
partial explanation for why, in an expanding internal
economy with an ever increasing demand for domestic trans-
portation, the coastwise (i.e., intracoast) and intercoastal
fleet had all but disappeared by the mid 1960's [Ref. 18:2].
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By the early 1970 's, over 80 percent of all bulkable
cargoes were being carried by the pure bulk carriers with
the biggest market in iron and coal [Ref . 15:16] . Most of
the bulk carriers operate in the non-liner trade, and it is
estimated that only 2 percent of U.S. bulk cargo is now
carried by U.S. flag ships. Figure III-2 displays which
flag registered ships recently carried the major portion of
U.S. oceanborne trade of all types. The significance of
these figures is directly related to the essentiality of
these imports. Of the over four billion tons of raw
materials currently required to sustain our peacetime
economy, the Department of Defense lists 71 commodities as
vital to our industrial security [Ref. 19:14]. Of the 68
that are imported, the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations has further identified 26 commodities considered
essential imports [Ref. 13:2-1]. Rather than address each
od these from a supply and demand perspective. Table III-III
is included to qualify the magnitude of need and indicate
potential accessibility problems based on source countries.
It is estimated that U.S. imports and exports (both dry and
liquid) will rise from 280 million metric tons to 464
million metric tons from 1980 through 2000 and Table III-IV
gives an idea of how some of these primarily bulk commodi-
ties may be affected [Ref. 13:2-2].
Because there is very little data on strictly breakbulk






Figure III-2. Vessels Serving U.S.
(By number of ships)
Economy: June
[Ref. 13:2-10]
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FORECAST OF U.S. SEABORNE TRADE IN MAJOR AND MINOR
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seaborne trade into an estimate of increases in breakbulk
shipping would, by necessity, be somewhat subjective. The
technological advances in merchant ship design and function,
and more specifically, the increase in the number of bulk
carriers and containerships, has resulted in the redirection
of the traditional cargoes of breakbulk ships. So, even as
projections show that the total ton-mile (TM) trade will
increase from 1.7 billion TM to 2.6 billion TM during the
1985-2000 period, it is practically impossible to equate
that growth to breakbulk operations other than to say break-
bulk cargoes will continue to expand but probably at a
slower pace than the total dry bulk market [Ref. 13:2-7],
The writer considers a 1 percent annual growth figure to be
probably reasonable.
The other portion of U.S. cargo relevant to this discus-
sion is military cargo. U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps bases are maintained outside the Continental
United States (CONUS) to protect U.S. interests worldwide.
These bases are predominantly supplied from the U.S. main-
land. Of the ten classes of supply and MILSTAMP water
commodity codes, almost all of the construction materials
(Class IV) and non-military consumables (Class X) were
determined suitable for carriage in breakbulk ships.
Significant portions of most of the other cargo classes
could also be transported in breakbulk ships [Ref. 13:2-13].
Considering just peacetime military cargo movements, DoD
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sponsored dry cargo originating in CONUS is expected to
consistently increase. Although the magnitude of tonnage
depends on the extent of worldwide military presence, the
tonnage required to maintain current levels of U.S. presence
abroad is approximately 5,3 million short tons of cargo
annually [Ref. 13:2-14],
Peacetime assets to move government cargo include the
U.S. flag fleet and the MSC controlled fleet. Appendix A
reflects summary data on all of the dry cargo moved by MSC
in the years FY 1975 and FY 1981. This summary data is
further broken down by the following specific types of
cargo: household goods (HHG) , reefer, bulk, privately owned
vehicles (POV's), ammunition, general (less HHG), radio-
active waste, trailers (cargo carrying), special, and
aircraft.
C. U.S. CONTROLLED AND WORLD DRY CARGO FLEETS AS A
PIOBILIZATION ASSET
The word "mobilization" brings different pictures to
people's minds depending on their perspective. The military
see it as the culmination of all their planning to success-
fully fight a war. The Department of Transportation, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) , MARAD, and other
national organizations see it as a marshalling of the entire
industrial base. The average U.S. citizen, too young to
remember World War II, probably thinks little beyond the
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institution of the draft. In reality, it is all of the
above and more. It is a process carefully planned to be
made more controllable with many degrees or steps from
surge, through partial mobilization, full mobilization and
total mobilization [Ref. 20:54],
In this section the term mobilization will be used to
refer to the military state of full mobilization where the
entire reserve force is activated and defense related
industries are "ratcheted up" to support it. When consider-
ing this environment, it rapidly becomes obvious how much
the United States is an island power. This country is,
quite simply, wholly dependent on ships both to perform and
to support major national security tasks. In anything less
than a full-scale nuclear war, we would need sufficient
numbers and suitable types of merchant ships to supply and
reinforce U.S. and allied combat forces overseas. What some
planners could easily forget is that, at the same time, the
U.S. would also need merchant ships to continue transporting
the vast quantities of essential raw materials needed for
the U.S. to fight a sustained war, not to mention the need
to move all manner of bulk commodities and finished goods to
help sustain allied countries. In other words, not only
would the military requirements for merchant shipping
increase sharply, but the "commercial" needs would also peak
at the same time.
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One of the most difficult problems to confront in con-
tingency planning is the fact that the mission hierarchy for
the merchant fleet in peacetime is completely reversed in a
wartime scenario. The resultant national defense mission
hierarchy for merchant shipping would be:
a. Military Auxiliary,
b. Defense resupply,
c. Security (support of the defense economy) , and
d. Commerce.
These missions can be further broken down into six major
roles during times of national emergency. These roles are:
strategic sealift. Mobile Logistic Support Force (MLSF)
augmentation, amphibious operations support. Logistics
Over-the-Shore (LOTS) , other military applications, and
support of the economy [Ref. 13:3-1].
To support these roles, the Navy and the Maritime
Administration must cooperate cloqely to ensure that com-
mercial merchant ships, built with government support, not
only perform their commerical purposes but are readily con-
vertable to defense purposes during times of national emer-
gency. National Defense Features (NDF) are specified so
that ship designs having potential use as naval or military
auxiliaries could function in the roles mentioned above.
Types of general cargo ships completely or partially suit-




a. Breakbulk, including dry bulk carriers with
breakbulk capability,






f • Combination (RO/RO, container, breakbulk) , and
g. Tug-Barge Combinations.
Ship types suitable for the renaining role of support for
the defense economy include dry bulk carriers with no
breakbulk capability, OBO carriers, and other miscellaneous
types [Ref. 21:Encl (1), 2].
To attempt to determine the suitability of dry cargo
ships for use in wartime, a ship type must be considered
from a functional perspective within the framework of the
following specific missions:
a. Port to port delivery of general conventional cargo.
b. Port to point delivery of general conventional cargo
to an area lacking an improved, operable port.
c. Port to port delivery of general conventional cargo
along with outsize cargo capability.
d. Port to point delivery of general conventional cargo
along with outsize cargo (for example LCU's and
Delong barges) with an offload capability in an area
lacking an improved, operable port (this also
provides the general requirements of supporting
amphibious and LOTS operations).
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e. Port to point delivery of containerized cargo, in an
area lacking an operable containerport (this also
meets the requirements of logistic re-supply for
amphibious operations).
f. Fleet re-supply or consolidation, whereby an
on-station Navy replenishment ship is re-supplied,
(Dry-cargo)
g. Provide a capability for unloading a non-self-
sustaining container ship.
h. Port to port opportune lifts of outsize military
cargo. [Ref . 21:Encl (1) ,3]
The types of National Defense Features that could be observ-
ed and/or manipulated to better assign a specific ship to
one or more of these missions would be related to speed,
shock resistance, generating plant capacity, feed/potable
water distillation and storage, propulsion systems, a
nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC) washdown capability,
military personnel facilities, communications, and cargo
gear/cargo operations.
Breakbulk ships, dry bulk ships with a breakbulk
capability, and heavy lift breakbulk ships in the "handy
size" category (10,000-38,000 DWT) have been found to be the
most useful and flexible from a national defense logistics
viewpoint. The breakbulk ships must have a self-sustaining
lift capacity of at least 70 long tons with an outreach of
25 feet over the side of the ship, a minimum od three holds
serviced with a minimum lift capacity of 20 long tons each,
and provide a 30 foot outreach to load lighters. The heavy
lift breakbulk ships must have, in addition, a minimum lift
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capability of 200 long tons with an outreach of 25 feet over
the side. These ships would be used for port to port
delivery, port to point delivery, port to port delivery of
outsize cargo, port to point delivery of outsize cargo, and
fleet resupply [Ref. 21:Encl (1), 7-8].
In a study of the world dry cargo contract fleet serving
U.S. seaborne commerce during the period July 1980 - July
1981, a total of 1891 vessels were observed and analyzed for
defense suitability. Of them, 62 percent were found suit-
able for an economic security role and 25 percent were
suitable for a defense resupply role [Ref. 13:5-14]. The
breakdown of this all important 25 percent by flag registry
is displayed in Figure III-3. Assuming this 25 percent of
the world's dry cargo contract fleet currently in U.S. trade
were, in fact, available for hire in a wartime scenario, a
fleet of approximately 480 ships of high military and
defense relevance could be assembled [Ref. 13:5-13].
How this relates to potential needs is best shown by
comparison. During the Korean War, an average of 40 dry
cargo ships were employed in the MSC controlled fleet to
sustain the deployment, representing 17 percent of the total
military suitable U.S. sealift assets. At the time, 2422
dry cargo ships were available from the NDRF, U.S. Merchant
Marine, and MSC nucleus fleet. In Vietnam during the peak
sealift year of 1968, the MSC controlled fleet averaged 420
ships or 35 percent of the total U.S. assets. If a
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Figure III-3. Composition of the World Dry Cargo Fleet
Serving U.S. Seaborne Commerce Suitable for a
Defense Resupply Mission (Period July 1980 -
June 1981) [Ref. 13:5-15]
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contingency occurred today, requiring a sealift capacity
comparable to the Korean War or Vietnam conflict, about 35
militarily suitable dry cargo ships would be needed and that
represents approximately 80 percent of today's U.S. control-
led dry cargo fleet [Ref . 22:26] . So, some analysts would
say that the U.S. is not in so bad a position after all
because in an emergency, we are still capable of providing
adequate sealift with existing U.S. resources.
If one were to settle into that somewhat complacent
attitude, one would be succumbing to a dangerous fallacy.
To help expose this fallacy, there are some questions that
should generate negative (or at least worried) responses.
If the military was directly utilizing 80 percent of the
U.S. controlled fleet, who is left to "mind the store?" The
U.S. economy would be completely dependent on foreign flag
ships for transporting everything from strategic raw
materials to sophistiaated manufactured goods. What happens
when shipping is sunk? Where is the reserve for the
Reserve? V7hat if major foreign flag countries choose to be
neutral and the Effective U.S. Controlled Fleet (EUSC)
becomes ineffective? How available are allied merchant
fleets for our emergency needs? Is the U.S. controlled
fleet in adequate operational condition (particularly the
NDRF) and could we really put together 350 functionally
balanced ships? If not, and foreign flag ships had to be
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chartered, is there enough slack in the world fleet to pick
up the additional U.S. cargo to keep our economy going?
Most of these fears were nicely summed up in 19 80 by a
quote by RADM Keener, then COMSC, when he said,
"The U.S. Navy, per se, does not have and will never have
organic sealift assets sufficient to meet the demands of
more than the very first phases of any emergency. The
cost in dollars and manpower for DoD to provide that
capability would simply be too great. We rely on the U.S.
Merchant Marine for emergency sealift services and sealift
assets, both in peacetime and wartime ... [but] the U.S.
flag merchant marine does not have in large quantities the
kind of ship that we in defense see the most need for.
Those are breakbulk and roll-on/roll-off, or self-
sustaining, 20-foot containerships. ... In the first six
months of this fiscal year [FY 79] ... the MSC spot-
chartered 47 ships and because there weren't enough U.S.
flag tankers, 22 of those were foreign." [Ref. 23:24-25]
If the U.S. had to mobilize in the near future, available
sealift resources (excluding operating U.S. Navy Auxil-
iaries) would come from, first, the MSC Controlled Fleet
inventory displayed in Figure II 1-4. The NDRF, including
the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) , and the privately owned U.S.
flag fleet are shown in Table III-V. The Effective U.S.
Controlled Fleet is displayed in Table III-VI. To better
equate these figures to the major merchant fleets of the
world (by flag registry) Table III-VII is included,
D. MODERN TRENDS IN DRY CARGO SHIP DESIGN AND CAPABILITIES
Breakbulk shipping in the form of small coastal carriers
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activity. The advent of tramp shipping with dry cargo
vessels operating on a worldwide basis first appeared on the
shipping scene about the middle of the 19th century. These
ships of approximately 20 00+ DWT carried commodities
required by the industrial nations. The general cargo ship
(a subcategory of dry cargo ships) must be evaluated by its
design that should provide adequate space to carry the cargo
and facilities for handling the cargo. The most typical of
these ships had two decks, hence the appellation "tween-
deckers." For many years, in this type of ship, the propel-
ling machinery was situated amidships with the cargo hold
forward and aft of the machinery space. Today, the tendency
is to position the machinery further aft so that there are
three or four holds forward of and one hold aft of the
machinery space. This enables the amidships portion of the
hull to be used for cargo, which is a definite improvement
since cargo stouage and handling are much more convenient.
There is, however, the problem of trim, but this can usually
be solved by having a midship deep tank, which can be avail-
able for cargo as well as water ballast [Ref. 16:65]. The
technology that permitted this substantial design change was
the switch from coal to oil fuel, reducing bunker capacity
needs and eliminating the necessity of storing coal fuel
immediately adjacent to the engine space.
Elements of cargo handling that have also greatly
improved over the years include self-supporting hatch covers
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and more versatile derrick and crane design. In general,
hatch ways should be as large as feasible in order to
minimize the amount of horizontal movement necessary to stow
the cargo. These openings must have portable coverings
which can be readily ranoved when the ship is in port, but
must be weathertight when the ship is at sea. Many designs
now exist that permit the opening of these large (commonly
20 feet by 60 feet) hatches at the push of a button
[Ref. 16:66], Derricks are fitted either to single or bipod
masts or special derrick posts and are operated by steam or
electric winches. Cargo ships generally have four derricks
for each hold with the capability of rigging two or more in
tandem for certain types of cargo maneuvers. Deck cranes
have the advantage of negligible rigging time and can
function within an entire working radius. Cranes are used
for rapid loading and discharging of cargo in the 3 ton to
15 ton range [Ref, 16:67],
Ships have continued to increase in size over time as
trade routes increased in length, thus improving produc-
tivity at sea and decreasing the cost per ton-mile.
However, these economies of scale at sea were being counter-
acted by diseconomies in port. Larger general cargo ships
with proportionately bigger cargoes increased costly port
time and caused bottlenecks in stevedoring operations,
storage and transshippments. In other words, the ports were
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not taking advantage of new technology as fast as the ship-
ping companies were. This lag, and the associated costs,
pushed shipping companies into even more elaborate tech-
nology swings to primarily reduce reliance on port opera-
tions whose management was now often accused of being
unresponsive.
In all fairness, shipping is an extremely dynamic
business that has fewer barriers to entry and exit than some
other forms of transportation. Although ships are very
expensive, the industry is not considered particularly
capital intensive because the ocean "highway" is free to the
user and the terminal infrastructure is provided by others
thus permitting the shipping companies flexible ship util-
ization to meet evolving marketing strategies. The port
management, on the other hand, has to look at their charter
from the perspective of managing a long term, probably
national, asset that serves many other social, political and
economic purposes than the obvious one of loading and
off-loading ships.
There were major ship design changes that resulted in
permanent shifts from reliance on predominantly breakbulk
shipping. The first was the development in the 1950 's of
specialized bulk carriers that could carry a variety of dry
cargoes, be purely either ore or crude oil, or be oil/bulk/
ore carriers. In order to provide rapid port turn arounds,
bulk carriers must transport their goods between ports which
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are equipped with specialized handling equipment. From the
mid 1950's and into the 1960's, this was the most rapidly
expanding segment of the seaborne shipping industry.
The late 196 0's and early 1970 's also saw the emergence
of unitized cargo carriers including containerships, RO/RO's,
pallet ships, and barge carriers including LASH and SEABEE
designs. Container ships are capable of carrying cargo in
prepackaged metal containers (20, 35 or 40 feet long by 8
feet high, by 8 feet wide) . They have the advantage of
being able to carry large volumes of cargo coupled with ease
of handling, thus drastically reducing material handling and
port turn around time. However, the cost of inland distri-
bution and large container marshalling yards still keep
total handling costs higher than expected.
RO/RO ships are, in general, designed for carriage of
automobiles, commercial motor vehicles (including trailers)
and other unitized cargo. The procedure for loading and
offloading vehicles is simply to drive them on or off the
ship. The cargo, in a sense, positions itself in cargo
spaces. In general, the idea of doors in the sides or ends
of a ship that open to form ramps was not adopted until
World War II made it essential to land goods on open
beaches. The types of transfer and access gear are
numerous, each designed to serve a specific purpose such as
a stern ramp, stern door, internal ramp, hoistable plat-
forms, bulkhead doors, and side ramps [Ref, 16:70]. Again,
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for cargo handling to be as easy as it sounds on RO/RO's,
there must be close coordination between ship and shore
facilities. This is particularly true with the disappear-
ance od the RO/RO carrying its own ramps. Ramps, because
they are by necessity bulky, take up a considerable portion
of otherwise useable cargo space. Therefore, newer RO/RO's
rely on port facilities to provide ramps suitable to their
quay and tidal conditions.
Pallet ships were developed to support routes where
cargo in containers was not sufficiently flexible. Cargo
handling methods are based on slings and pallets. Most
ships built for palletized cargo also handle other cargo.
For instance, a ship built for this purpose, the Manor a, is
built to transport cargo as follows:
a. Pallets shipped through side-ports and also by
crane; the pallets are then moved forward and aft
by truck in the upper 'tween decks.
b. General cargo carried in the holds.
c. Containers on the upper deck. [Ref. 16:74]
Another attempt to cut in-port turn around time and
thereby cut costs has led to the development of barge carry-
ing ships. The LASH ship uses a "lift-up and lift-over"
(LO/LO) technique with 500 ton gantry cranes to stow pre-
loaded lighters. The SEABEE ships, on the other hand, float
barges onto an elevator of approximately 20 00 ton capacity
and use a roller system for stowage. The primary advantage
of these carriers is that they are capable of loading and
101

Iunloading barges in rivers and estuaries away from docks and
quays. Thus, they reduce the time in port and avoid the
usual problems of port congestimn [Ref. 16:80], They also
have obvious military applications of over- the-shore dis-
charging of cargo in locations where no port facilities
exist.
Not only have ship configurations changed over the past
thirty years to meet new shipping demands, but less visible
technological advances have also made major impacts by
increasing ship productivity. Hull systems have been
improved to increase speed and facilitate seakeeping,
propulsion systems have become more fuel efficient, cargo
handling and containment has become more sophisticated,
navigation and communications* have made tremendous strides,
steering, maneuvering and mooring capabilities are much
improved, and automation and control systems have truly
revolutionized the merchant shipping industry.
102

IV. giqNI F ICANT LE;gI S i;.ATgP PQIh ICY CHANgE? ANg QPERATIQNA^,
TRENDS IMPACTING THE U.S. LINER TRADE
A. THE MERCHANT MARINE ACT OF 1970: 1970 to 19 81
As discussed in an historical context in Chapter II If
the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 was an attempt to update the
Act of 193 6. The international maritime industry as well as
the U.S. flag segment had undergone many changes since 1936
and while amendments had been made to the original Act, a
major rewrite was in order. What was the goal of this new
piece of legislation? First and foremost, it restated the
need for a strong merchant marine and a viable shipbuilding
industry. At the same time it recognized that the dominant
world trade had shifted from liner service to trade in bulk
commodities more prevalently transported in tramps or pri-
vately owned ships. Other ship operational considerations
were the technology supported shifts to bigger ships,
shorter turnaround times, and decreasing manpower require-
ments associated with the new ships. On the shipbuilding
side, the Act reflected the thinking that U.S. yards could
become more efficient, and even competitive on a world
market basis, if presented with the right set of conditions
[Ref . 26:93] .
In support of these objectives, the Act legislated the




a. It mandated the construction of 30 vessels during
the period 1971-1980 to promote economies of scale
due to standardization and a stabilized work force.
b. It increased the Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance
funds from $1 billion to $3 billion to provide
capital for ship construction.
c. It permitted shipbuilders to apply for and receive
CDS funds directly thus breaking the inappropriate
tie between CDS and ODS.
d. It replaced the Capital Reserve Fund with the
Capital Construction Fund (CCF) for use by all
eligible vessels in all trades.
e. It authorized the purchase of foreign components
for shipbuilding where insistance on U.S. components
would result in an unreasonable delay in completion
of the ship.
f. It created the Commission of American Shipbuilding
to act as an industry investigator and recommender
of improvements [Ref. 26:93-94].
From an operations perspective, the following changes
were initiated by the Act of 1970:
a. The CCF with its attendant tax advantages was made
available to the non-liner bulk cargo trades to
better permit competition with foreign-flag counter-
parts and encourage the return of "Flags of
Convenience" to the U.S. fold.
b. "Subsistence" was eliminated as an item in the ODS
to encourage greater efficiency.
c. The "recapture clause" was eliminated in an attempt
to encourage improved efficiency (i.e., if a ship-
ping company made more profits than were allowed,
they had to remit the excess profits thus encourag-
ing them to spend to the limit) .
d. Payment of ODS funds were prohibited for seamen not
necessary for the efficient manning of the vessel
and tied the subsidizable wage cost of those men
employed to a national wage index thus forcing both
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the government and management to be more cost
conscious and ultimately more competetive in the
world market. [Ref. 26:95-96]
After reviewing the intent of the Merchant Marine Act of
1970, it is appropriate to look at its actual effect on the
U.S. merchant marine from 1970 to 19 81. This information is
best displayed in tables. The actual number of U.S. flag
ships built in this period is contained in Table IV-I. A
snapshot view of 1978 reveals more specific data in Table
IV-II. This can be compared to Table IV-III showing a total
of 1134 dry cargo ships (1382 total merchant ships less 248
non-dry cargo ships) built for the world market in 1978.
This represented an average shipbuilding year [Ref, 27:9].
Actual CDS and ODS paid in a similar period is shown in
Table IV- IV. Changes in U.S. oceanborne foreign trade dry
cargo carried including the U.S. flag market share is
displayed in Table IV-V. The U.S. ocean going merchant
marine existing at the end of the represented period is
shown in Table IV-VI.
The tables represent a good overview of what did happen
to the U.S. flag merchant fleet over that twelve year
period, but it is difficult to identify what if anything is
attributable to the Act of 1970. Looking again at
Table IV-I, there is no question that there appears to be a
shipbuilding spree by peacetime standards. As it takes time
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El Paso Southern Tanker
Wilmington Trust Co.











Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co
(Shipmor Associates)
General Electric Credit Corp.
(Shell Oil Co.
)
Patriot I Shipping Corp.
SOHIO Subsidiary




















* Bareboat charterer is shown in parentheses if owner is
a bank.
























(Compiled from Reference 27, Appendices HID, HIE, IIIF,
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and 1975 included ship deliveries that were directly related
to the new emphasis on bulk trades. The objective of cost
reduction also appeared effective as the CDS rate has con-
sistently decreased which permits the building of more ships
with the same or less outlay of funds [Ref . 26:97] . In
fact, with the "buy foreign" legislation passed in 1981, no
CDS funds were requested for Fy82, FY83 , and FY84. Pressure
by shipbuilding interests has kept this legislation from
being implemented and, consequently some CDS funds were
reinstated into the FY82 and FY83 national budgets.
However, the last ship to be built with CDS funds probably
was the tanker Falcon Champion built to be chartered by MSC
and launched 10 September 1983. As a result of changes in
the ODS, there was more emphasis on reducing operational
costs also. This was the era of taking advantage of tech-
nology to increase speeds, reduce turn around time, build
bigger capacity ships, and innovate to reduce crew size.
It should be noted that this encouragement to become
more competitive on the world markets has led directly to
the unsuitability of most of these newer ships for military
purposes. For instance, although breakbulk shipping was
alive and well in world trade as evidenced by the makeup of
the ships delivered worldwide in 1978, not a single
breakbulk ship has been built in the U.S. during the period
under review. Although bulk shipbuilding was encouraged by
the Act of 1970, the U.S. continued to lose market share in
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this basically non-liner trade (see Table IV-V) . The U.S.
never came close to its goal of 300 subsidized ships and, in
fact, only 68 were attributed to the 1970 Act. This was
primarily because the funds for this 30 ship mandate were
tied to annual appropriations. Congress has a notoriously
short memory when it comes to promises of funds in the out
years.
Another approach at reviewing the long term effect of
the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 is to look at follow-on
legislation; in particular, the Omnibus Maritime Bill, HR.
4769, initially submitted in 1979. A "White Paper" on the
bill released by Representative John M. Murphy, the then-
Chairman of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee, investigated the total spectrum of U.S. maritime
capabilities, particularly as they related to national
security requironents, and concluded: "The American-flag
merchant fleet is virtually incapable of meeting projected
wartime demands. Moreover r present fleet resources would be
severely taxed by a peacetime movement across secure sea
lanes in a non-NATO contingency" [Ref. 23]. If this sounds
familiar, it is because similar statements were made to
support the Merchant Marine Act of 1970.
The Omnibus Maritime Bill is currently back in committee
and there are signs it will never be passed in its entirety,
mainly because it is considered too broad in" scope and,
hence, a concensus is just too difficult to obtain. Special
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Iinterest groups, individuals, and lobbies who are proponents
of one section are usually indifferent or hostile to other
sections of the bill.
Another reason the bill in its entirety has little
chance of passage relates to a recent Comptroller General
report that examined the allegations that regulation under
the Shipping Act of 1916 led to a decline of the U.S. flag
liner fleet, led to inefficient service, and damaged foreign
relations. The conclusions of the report stated:
"While valid reasons exist for modifying the Act, GAO does
not believe the current condition of the general cargo
liner segment of the U.S. Merchant Marine is among them.
Certain provisions of the Act have fostered inefficiencies
and high costs in the ocean liner shipping industry and
strained foreign relations, but the U.S. flag liner fleet
has performed adequately and does not appear to be in the
state of decline generally ascribed to it" [Ref. 30:i].
However, three primary thrusts of this bill for maritime
reform have basically been broken out and submitted inde-
pendently. On the regulatory side, the reaffirmation of the
anti-trust immunity in liner conferences has passed the
Senate as S47 and is currently expected to pass in the House
as HR 187 8. A whole potpourri of reforms such as modifying
subsidies, redesigning cargo preference, and instituting
indirect incentives have all been resubmitted in various
forms with differing degrees of acceptance. The initially





All in all, it would be difficult to call the Merchant
Marine Act of 1970 a success. At best, one might concede
that without it, things could be worse.
B. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD) CODE
OF CONDUCT FOR LINER CONFERENCES
The subject Code, which went into effect in October 1983
after ratification by our principal European allies,
has been under heated discussion since its formula-
tion in 1974. The United States has remained the major
maritime power holdout primarily because two of the core
provisions in the code sanctioning cargo sharing and closed
conferences are contrary to our laws and/or traditional
policy on such matters. Consequently, the Code has always
been fundamentally unacceptable to the United States. Other
fears concerning the application and implementation were
summed up in the following statement by the Honorable
Samuel B. Nemirow, Assistant Secretary for Maritime Affairs,
Department of Commerce during 1981 Congressional hearings:
"Our mutual problem in this regard is compounded because
the code, as drafted, is open to multiple interpretations.
Additionally, many countries have ratified or acceded to
the code with a variety of reservations. Perhaps the most
notable are the reservations, commonly known as the
'Brussels Package,' to be lodged by the member states of
the European Community. Another example would be the
reservations of the U.S.S.R. and other East Bloc countries
which would exclude from the code's coverage the operation
of joint shipping lines established on the basis of
bilateral agreenents to serve the trade between the
countries concerned. This exclusion is significant
because much of the Soviet Union's trade with developing
countries is carried by such joint shipping ventures.
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These two reservations, when taken together with others
which I will not detail this morning, will make the
application of the code a very complex and difficult
affair. Each announced derogation from the code as
written spawns further problems of implementation. Only
after a period of trial and error will the full
implications of the code's provisions reveal themselves.
They cannot be forecast with precision." [Ref. 32:200]
The Code was conceived as a result of a series of
research studies done in the 1960 's that concluded that
countries with chronic shortages of foreign exchange may
consider investing in merchant shipping as a means of
improving their balance-of-payments position [Ref. 33:241].
Couple this approach with a new sense of economic national-
ism also sweeping through the developing countries and the
root causes for the dissatisfaction with liner conferences
by the developing countries are apparent. They felt their
specific needs were being ignored and a rate system was
being maintained which they believed to be discriminatory
with respect to their exports. The developing countries,
particularly in Africa, were and continue to be primarily
exporters of low value bulk raw materials and importers of
higher value finished goods and processed agricultural
products. The Code therefore is aimed at this sense of
injustice.
The part of the Code which initially received the
greatest amount of attention was the cargo-sharing scheme,
in which it is stated that nations which generate cargo are
entitled to participation in the ocean transport of goods in
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proportion to their contribution to world trade. Specific-
ally, 40 percent of the trade is alloted to each of the two
trading nations, leaving 20 percent for cross-traders
[Ref . 31:242] . Note that the developing countries are not
against discriminatory practices, they just want the
discrimination to benefit them equally.
Every year since the UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner
Conferences was submitted for ratification, an international
conference has been held to work out differences and promote
the ratification. At the UNCTAD V Conference in May 1979,
it was noted that 40 countries representing 17 percent of
the world liner tonnage were already contracting parties to
the Code. A 25 percent minimum was required and it was
expected that shortly three or four European Economic
Community (EEC) members would join and thereby enter the
Code into force. At that time, in response to the question
of what would be the impact of the Code on liner conferences
and shipper's organizations, the following response was
made
:
"In a strictly legal sense the U.N. Code will become the
framework within which liner conferences and shippers'
organizations would operate at least in the trades between
contracting parties to the Code. In practical terms,
however, European-based conferences would be well advised
to act generally in conformity with the guidelines of the
U.N. Code (plus EEC regulation where applicable) , even if
the range covered by these conferences includes a number
of countries which are not yet a contracting party to the
Code. ...The fact that one or the other Code provision
does not entirely tally with the well-known provisions of
the CENSA/ESC Code and its related recommendations cannot
be denied. This should, however, not present major
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difficulties as the UN Code is flexible. The terminus
'unless mutually agreed otherwise' appears in most of the
relevant provisions of the Code." [Ref . 34:27 3]
With this somewhat innocuous statement, it is interest-
ing to return to the U.S. reaction to the Code. A study
commissioned by the Department of Transportation to look at
the potential impact on nonmarket cargo allocation in the
U.S. foreign trade, including an analysis of the possible
effects of the UNCTAD Liner Code concluded it would have
serious implications for U.S. ocean shipping policy, for the
U.S. flag liner industry, for U.S, foreign traders and U.S.
consumers, and for overall U.S. foreign policy
[Ref. 35:131]. This uncompromising approach prevailed
through 1979.
Only when it became obvious that ratification of the
Code was imminent did the U.S, contract for another major
study designed basically to look at the issues raised by a
world in which the Code was in effect and the impact of the
Code on U.S. carriers operating outside the Code; specif-
ically, the impact on our export- import commerce, the impact
on our ability to have a strong and healthy merchant marine,
and the impact on U.S. shippers [Ref. 32:202], The defen-
sive posture of the U.S. is appropriately described in the
following section of the 1981 hearings quoted previously:
"Mr. SUNIA. I am curious to know if anybody is enthusi-
astic about the code at all. It seems to me that we are




I wonder if there is a group somewhere who is supporting
the code.
Mr. NEMIRCW. I can give you a list of countries who are
not only enthusiastic, but actively pursuing the code for
their own national purposes. Most developing countries
are enthusiastic supporters of the Code.
We do a great deal of business in developing countries.
A great deal of our shipping assets are devoted to
carrying cargoes between the United States and developing
countries. We are in that environment, an international
environment as a buyer/seller on each end. While we may
not be enthusiastic, our objective here is to define the
best environment that we can for U.S. carriers to compete
in a world where your trading partners have accepted the
Code.
Mr. SUNIA. Thank you.
Mr. BIAGGI. I think the gentleman makes an excellent
point.
The fact of the matter is that the world has been
moving, and the United States has just been looking at it.
That is, I think a rather moderate statement of the facts,
and that is one of the reasons why we are having these
hearings.
I am just concerned that in the end, we may be enveloped
by this, and have no opportunity to have any input. We
ma^ be saddled with something that we could have been in a
position to alter, at least accommodate some of our
concerns. It is a perfect illustration of the effect of
an isolated attitude. And I am not so sure that the
policy in the past has been a beneficial one."
In April 1983, with the signing by the Federal Republic
of Germany and the Netherlands, the requisite quorum was
reached. As the Code was written to go into effect six
months after ratification, 6 October 19 83 was the effective
date of implementation. In preparation, the U.S. has been
negotiating bilateral agreements with several developing
countries. Group discussions have also been ongoing between
the U.S. and the EEC and Japan in an attempt to present a
unified front of developed countries to the developing
countries. Japan is a bit of a problem because, although
119

Ithey have publically said they would sign, there are
indications that it will sign with reservations [Ref . 36]
.
The EEC also signed with a set of reservations sanetimes
referred to as the "Brussels Package" mentioned earlier.
These "subsets" of the Code confuse an already complex
document.
Where the world goes from here is going to be very
interesting to watch. For the Code to work, major
legislative efforts must still be made "at home" to make
existing maritime policies of the signers of the Code
consistent with the Code. This may take some time and
confusion will certainly reign for the next year or two.
Additionally, to support the 40-40-20 rule, there will have
to be a reshuffling of world fleets because the shipping
market is currently too depressed to justify a large scale
building program. What types of ships the developing
countries will acquire will be interesting to observe, as
well as what segment of the market they will focus on. Now
that many of them have modern containerports, the trend
could be toward more containerization or they could stay
with the more flexible multipurpose cargo ships. Another
issue relates to how much of the liner tonnage displaced
from UNCTAD Code regulated trades will get "dumped" on the
wide-open U,S, trades. Fears remain that the important
cross-trading opportunities for U,S. flag carriers will be
curtailed. Close monitoring and appropriate U.S.
120

competetive moves will hopefully alleviate any hardships due
to the Code.
C. INTERMODAL TRANSPORTATION: THE CHANGING DOMESTIC SCENE
1 . Background
Up to this point, the emphasis of this thesis has
been international oceanborne trade. But one cannot forget
that oceanborne cargo originates in every one of the 48
contiguous states and has a considerable transportation
history before ever arriving at the pier. In an attempt to
give a broader perspective, the following section will
discuss the growth of domestic intermodal transportation and
its potential impacts on oceanborne transportation.
Intermodal transportation, specifically trailer on
f latear (TOFC) and container on f la tear (COFC) , which
transformed the shipping of goods from a labor intensive to
a capital intensive activity, initially met with consider-
able resistance from both carriers and shippers. When the
trucking and the railroad industries first got together to
develop the TOFC or "piggyback" service, the railroads
shipped trailers full one way, but completely ignored the
backhaul. As a result, they lost money and became hostile
to piggyback service. Since then railroad management has
learned to balance its freight movements and is finding that
both TOFC and COFC can be very profitable.
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COFC service developed in a somewhat different
fashion than TOFC. Containerization got its start in
international trade over twenty years ago. It was intro-
duced as a means of reducing handling costs, damage levels,
and pilferage. Now it dominates the ocean transport market,
enjoying worldwide acceptance. As the use of containeriza-
tion rapidly took over inport/export markets. United States
shippers had to follow suit to remain competitive in world
markets. U.S. shippers entered this market quickly and
profitably first with their industrialized trading partners
and later with their developing country partners.
As a result of this rapid expansion, and although
piggyback trailers command the larger portion of the
domestic intermodal market today, container transportation
is attracting considerable interest within the domestic
market. COFC supporters assert that "containers are just as
- and in some cases more - efficient than trailers for
intermodal freight" [Ref . 37:53] . Detractors cite the need
for increased handling and more sophisticated equipment as
major drawbacks to container use. How legitimate are these
arguments? Some of the proven advantages of containerized
freight include:
a. reduced loss and pilferage,
b. reduced transit damage,
c. improved transit time.
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Id, more effective material tracking capabilities, and
e, container capacity to serve a temporary storage unit.
In addition, from a railroad perspective, a container pres-
ents a more aerodynamic unit than a trailer. It lacks the
open space occupied by trailer wheels, which creates wind
resistance. It also offers lower overhead to facilitate
tunnel and elevated highway clearance [Ref. 37:53].
Some of the extra expenses associated with con-
tainers and not trailers are the more sophisticated terminal
equipment for container handling and the costs of supplying
"bogies" o'r chassis for hauling the container from the
terminal or a rail connection into the hinterland.
Container proponents emphasize that shippers pay for
the trailer undercarriage weight in their freight charges.
Shippers argue that the weight penalty for trailer road
equipment is less than 40 00 pounds which is a relatively
small amount when considered in relation to the total load.
Therefore, the cost associated with carrying this weight is
in itself insufficient to persuade shippers to switch.
If there was only internal domestic service to
consider, resistance to change would probably keep piggyback
service the dominant intermodal form of transportation.
Again, however, the international market for U.S. goods
cannot be ignored.
The use of major ports as "load centers" impacts on
both TOFC and COFC transportation within the United States.
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The load center theory is based on the premise that because
of the high fuel costs, it is cheaper for freight to travel
from several locations to the ship than for the ship to make
multiple pickup stops. The ocean carriers contract with
feeder ships and overland transportation companies to carry
cargo to a loading point. This trend signifies a potent-
ially large area of growth for domestic containerization.
To take advantage of this concept, at least one
major railroad, the Santa Fe, is actively seeking to develop
its domestic container business. The railroad is gambling
that containers will ultimately replace trailers for a large
percentage of domestic service "for the same reason the
boxcar is being replaced - cost" [Ref . 37:53] . In response
to the oft-cited criticism that containers are more expen-
sive and difficult to handle than conventional trailers, the
Santa Fe's vice-president-traffic stated, "We have no
problem loading containers at our terminals, primarily
because we have been gearing up to handle this business for
some time. Our management is committed to intermodalism and
containerization and is spending money to back that up"
[Ref. 37:53] . That is a very important point. Because of
the considerable up-front costs, investment in container-
ization is a major, long-term decision on the part of a
carrier as well as a shipper. The Santa Fe has reduced its
risk somewhat by focusing on the interface with ocean
carriers. Almost every major port in the U.S. is currently
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configured to handle containerized freight. Therefore, the
investment in terminal equipment at the port ends had
already been made and Santa Fe had only to develop a few of
its inland terminals to provide a complete system with
containerized service.
The railroad industry as a whole understands that
intermodalism' s future depends on improved service. Inno-
vative ideas that are proving successful include dedicated
TOFC/COFC trains that simplify handling, shorten terminal
time, and reduce transit times. The development of distri-
bution centers in major metropolitan areas where freight can
be shipped via motor carrier to a hub center for transfer to
railr allows the shipper to take advantage of competitive
piggyback rates while obtaining transit times comparable to
those of motor carriers. New rail car designs that decrease
weight, reduce clearance, lower center of gravity, expand to
carry either 40 foot containers or 45 foot trailers, upgrade
load stability, and enhance in-transit security are just a
few of the recent technological advances supporting both
TOFC and COFC. Railroads are only beginning to fine tune
their operations to maximize the efficiencies inherent in
intermodalism. Effective marketing, modern management
techniques, liberalized regulation, and updated workrules
have the potential to help the railroads regain old markets
and establish new ones.
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2. MaJQC Lggj-glatjon Inpactjng Iptggmodaligm
During the last five years, American transportation
carriers have been thrust into a deregulatory environment
after decades of government regulation. Both the truck and
rail industries no longer have the controlled stability of
regulated industries. Instead, they now have market entry
and rate making freedoms and can compete with one another on
an individual rather than a collective carrier basis.
The Motor Carrier Act of 19 80, signed into law on
1 July 1980, was viewed by the trucking industry as com-
promise legislation that adopted, with modifications, many
regulatory reforms. As was expected, there continues to be
a period of federal reorganization, and rationalization, in /
interpreting and carrying out the 1980 law. Economic
regulation has been moving in the direction of allowing the
industry time to react to the new regulatory environment
established by Congress.
The National Transportation Policy provision in the
Act specifically states as one of the objectives the promo-
tion of intermodal transportation. The most apparent
impacts of the Act relate to the influx of new carriers,
increased rate activity, and expansion of both private and
contract carriers into the market. Of particular interest
was the addition of Section 34 to the 1980 Act. It states
that a "motor common carrier or contract carrier of property
may deliver to or receive from a rail carrier a trailer
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moving in TOFC service at any point on the route of the rail
carrier if the motor carrier is authorized to serve the
origin and destination points of the traffic" [Ref. 38:24],
This provision was intended to promote intermodal cooper-
ation by permitting greater accessibility by motor carriers
to centralized intermodal transfer terminals.
An important weakness of the Act of 19 80 is its
failure to give to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
the authority to require through routes and joint rates
between trucking companies and railroads. It does, however,
provide such authority for motor trucking/domestic water
carrier service. Unfortunately, this interface is unlikely
to occur very often. Another failure in the Act is its lack
of provisions dealing with the intermodal consequences of
the legislation, particularly its impact on oceanborne
shipping.
The full extent of the consequences of the Motor
Carrier Act of 1980 have yet to be seen. The success or
failure of the Act will be largely determined by the ICC by
how it interprets the various provisions. The Act may
encourage railroads to cooperate with trucking companies but
the degree of cooperation will be totally dependent on
whether or not some rate or other advantage accrues to the
railroad.
The Staggers Rail Act of 19 80 has been described as
"perhaps the most important railroad legislation since 187 7
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..•when, with the original Interstate Commerce Act, (we)
began the halting, fumbling, and uncertain process of
putting regulatory chains on railroads" [Ref. 39:47],
Through a series of laws enacted over many years, the ICC
assumed greater and greater regulatory responsibility over
the railroad's fortunes, including such facets of operations
as rates, service, entry and exit, and mergers and consoli-
dations. The Railroad Revitalization and Reform Act of 197 6
represented the first significant shift in approach. For
the first time Congress concluded that the improvement of
the railroads' fortunes appeared to depend on less regula-
tion- rather than more. By 1979, deregulation was a popular
political platform. The Staggers Rail Act of 19 80 was
designed to create a far more limited regulatory scheme that
would reflect the railroads' current competitive and
financial status, and provide incentives for the railroads
to cut costs, improve service and productivity and to price
services more competitively. From a railroad perspective,
"the railroads are getting back the freedom to set - within
limits - their own rates, determine their own service
standards, and try new ideas for getting business"
[Ref. 39:681. The Act did open a whole new aspect of
pricing options, including contracts and volume rates that
appealed to shippers and that made railroads more




On 23 March 1981, the ICC decontrolled all truck and
rail services provided by the railroads in connection with
TOFC/COFC movements. This action was intended to give
railroads more marketing flexibility. This deregulation
gave the railroads the opportunity to counteract the large
efficiency advantage gained by motor carriers following
their deregulation the previous year. For the first time,
railroads were able to enter the retail delivery service,
providing door-to-door service [Ref. 37:40].
Making a move from a regulated to a deregulated
state provided a focus for opposition from organizations
that felt regulation meant stability and reasonable
competition which in turn provided the shipping public with
good service at a reasonable cost.
The growing pains of deregulation caused numerous
fears to surface. Port authorities, especially those of
West Coast and Gulf Coast ports that relied heavily on land-
bridge services for their revenues, feared that railroad
service would decrease in quality and dependability or
increase substantially in price. If that in fact happened
over time, it was believed "that ocean carriers, not wanting
to pay higher rail rates, [would] decide to eliminate the
overland leg and carry the entire movement themselves"
[Ref. 37;42] . The result being that one or more U.S. ports
would be bypassed. The motor carriers claimed the railroads
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now had the advantage while the railroads jealously com-
plained about any supposed inroads by the trucking firms.
Amongst all the bickering, piggyback traffic volume
continues to increase. Even during the current recession,
TOFC services have held their own. One of the reasons for
this apparent stability remains the high cost of fuel.
Given the current high cost of transportation in general and
fuel in particular, piggyback trailers on rail cars continue
to represent an efficient form of moving goods in quantity
over medium to long distances [Ref. 37:47]. As time passes,
however, motor carriers are becoming more fuel efficient,
and with the price of fuel stabilizing, at least for the
moment, the rail industry will have to become more sophis-
ticated with respect to marketing and equipment technology
to substantially increase both its TOFC and COFC business.
3. The "Landbridae" Concept in Movement of Foreign
The previous section primarily discussed issues
related to the rail/truck interface. However, perhaps the
most critical link in the intermodal system is the rail/
maritime interface. This link is important because, for the
United States to compete in the international market, there
has developed relatively inexpensive and timely ways to
transport international freight entering any U.S. port to
the opposite coast for transshipment elsewhere (Landbridge)
.
There also exists a need for goods coming from overseas
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I(imports) to efficiently get to the U.S. consumer in the
U.S. hinterland and for goods being shipped to overseas
destinations (exports) to efficiently get to the inter-
national consumers (Microbridge) . Minibridges also link Far
East ports with the Atlantic Coast by carrying cargo from
Asia to the Pacific Coast via ocean carriers, and from the
Pacific to the Atlantic by rail. These minibridges are all
conducted under joint through- service tariffs with a single
bill of lading and a single rate. The through rates are
usually roughly equal to, or below, the rate for all-water
carriage between the Atlantic Coast ports and the Far East.
While there has been a lot of legal fighting concerning
minibridges, the courts decided "Minibridges greatly expand
the alternative forms of transportation open to the
shippers' choice" [Ref. 40:20].
The importance of containerized transportation is
highlighted by the following quote by the manager of market-
ing services for the Port of New York and New Jersey. He
said, "There is no way to stop world intermodalism. It's
just a matter of time before every port and steam ship line
is containerized" [Ref. 37:58]. In other words, he felt all
non-bulk oceanborne freight would be containerized freight,
a large portion of which would originate, end up, or pass
through the United States. This may be a bit exagerated.
If Table IV-VII represents a valid projection of the world
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appear breakbulk shipping will continue to have a market.
Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to assume that
approximately 85 percent of the dry general cargo will be
containerized.
To provide for this movement requires an adequate
rail infrastructure suitable for carrying containerized
freight, strategically located intermodal terminals and a
solution to the problem of repositioning empty containers.
Unfortunately, the development of inland container transfer
facilities lags considerably behind water carrier progress.
To try and cut costs, most existing inland intermodal
facilities were created out of junked or underutilized rail
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Iyards. These facilities continue to function on a make-do
basis with inadequate paving and poor layouts.
While decisions are being made concerning invest-
ments in modern interraodal transfer facilities , railroads
are getting more sophisticated in managing empty containers.
These containers are routed to either "neutral pools" where
they await movement to a consignee for reloading or to the
closest port, not necessarily its original offloading point,
to minimize imbalances of traffic. The trick is to optimize
container returns by keeping utilization high. This is an
area where cooperation between shippers, railroads, and the
ocean shipping companies can have tremendous payoffs by
reducing container handling and ownership costs.
Given the continuing increases of import/export
container volume, plus the containers' potential for reduc-
ing energy requir^ients on inland haulage versus TOFC or over-
the-road movement, economics dictate the growth of contain-
erization for domestic as well as overseas shipping. The
necessity of moving international containerized freight will
spur capital investment in container handling and carrying
equipment. As the infrastructure expands from the coasts
inland, there is little doubt that containerization will
become cost effective for almost every shipper in the
hinterland thus reducing the amount of breakbulk cargo at
its source, the manufacturing plant or distribution center.
A good example of how this expansion of containerization at
13 3

the distribution point has impacted breakbulk cargo is the
canned goods industry that used to support the domestic
breakbulk trade by providing flooring-off cargo to improve
utilization. Almost all of those goods are now container-
ized at the point of origin and shipped by land or micro-
bridged to overseas destinations.
From a DoD perspective, it is an established policy
that DoD cargo will be containerized for transportation
whenever possible because movement of cargo in containers is
cost-effective in peacetime [Ref* 42:117], Relying on con-
tainers for cargo movement in a war or contingency, however,
introduces an element of risk which must be either removed
or reduced to a manageable proportion. The next section
will discuss this issue at length.
D, MILITARY MOBILIZATION THINKING
!• Shift in Wartime Scenarios
Until recently, military planners concentrated
almost exclusively on being prepared for a one-and-a-half
war scenario which consisted of a NATO war in Western Europe
and a lesser war elsewhere in the world. That entailed a
focus on turning back a massive Warsaw Pact surge in a few
weeks. In other words, 90-120 days was the mobilization
planning horizon. Consequently, for the past ten years or
so, U.S. strategic planners have been oriented toward
building up combat power within the first sixty days of the
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war. As a result airlift, not sealift, received most of the
attention. Troops would be airlifted to the combat zone
with massive amounts of pre-positioned materials waiting for
them in Europe. The need for U.S. sealift was further
disguised because NATO allies had earmarked some 60 cargo
vessels specifically for NATO reinforcement. The U.S.
planned on at least 400 of those ships to assist in
reinforcing U.S. troops [Ref. 43:4]. These two facts,
together with the underlying assumption that any NATO
conflict would be over quickly, have obscured the need for
adaquate sealift resources to meet contingencies elsewhere
in the world.
The role of mobilization exercises as highlighters
of readiness problems cannot be underestimated. In 197 6,
the Army conducted the first large scale mobilization
exercise in decades, named "MOBEX 76." The exercise called
attention to numerous deficiencies and caused the Defense
Department to sponsor a follow-on exercise in 1978, "Nifty
Nugget." Soon the news media were reporting on the
dangerously low state of our national preparedness. In
1979, the federal emergency planning function was withdrawn
from the depths of GSA and a new Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) was formed. In November 1980, an
expanded mobilization exercise was held called "Proud
Spirit." Whereas "MOBEX 76" had been Army only, and "Nifty
Nugget" had been defense wide, "Proud Spirit" also included
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the civil side of the government, led by the new FEMA
[Ref • 20:56] . MSC participation in both live and command
post exercises has increased as a direct result of the
increased emphasis on mobilization readiness within DoD and
the new awareness of the importance of sealift.
Looking at the demands for force deployment and
sustainability over the next decade r it has become clear
that the U.S. cannot focus on any particular area of the
world and say that it is the only area needing Navy, Marine,
Army and Air Force forces. The forces we need must be flex-
ible enough to meet projected needs in NATO, the Western
Pacific, Middle East, Southwest Asia and wherever else the
challenge originates [Ref. 22:25]. The Iranian crisis in
1980-1981 underscored the point that there are strategic
areas outside Western Europe with the Indian Ocean in the
forefront, but with at least a half a dozen other spots in
the world vital to U.S. interests as well. Therefore, U.S.
defense planners are now preparing our forces to fight
multiple conflicts simultaneously in widely scattered parts
of the world [Ref. 19:13]. Consequently, the U.S. commit-
ment to the world's sea lanes has expanded considerably.
While it is gratifying to see positive signs in mobilization
plans and media coverage of this new military committment to
not only a stronger navy but also to a stronger merchant
marine, it can only be reiterated that it will take more
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than verbal commit tinent to rectify the following weaknesses
and make strategic planning viable:
a. a U.S. liner fleet with average age of 17 years;
b. a fleet that carries only 3.6 percent of U.S.
foreign trade (and decreasing);
c. only nine remaining U.S. flag liner companies;
d. severe lack of militarily useful ship designs for
fuel as well as dry cargo; and
e. questionable availability of allied or other ship-
ping to meet our defense needs.
2. RQlr of Po;:tg in P^Qbiliz^tiQn
No discussion of military ocean cargo can be
sensibly divorced from an overview of port availability and
functional capabilities at the CONUS ports of embarkation
(POE)
.
In March 1977, the Military Traffic Management
Command requested that the Assistant Secretary of Defense
approve the establishment of a Ports for National Defense
(PND) program. The PND program would be used to examine
defense interests concerning commercial ocean ports within
CONUS and plan for DoD use of available cargo outloading
ports during emergencies. In addition, MTMC would review
the capabilities of military-owned, common-user, general-
cargo and ammunition ports and would support improvements as
required. The PND program was approved and is currently
managed for the Secretary of Defense, by MTMC, in cooper-,
ation with the Maritime Administration, U.S. Coast Guard,
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Military Sealift Command, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
[Ref . 44:10]
.
One of the major purposes of the PND program is to
ensure that the CONUS ocean ports can support DoD transpor-
tation requirements by the predesignation of commercial port
facilities for resupply operations during national
emergencies,
MTMC uses military common-user and commercial port
facilities for outloading DoD cargo. Peak outloading
requirements, which are generally associated with defense-
related emergencies and mobilization, call for much more
intense use of commercial ports by DoD, The commercial
seaport industry has proven able to provide MTMC with
emergency cargo-outloading facilities during these periods
of high activity. The quality of these facilities has
proven adequate for DoD backup needs, since they are modern,
efficient, and versatile in ability to transfer cargo to
oceangoing vessels. This ability includes sophisticated
container-handling systems.
The number and types of berths predesignated at
commercial as well as military-owned facilities are based on
DoD transportation requirements, which are projected during
deployment analyses. MTMC projects port-facility require-
ments, and MARAD allocates commercial port facilities for
exclusive DoD use during national emergencies. In Fiscal
Year 1981, 57 commercial berths in 24 ports were proposed by
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MTMCf validated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and approved
by the Secretary of Defense. A list of these berths was
sent to MARAD, who coordinated these DoD requirements for
civil port facilities with appropriate port authorities. Of
the 57 berths designated, 40 were suitable for general cargo
and 17 were suitable for wheeled vehicles to be driven onto
and off specially designed ships. All berths had suitable
staging and storage areas [Ref. 44:11].
Another major purpose of the PND program is the
identification of port facilities for unit deployments.
MTMC conducts studies to identify port facilities that would
be necessary for the rapid deployment of major U.S. tactical
forces. The report, "An Analysis of Unit Deployments
Through CONUS Ports" (April 1982) , analyzes the port
requirements of U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps units.
The port facilities identified in this study will supplement
other predesignated port facilities, and the study will be
used for planning unit deployments. Required port
facilities and support systems, based on four mixes of ship
types, have been identified for deploying units. Required
port facilities in each port city have been determined, and
alternate facilities have been identified [Ref. 44:12].
Some idea of relatively current military cargo
workloads for major West Coast ports are found in
Table IV-VIII. In addition to the West Coast data provided
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Agreements exist between MTMC area commands and two non-
ammunition oriented Naval West Coast activities; the Naval
Construction Battalion Center at Port Hueneme, CA and the
Naval Supply Center at San Diego, CA. The MTON's of cargo
loaded on MSC ships from these locations in FY82 were 81,553
and 42,408 respectively.
3 . Military Cargo Containment and Handling Trends
When discussing this topic, it is appropriate to
look at the DoD interface with the commercial intermodal
transportation system in both peacetime and mobilization
scenarios. While the peacetime movement of military cargo
has followed the lead of the commercial sector into con-
tainerization, there remain a number of DoD mobilization
requirements that Have no commercial counterpart and con-
sequently must be planned well in advance of the anticipated
need.
Not to dwell on the domestic intermodal scene dis-
cussed earlier in this chapter, the emphasis here will be on
the port of embarkation (POE) and port of debarkation (POD)
(i.e., when the cargo reaches the beach). First, the three
primary ocean intermodal systems and their associated
carriers; the containership, RO/RO, and LASH/SEABEE briefly
described in Chapter III will be discussed. These systems
will be listed in decending order of cargo handling com-
plexity (highest first) and coincidentally ascending order
of military usefulness (highest last) . The components of
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the containership system include the container, the contain-
ership, and a containerport, which includes a rail terminal,
special container cranes for vessel loading, a large con-
tainer storage area, container handling equipment, and one
or more land carriers to move the containers to and from the
containerport and the hinterland. Components of the RO/RO
system include the RO/RO ship, a relatively simple loading
pier, a loading ramp, a small storage area, and the wheeled
vehicle, which may be either the cab and trailer or the
trailer alone. Components in the LASH and SEABEE system
include the vessel, the barge or lighter, standard piers,
and standard port cargo handling equipment [Ref. 42:11],
The LASH and SEABEE systems are particularly flexible
because not only do they marry the ocean system to the
inland waterway system, they are efficient methods of load-
ing and discharging cargo at ports (or beachheads) lacking
piers and warehousing.
As breakbulk shipping was displaced in the U.S. flag
fleet by the above ocean intermodal systems, defense
planners were deprived of the versatile ships that were
selfsustaining (i.e., could load and offload their own
cargo) , could accept outsized cargo, and could transport
ammunition.
As indicated by the hierarchy in which the three
systems are displayed, containerships present the greatest
problem for contingency planners, Containerships can be
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either self-sustaining or non-self-sustaining. Self-
sustaining containerships are mostly conversions from older
breakbulk ships. The non-self-sustaining type are by far in
the majority and by definition rely on expensive and complex
shoreside facilities to load and discharge. Three of the
major containership problem areas are as follows:
a. How can a non-self-sustaining containership be
discharged when there are no shore facilities
available?
b. How can the non-self-sustaining containership be
used in an underway replenishment role?
c. How can sufficient shipboard containers be acquired
rapidly in a contingency situation? [Ref. 42:113]
All of these problem areas exist because the U.S. transpor-
tation system is commercially oriented and there are few
incentives to the commercial sector to design their
logistics systems to facilitate movement of military cargo
in a mobilization scenario. After all, why should shipping
companies build more expensive self-sustaining container-
ships when their trade is between developed containerports?
Why should a containership have the capability of offloading
dry cargo at sea when there is no commercial application?
What is the commercial advantage to maintaining large
reserve pools of containers for quick availability when well
managed rotation of containers to promote utilization has
proven so cost effective? If the government does not insist
upon and provide the funds to finance appropriate National
Defense Features, the system modifications will never be
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made and containerships will remain a weak link in the
sealift chain.
The military is aware of these problems and in fact
is investigating opportunities to maximize DoD use of
containers for its transport needs. Some of these efforts
include:
a. The potential to redesign (and reduce in size) some
military equipment now marginally too large for
containerization.
b. The investigation of whether or not it is cost
effective to use the container as a portable ware-
house, in particular, a leased commercial container,
and if so, how to optimize DoD's container
inventory.
c. A review of the design of modular (or breakdown)
containers so as to reduce storage requirements when
not in use.
d. How best to standardize both container dimensions
and container system support equipment between mmdes
and between DoD and the commercial sector.
All of these present real opportunities for improvement.
However, studies will not help much if war is declared
tomorrow.
Military planners did start reacting to these new
conditions by the early 1970 's. By 197 6 there were two
major test and evaluation programs underway; the Container
Offloading and Transfer System (COTS) and Logistics-Over-
the-Shore (LOTS). Both of these programs were oriented
toward utilization of the new containment and transfer
methods now prevelant in the U.S. flag fleet.
144

The LOTS program was to consist of five preliminary
tests including a conventional breakbulk ship, a heavy-lift
breakbulk ship, a containership, a LASH, and a SEABEE. The
two tests of particular interest here concern the Conven-
tional Breakbulk Ship Pretest and the Heavy-Lift Breakbulk
Ship Pretest. The purpose of the first test, conducted in
April 1976, was to determine the capability of the Services
to use such a vessel for deploying selected heavy, outsized
LOTS equipment to a site where fixed port facilities did not
exist. The LOTS test items were the Army's two newly
acquired container handling cranes (140-ton and 30 0-ton
capacities) , an Army LCM-8 landing craft and a Navy 3x15
floating causeway. The cranes were disassembled so that the
weight of each major component was less than 60 long tons,
the maximum capacity of heavy lift booms on the majority of
cargo ships. The causeway weight exceeded this capacity by
.3 long tons. The risk of making that lift would normally
be acceptable under emergency conditions. The major test
objectives were successfully achieved with only minor and
apparently correctable problems [Ref. 46:i]. The conclusion
reached was that LOTS equipment could be deployed by con-
ventional breakbulk ships with heavy-lift boom capacities of
60 or more long tons and discharged into LCM-8 landing craft
in a calm to moderate sea for movement to shore. The
containership cranes could be landed with minimum beach
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preparation, reassembled on the beach, and positioned for
subsequent container operations [Ref, 46:42],
The objective of the Heavy-Lift Breakbulk Ship
Pretest, conducted in November 197 6, was to verify the
capabilities for deploying newly procured LOTS equipment
assembled in a near ready-to-use configuration. It was
anticipated that a LOTS beach and throughput system could be
established more rapidly if equipment assembly requirements
were minimized. Operational response time would be signifi-
cantly improved because the detailed disassembly required
for embarkation aboard conventional breakbulk ships, con-
tainerships, and most bargeships would not be required for
the heavy-lift breakbulk ship, A secondary objective,
conducting a container-oriented throughput operation, was
added to the pretest for training purposes [Ref, 47:i].
The results of the pretest indicated that equipment
could be deployed with minimal disassembly and emphasized
the continuing need for the heavy-lift breakbulk ship.
Anticipated time savings were in the order of 53 hours in
the deployment of the 30 0-ton capacity crane with minimum
disassembly. This is compared to the time needed for the
more detailed disassembly required when only conventional
breakbulk ships are available. The heaviest item loaded in
this pretest was a 146 6-Class LCV that weighed 180 long
tons. The SS TRANSCOLUMBIA mentioned in Chapter II was the
heavy-lift breakbulk ship used,
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During the container throughput phase of the test a
temporary containership discharge facility (TCDF) , consist-
ing of an Army 300-ton lifting capacity crane mounted on a
DeLong barge, was used by military personnel to unload
containers from a ship for the first time. A DeLong barge
was also used to form a pier at the beach. The DeLong, with
ramps and a 140-ton crane aboard, was beached, jacked-up,
ramps lowered, and made operational in approximately 18
hours. The pier with the 140-ton crane was then used as an
unloading facility for containers [Ref. 47:23].
Also tested for the first time was the Army's
300-ton capacity crane which was placed at the high water
line and used as a crane-on-beach container unloading
facility. Both the 300-ton crane-on-beach and the 140-ton
crane on the DeLong pier were hampered by an inability to
reach containers in lighters at low tide. Amphibians -
LARC-LX's and LARC-XV s - were successfully and continuously
used during calm seas. A causeway ferry was employed to
load containers on MILVAN chassis at shipside using the
TCDF, but wave motion and container alignment difficulties
with the chassis made this operation unacceptably time
consuming. The causeway ferry was successfully used to
lighter containers at low tide and over sandbars to the
beach where a front loader rapidly off-loaded the containers
and placed them on MILVAN chassis [Ref. 47:26] .
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These early Army managed LOTS tests were followed in
1979 with plans for a more advanced series of tests called
the Joint Logistics-Over-the-Shore II (JLOTS II) tests. The
Navy was designated the lead service. JLOTS II was planned
in three phases. Phase I (Equipment Deployment) was similar
to earlier LOTS tests. It was completed in August 1983.
Phase II (RO/RO Vehicle Operations), completed October 1983,
was a new test with the following objectives:
a. load RO/RO ships at port of embarkation (POE)
;
b. install a RO/RO discharge facility;
c. handle two ship configurations with integral and
non-integral ramps;
d. off-load ships offshore; and
e. deliver vehicles to shore.
Phase III (Cargo throughput operations), planned for
October 19 84, will be a combination of previous and new
tests which will include the following objectives:
a. install equipment;
b. off-load container/breakbulk ships offshore;
c. deliver cargo to shore/marshalling area;
d. install bulk Petroleum/Oil/Lubricant (POL)
systems; and
e. operate in sea state 3.
Phase III is interesting because it will be the first test
of the new Auxiliary Crane Ship (TACS) which will be a
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converted containership with three cranes capable of
operating in sea states up to a 3 designation.
Both the LOTS and completed JLOTS II tests indicated
containerized and other heavy equipment can be moved ashore
with little to no port facilities available, serious prob-
lems need to be underscored. An over-the-shore operation
requires a number of large and heavy items, such a front-
loaders, sideloaders, LARC-LX's, LCM-8's, LCV's, and a
variety of cranes. The paucity of heavy-lift breakbulk
ships is also a major limiting factor. For example,
together the two heavy-lift ships on long term charter by
MSC, the TRANSCOLUMBIA and the TRANSCOLORADO, can only
embark two- thirds of one Army heavy boat company on a
one-time lift. Thus, careful selectivity will always have
to be a criterion for deployment planning. Other than the
two MSC ships, only one RO/RO currently in commercial use
and with less stowage space, has the same availability for
LCU deployment [Ref. 47:32]. Perversely, the increase in
military utilization of containerized cargo does not
decrease the military need for conventional and heavy-lift
breakbulk ships in initial deployments. In some cases it
even apparently increases the need. However, the identifi-
cation of logistics-over-the-shore problems and the innova-
tive use of existing technolpgy to solve those problems
indicates military planners are on the right track.
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4. Manpower as a Mobilization Asset
It is all well and good to initially focus on
material sealift resources, but one could have all the right
kinds of ships waiting patiently for mobilization and they
would be useless without the proper numbers of adequately
trained personnel. The Navy manpower planners had to con-
front this problem in the mid-1970 's and make radical
personnel policy changes to alleviate the military problem.
The situation is not dissimilar when one looks at the
capability of the civilian maritime labor pool to man the
various fleets that would come under DoD control as
mobilization progressed.
As noted earlier, the first fleet available is the
MSC Nucleus fleet manned by civil service mariners. The MSC
charter fleet is manned by commercial crews under union
contract. Tables IV- IX through IV-XI give an idea of
current utilization of the existing civilian (non-civil
service) maritime pool.
Should mobilization proceed, the first ships to come
out of the National Defense Reserve Fleet would be the Ready
Reserve Force (RRF) currently at a strength of 31 dry cargo
ships and one tanker [Ref . 4 8] . These ships consist of the
most capable and modern portion of the NDRF, Many have been
upgraded through a four-phase plan funded by the Navy and
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AVERAGE DAYS WORKED PER MAN ON OCEANGOING SHIPS, 1,000 GT & OVER
(Nationwide minus Great Lakes & unknown)
1981 1982
Licensed Deck 107 .5 97 .3
Licensed Engine 106 .3 98 .0
Radio 115 .5 103 .2
Staff 117 .9 118 .3
Unlicensed Deck 116 .9 110 .1
Unlicensed Engine 121 .1 114 .7
Cooks and Stewards 113 .0 107 .6
Miscellaneous 52 .4 45 .6
The data includes all persons who sailed on oceangoing ships,
1,000 GT and over during the specified calendar year and
received a U.S. Coast Guard discharge slip, even though they
may have only worked a few days. Persons who sailed but did
not received a U.S. Coast Guard discharge slip are not included,
For example, civil service personnel aboard M.S.C. ships are
not included.
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crewed and made ready for service in five to ten days.
Current plans, projecting for the next five years, are to
build up the RRF to over 60 ships by not only upgrading
existing ships in the NRDF inventory, but also by encourag-
ing turn-ins by the commercial sector [Ref. 48] . These
ships would, upon callup, be manned by crews from the exist-
ing maritime work force and from those who can be persuaded
to return to sea to help meet the demands of any national
emergency. Table IV-XII displays the manpower requirenents
of typical type ships in the RRF. Because employment is
currently low in the maritime industry, the manning of the
RRF does not appear to be a problem. However, the manning
of the rest of the NDRF, as it is phased in over a 60-day
period, appears precarious indeed.
The U.S. Merchant Marine contributes to the U.S.
sealift posture in non-mobilization situations (note that
the Vietnam sealift fell into this category) through the
Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) . This program provides U.S.
flag ships as a contractual commitment which is a prerequi-
site to carriage of DoD peacetime cargo. Privately owned
ships built and operated with federal subsidy also must be
offered for SRP enrollment. Plans would have about 17 7 dry
cargo ships and 39 tankers committed for call-up in a phased
schedule under this program [Ref. 49:13]. Should requisi-




MANNING, READY RESERVE FLEET [Ref. 49:122]
Victory C-3 C-Train C-4 Mariner
Licensed Deck 5 5 5 5
Licensed Engineer 6 6 5 6
Radio 1 1 1 1
Licensed 12 12 11 12
Unlicensed Deck 10 11 12 10
Unlicensed Engineer 11 10 10 11
Unlicensed Steward 9 8 7 9
Unlicensed 30 29 29 . 30
TOTAL 42 41 40 42
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Merchant Marine ships useful for military sealift would be
requisitioned by MARAD which, as the National Shipping
Authority, has the responsibility for allocating shipping
assets between military and civilian needs. An important
consideration must be who will man these ships and what
obligations they will incur.
The final source of ships in a mobilization scenario
is the Effective U.S. Controlled fleet. Should in fact
these U.S. owned ships registered under foreign flags
actually be made available, they present a serious manning
problem in that their foreign crews may have to be dismissed
and U.S. citizen crews found on short notice.
Up to this point in the thesis, strictly seafaring
manning has been discussed. Activating any large number of
ships will, of course, have tremendous impacts on shipyard
labor as well as longshore labor. However, to limit the
focus to seafaring labor. Table IV~XIII displays trends
since 1926. A joint MARAD/MSC study entitled "Civilian
Seafaring Manpower Requirements in Peace and War, 197 8 to
1984" concluded that while the U.S. would probably have
sufficient mariners to man ships in a minor emergency, it
would stretch our manpower resources to the limit
[Ref. 49:16]. Another problem is that as the maritime
industry remains depressed and employment practices
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1927 30 330 10 850
1928 28 450 11 350
1929 28 870 11 130
1930 29 630 11 820
1931 25 730 10 850
1932 22 300 10 530
1933 19 400 9 880
1934 21 120 11 330
1935 21 400 11 820
1936 22 630 12 170
1937 14 720 12 580
1938 23 350 12 250
1939 20 850 13 530
1940 23 860 13 130
1941 22 380 12 670
1942 25 080 13 580
1943 35 460 11 490
1944 76 050 19 500
1945 110 980 29 070
1946 131 570 29 970
1947 89 410 20 150
1948 73 529 18 399
1949 41 096 19 065
1950 33 748 17 220
1951 28 123 17 712
1952 65 863 18 122
1953 42 Oil 17 507
1954 36 560 15 416
1955 33 249 14 719
1956 32 482 15 607
1957 34 637 14 844
1958 31 447 13 160
1959 28 650 13 763
1960 27 762 12 224
1961 28 668 12 053
1962 27 941 12 205
1963 24 975 11 381
1964 28 293 11 230
1965 28 529 11 059
1966 32 827 10 985
1967 37 620 11 291
1968 35 982 10 877
1969 32 107 11 094
1970 27 985 10 748
1971 22 257 10 567
1972 17 111 9 372
1973 16 346 9 414
1974 14 775 9 754
1975 14 234 9 280
1976 12 043 7 598
1977 12 319 7 553
1978 11 ,870 8 ,017
1979 11 ,277 8 ,840
1980 10 ,628 8 ,844




























































average age of merchant seamen is rising alarmingly. As
there appears little future for the younger unlicensed
mariners, little new blood is entering the system thus
exacerbating the age problem. Table IV-XIV displays recent
median ages of seafarers who worked on oceangoing ships.
In a statement by Admiral Keener, then COMSC, in the
previously referenced 19 81 hearings he said:
"I frankly do not know how Federal needs can be met short
of mobilization. In our peacetime society we cannot
allocate people to jobs, no matter how badly their
services may be needed. Personnel readiness problems
must be resolved in the event of a threat against either
world peace or national survival."
There are, of course, things that can be done in
anticipation of manpower shortages including:
a. the development of procedures for expanding recruit-
ment programs and accelerating training programs,
b. to earmark Navy facilities to be used to augment the
training resources of the maritime unions as well as
the maritime academies, and
c. to negotiate agreements with the unions to assure
they give top priority to manning ships carrying
military cargo. [Ref. 49:18]
All of these actions should be undertaken to avoid
the same buildup pitfalls encountered when the Korean
Conflict raised the seagoing billets from 57,000 in
June 1950 to 87,000 in June 1951. The problems associated
with this 53 percent increase in billet requirements in one




MEDIAN AGES OF SEAFARERS WHO WORKED ON OCEANGOING SHIPS,
1,000 GT & OVER
(Nationwide minus Great Lakes & unknown)
1981 1982
Licensed Deck 48.1 43.9
Licensed Engine 44.6 40.5
Radio 54.5 54.8
Staff 54.3 54.8
Unlicensed Deck 50.6 48.8
Unlicensed Engine 50.3 49.7
Cooks and Stewards 52.6 52.2
Miscellaneous 46.0 44.0




employment patterns inherent in the U.S. merchant marine
along with the high wages and job opportunities ashore, made
it difficult to persuade experienced seamen to return to
sea. As a result, a significant shortage of licensed radio
operators, engineers and able bodied seamen was experienced
[Ref . 14:40] .
But in final analysis, the most important factors
influencing the availability of mariners are personal. If,
for example, the U.S. were engaged in a war for national
survival, it would be reasonable to assume that Americans
would serve voluntarily as they have throughout history.
But in a limited conflict, the availability of mariners
would probably be more influenced by economic factors than
anything else. If jobs ashore were scarce and our economy
were not booming, it would be expected that mariners could
be recruited rather easily. In different circumstances,
however, creative incentives could be developed to meet the
need. For instance, if the military draft were reinstated,
maritime service could be made an alternative. In other
words, the merchant marine manpower element of sealift




V. THE COMBINED SERVICE AND RELATED FUNCTIONS
QUANTIFI ED ANP QUALI F I Eg
A. SERVICE PROVIDED BY THE COMBINED SERVICE
There is no question that the Combined Service
carries a considerable amount of cargo. Where it carried
only approximately five percent of the total dry cargo
measurement tons moved by the Military Sealift Command in
FY82r that represented 24 percent of the cargo carried by
all of their time charter ships. General comments concern-
ing the cargo carried, overall utilization of cargo space,
and other cargo related issues are extracted from summaries
of the Sealift Cargo Ship Voyage Analyses of 1979, 19 80,
1981, and 1982. Parts of the Analyses are included to
better display cargo trends.
The 1979 Analysis states:
"The first six months of 1979 is characterized as a
service between the West Coast and MID-PAC Islands, and
another service called Tri-Coast, (EC, GC, WC) to the Far
East. These services utilized 7 breakbulk ships. The
last six months is characterized as a combined scheduled
service utilizing only 6 ships that travel East Coast and
Gulf Coast to Far East to West Coast, then from the West
Coast to Far East to East and Gulf Coast. On trips to the
Far East, cargo is also carried to MID-PAC Islands. From
the standpoint of reducing losses the Combined Service has
been quite successful. The number of voyages is reduced
from 13 to 10 with only 1 additional day per voyage. MTs
carried per voyage increased significantly by 2,729 MTs
(from 15,681 MTs to 18,410 MTs), with resultant increases
in percent of utilization, MTs lifted per day (from 16 3
MTs to 190 MTs), and lower costs per (000) MTM, and MTs
with more favorable actual income to cost ratios per ton
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of cargo lifted. This has occurred in spite of an
increase in average estimated daily cost by almost $500
per day, ($14,947 to $15,443). The bottom line is a
reduction in average voyage profit (loss) from ($503,5 92)
to ($353,124). Interestingly the fact is that actual
expense in dollars per dollar of income has been reduced
from 1.573 to 1.304. For 1980 the financial plan expense
for chartered breakbulk ships is 1.3 dollars of expense
per dollar of income. For the first 10 weeks reported the
trend is continuing at approximately 1.324."
The 19 80 Analysis encompassing the first full year
of Combined Service operations states:
"As in FY79, utilization for voyages originating on the
West Coast is about 4,100 MTs greater per voyage than for
voyages originating in the East Coast. Outbound
utilization from the East Coast has increased from 39%
[65%] to 48% [80%] , but intra and inbound cargo on
controlled ships to the West Coast has decreased by about
11% [18%] . Overall average MTs per voyage has decreased
from 18,410 MTs to 17,777 MTs. The cost per MT and cost
per (000) MTM has increased. The ratios of increase to
cost per MT and (000) MTM have improved slightly in FY 80,
by 1.5% to 1.0% respectively. However, estimated daily
cost are up by over 35% due to increased charter cost and
increased fuel cost. Interestingly, actual expense per
dollar of income has reduced slightly from $1,3 04 to
$1,280, which is 2 cents lower than planned at $1.30.
Higher losses per voyage, approximately 19%, is due to a
deficit plan whereby increased income at the same ratio to
cost results in increased actual dollar loss per voyage."
The 1981 Analysis states:
"In FY81 , utilization for voyages originating on the West
Coast is about 4,400 MTs. Outbound utilization, as well
as intra area and inbound has decreased in FY 81 as MTs
per voyage has declined from 17,777 MTs per voyage in FY
80 to 16,161 MTs in FY 81 , a decrease of 5.7%. This is
the second year in a row that the Combined Service has
experienced a decline in cargo. In FY 79 18,410 MTs were
carried per voyage. The decline in FY 80 was 3.4%. The
estimated cost per MT and cost per 10 00 MTM have both
increased by 19% and 9% respectively. The ratios of
income to cost per MT have also increased by 3% overall
due again to the decrease in cargo lifted. However,
estimated daily costs are up by over 7.5% due to increase
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charter hire cost tempered slightly by a decline in bunker
fuel cost. Interestingly, actual expense per dollar of
income has reduced slightly from $1.31 to $1,127 which is
2.3 cents lower than planned at $1.15. Losses per voyage,
approximately 4.2% less than in FY 80, is due to a deficit
plan whereby increased income at the same ratio to cost
results in increased actual dollar loss per voyage."
The 1982 Analysis states:
"The Combined Service utilized five ships on 22 voyages in
FY 82 compared to six ships on 24 voyages in FY 81 with
the same route structure. The FY 82 utilization for
voyages originating on the West Coast is approximately
2,900 MTs per voyage greater than for voyages originating
on the East Coast. The 385,203 MTs of cargo carried by
the five larger ships in FY 82 is practically the same as
the 385,621 MTs carried in FY 81 in smaller ships. From
FY 81 and FY 82 outbound cargo is approximately 3,000 MTs
higher. There was an increase of 14,000 MTs in intra area
cargo, and a decrease of 17,000 MTs in inbound cargo.
Outbound and intra area ship utilization has increased by
8% and 9% respectively, and inbound decreased by 3%.
Unfortunately, although the number of ships in the
Combined Service have been reduced from six to five or by
16.7%, the estimated daily cost per ship has increased by
22.0%. The P/(L)$ remains within 1% at an estimated
$408,318 loss per voyage. Clearly the breakbulk billing
rates do not compensate for the cost of the Combined
Service where the number of miles steamed per billing rate
mile is 200% as great as East Coast to Europe services,
4.5:1 compared to 2.2:1. The billing rate from East Coast
to Japan is only 150% of the billing rate from the East
Coast to Europe. Actually, the East Coast to Europe
service produces a favorable P/(L)$. The ratio of income
to cost per MT for the Combined Service is .831:1,
indicating that a 20.3% increase on the FY 82 billing
rates to the Pacific and Far East would have made it
possible to have a break even P/(L)$. Time in port is
averaging 40% for 20 to 23 port calls per voyage. This is
10% better than the worldwide average for all voyages,
which is approximately 50% time in port and 50% time at
sea. CSM West Coast in port activity shows that 51.6% of
in port time is needed to handle cargo compared to 36.2%
in East and Gulf Coast ports. Generally, the West Coast
stevedore gangs work two shifts, and the East Coast
stevedores work one shift. However, cargo handling
productivity is averaging 1081 MT per day for the East
16 3

Coast and 103 MT per day for the West Coast,
Notwithstanding the billing rate problem and its effect in
the P/(L)$ it is requested that every effort possible be
made to expedite in port activities to reduce the amount
of time spent in port, and load all available cargo,"
These comments indicate fairly consistent Combined
Service operational trends and areas of concern. Because
these are summaries, they address only a few overall
categories of quantifiable voyage information; mission
accomplishment is reflected by MTON's carried and number of
voyages, the overall percent of utilization, the average
cost (both fixed and variable) , the rate structure, and the
resultant average profit or loss per voyage. Because the
Combined Service was structured as a functional loss control
center, as mentioned in Chapter II, its financial plan was
designed as a deficit plan whereby, for example in 19 80, the
ratio of budgeted expenses to budgeted income was 1.3:1.
The trend here has been to get closer and closer to a break
even operation by better estimating cargo requirements and,
therefore, costs. Unfortunately, the billing rates
continue, for many valid reasons, to be unrealistic with the
MSC Atlantic routes cross subsidizing the Pacific routes.
Utilization of cargo space on certain legs of each
voyage has consistently been a problem for the CS.
Table V-I is included to show current utilization trends.
Below deck utilization is actually quite good by commercial
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moved by MSC in 1975 and 1981. Although there was an
overall 21 percent decrease in cargo, some significant
changes include:
a. a 72 percent decrease in ammunition, hazardous cargo,
and radioactive waste;
b. a 99 percent increase in cargo carrying trailers;
c. a 66 percent decrease in special cargo;
d. a 43 percent decrease in cargo via time and voyage
charter; and
e. a 65 percent decrease in breakbulk cargo via
commercial agreement.
2. gpggj&l Lift Isgyigs
There are three often used rationales that support
the continued operation of a peacetime scheduled breakbulk
service by MSC. The first is that the military regularly -
requires heavy or special lifts that could not be met in a
timely manner by a commercial U.S. flag carrier. The second
relates to the inaccessibility of many of the Pacific
islands to regular commercial traffic, and the third
rationale is oriented toward availability of ships for
mobilization exercises.
The MILSTAMP definition of special cargo is:
a. all wheeled or tracked vehicles not POVs regardless
of size; or
b. cargo more than 10,000 lbs; or
c. cargo more than 35 feet in any direction.
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Therefore, not all cargo fitting the tariff structure of "
special cargo such as telephone poles or outsized steel
products is necessarily a heavy lift iten. Some recent MSC
cargo that did require special handling included sonar domes
(27,000 lbs), a surfacer machine (approximately 10,000 lbs),
a concrete batch plant (42,250 lbs) , and a ship reduction
gear (138,000 lbs) [Ref . 50] . Most of these items could be
carried by any ship in the CS fleet as they currently range
in lift capacity from 60 to 80 tons.
Occasionally very heavy items must be transported.
The two heavy lift ships employed by MSC are the
TRANSCOLORADO and the TRANSCOLUMBIA which both have boom
configurations that when married are capable of lifting 240
long tons. Together with one barge ship and one RO/RO in
commercial operation, these ships represent the heavy lift
capability of the entire U.S. flag fleet. If the
TRANSCOLORADO and TRANSCOLUMBIA did not remain under
contractural agreement to MSC, there is considerable doubt
that their services could be guaranteed to meet the shipper
services' interraittant and irregular requirements. Even when
available, these ships would be provided at considerable
cost to the government.
The flexibility and timeliness of CS services in the
Pacific and Far East is also more than just a convenience.
There is scheduled commercial container service as well as
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liner and tramp breakbulk service available from West Coast
ports to Hawaii, Kwajalein, Japan, Okinawa, Korea, and the
Philippines. Breakbulk service to Hawaii is via barge, and
breakbulk space on container vessels can also be negotiated
on an as-required basis from Matson and U.S. Lines. Break-
bulk service to Guam would be on an inducement basis as
there is currently no pure breakbulk service to this
destination. Service to other Far East locations could be
provided utilizing a combination of service presently
available with Lykes' scheduled RO/RO's and with American
President Line's (APL's) C-5 tramp service into the Far East
and Southeast Asia [Ref. 51:1].
The problems arise when, unlike CS vessels, there is
no one carrier which services all CS ports as they exist
today, (e.g. Tacoraa/Seattle (APL, Barge) , Oakland' (all)
,
Port Hueneme (none). Long Beach (all), San Diego (none)).
However, it should be noted that all have in the past, on
inducement (750-1000 MT) , been willing to consider calling
at MOTBA, Oakland, San Diego, and Port Hueneme. Ports for
which there are currently no scheduled or semi-scheduled
tramp service include Midway Island, Wake Island, intra-West
Coast movements, and West Coast - East/Gulf Coast. There is
reason to believe that service to these areas could be
induced on a basis of volume and cost. Based on known U.S.
flag shipping in the Far East, interport shipping for this
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area would be questionable, particularly where shipping in
more than one direction would be necessary. As noted
earlier, the transportation of not only special cargo but
also aircraft and hazardous cargo would require considerable
prior and sensitive coordination with respective commercial
carriers to ensure availability and timeliness of lift as
well as negotiated rates [Ref. 51:2], The criticality of
some Required Delivery Dates (RDD's) would result in special
planning and coordination challenges in a purely commercial
market and could require cargo to be diverted to foreign
flag ships under not very unusual circumstances.
The issue of the CS as an available and reliable
mobilization exercise resource is of particular concern
because of the dwindling U.S. flag assets, especially on the
West Coast. It is felt that not enough of the right kind of
ships are available to meet existing exercise requirements
or planned requirements. The knowledge that CS ships are
available on reasonably short notice is a particular
advantage to mobilization exercise planners. This
capability would be difficult to duplicate in a totally
commercial shipping environment.
3. The CS and Sucge Requirements
Chapter IV included a section on the changing
perspectives of contingency and mobilization planners. That
information is significant because the CS is continually
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being evaluated within the framework of overall MSC surge
breakbulk capability. The CS ships as a percentage of the
chartered MSC dry cargo fleet changes continually but
fluctuates between 15 to 30 percent. The U.S. Naval Ship
(USNS) fleet, as seen in Table V-II, contains one refriger-
ated cargo ship, five dry cargo ships, four vehicle cargo
ships, and the four converted SL-7's [Ref. 25:1]. There-
fore, as a percentage of the dry cargo surge capacity, CS
ships represent 10 to 20 percent of the total MSC controlled
dry cargo fleet in numbers of ships. The USNS ships are
almost exclusively assigned to certain routes and/or
functions that would be difficult to substitute for if they
were pulled away to meet another contingency requirenent.
A consistent MSC policy has been to utilize its
nucleus ships and charter fleet as productively as possible.
But when cargo was temporarily not available, the ships were
put in Reduced Operating Status (ROS) to maintain a con-
sistent level of surge capacity in the controlled fleet.
Other resources are also available in a less than
full mobilization scenario. Two sources currently getting
considerable visibility are the Ready Reserve Force (RRF)
and the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) . Both of these
sources can make ships available on short notice to augment





UNITED STATES NAVAL SHIPS ( USNS ) 1 JANUARY 1983 [Ref. 25:2-4]
CLASS DES NAME
AK V#3 FURMAN
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The RRF can be made available five to ten days after
requested in accordance with authority granted in Section
718 of the Defense Appropriations Act (96-154) . The program
to develop the RRF to provide militarily useful ships
available in a quick response situation began in 197 7 when
the U.S. Navy transferred $5.2 million to MARAD to begin a
four-phased upgrade program of ships from the NRDF. Another
source of more modern ships came from the government trade-
in program that is still attracting newer ships to the RRF
inventory. The objectives of the RRF have been slightly
altered over time from the original concept of providing DoD
with a sealift capability equivalent to that of thirty
Victory Ships (approximately 340,000 measurement tons). Now
a variety of ship types are used and the program is being
expanded considerably to provide the primary source of surge
capability. New ships are actually being built for the RRF
and of particular interest are the new crane ships (TAGS)
that will primarily support the discharging of non-
selfsustaining containerships. In conjunction with this new
emphasis on the RRF, the ROS concept within the MSC control-
led fleet will be phased out by FY85. Should it be deemed
appropriate to put a ship in ROS thereafter, the cost will
be charged to a new MSC "readiness account" instead of the





The SRP ships are a diverse group of ships built
since 1970 with government subsidy and/or operated with
government subsidy. Additionally, a shipping company
wishing to carry government cargo must dedicate 50 percent
of his fleet (including older ships) to the program.
Phasing plans are developed as part of the agreement based
on the type of ship and potential uses. To press these
ships into service requires an extensive but quickly
orchestrated chain of events starting with the initial MSC
request and culminating with the ultimate notification of
the President. The callup procedures have has been tested
but the program has never tried, so questions remain as to
its viability as a surge capability.
This change in emphasis may have a profound impact
on the Combined Service. It would appear that MSC
controlled breakbulk ships are going to be more and more
justified solely on projected cargo requirements and less on
their capabilities as breakbulk carriers in surge scenarios.
B. THE IMPACT OF MSC CONTROLLED DRY CARGO SHIPPING ON
RELATED PORT FUNCTIONS
1. Ship Characteristics and Cargo Handling Impacts
Just as port efficiencies affect CS operations, so
do the characteristics of the CS ships and their operations
impact the ports utilized on a regular basis. As the CS can
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be described as a "liner" service within MSC controlled
shipping, studies done for the commercial sector have some
applicability.
One study in particular, "The Economics of
Conventional Liner Breakbulk Cargo-handling Efficiency,"
attempts to develop an optimization model of liner charac-
teristics that minimize total system costs, both at sea and
at port [Ref. 52]. Because of numerous seasonal and random
variables relative to shipping in general coupled with the
additional problems associated with breakbulk cargo com-
positions, within hold placements, various ship design
characteristics, different quay facilities, etc., the
problem was generally broken down and addressed as manage-
able but less valuable pieces. However, the authors of the study,
Mitchell Kellman and Don Shneerson appear to make a valid
empirical estimate of the relationship between handling
performance of breakbulk cargo on the one hand, and ship and
cargo related variables on the other.
They developed a "productivity index" which is
invariant to many of the factors, such as seasonal
differences, which had impeded previous investigations.
Their model studies the effects of a large set of ship and
capgo related variables upon this index, utilizing multiple-
variate stepwise linear regression techniques. The data
collection effort and the development of the index will not
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be discussed here. It must be explained however, that the
index I. must be calculated for each ith loading and
unloading utilizing the following equation:
Ij_ = f (A^, B^^; C)^ = 1. ..N
= 1. . . J
where i = ship arrival,
j = cargo category,
A. = a set of ship-specific variables,
B- = a set of specific cargo related and other
^3 arrival specific variables not associated with
the ship itself, and
C = a further set of exogenous variables.
The resultant indices are then input to the model which can
then be used to explain the inter-ship variations in the
efficiencies of relative cargo handling.
Table V-III shows -the ship related variables
(A.) and the handling and cargo related variables
(B-.) tested. Regression analysis was performed and
the variables which added very little to the explanatory
power of the regression were excluded from the final
estimated equation. Of the nearly 20 explanatory variables
tested, only five were determined to be significant. These
five variables were the age of the ship, the size of the
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hatches to holds, and the proportion of tonnage carried in
containers.
This analytical approach can be applied to the
Combined Service and valuable lessons can be learned. Each
of the five above mentioned variables will be briefly
discussed and related to the current CS ships. The first
finding was that the older the ship, the less efficiently
was its cargo handled (both loading and unloading) . In
fact, the results indicated that for each additional year in
the age of the ship, the cargo handling efficiency would
decrease by approximately 1 percent. This consistently
positive relationship implies that given two ships of
identical size, one being five years old and the other being
25 years old, both carrying the same cargo composition, the
cargo of the latter would be handled 20 percent slower.
What this means to the CS is that, because the average age
of the ships in use is approximately 18 years (or 18 years
behind the technology curve) , there is a built-in cargo
handling inefficiency which must adversely impact cargo
handling operations.
The second factor, the size of the ship, relates to
the increasing returns to scale in the handling per ton of
cargo for larger ships. This type of result had been
typically demonstrated for bulk cargoes and now was found to
be true for breakbulk cargoes as well. The total time
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required for handling such cargoes tended to increase with
the size of the ship, but the time required to handle each
ton of cargo tended to decrease. A perfect example of the
applicability of ship size to the CS was the short term use
of the President Adams, a C-5 ship, for Voyage #003 of FY83
.
She carried considerably more cargo and had a profit making
voyage, but because she disrupted the cargo flow to the
other CS ships and spent more time in port loading and
off-loading, the resultant swings in the schedule could not
be tolerated and her services were discontinued.
The negative coefficient of the third factor, the
number of shipboard cranes, was felt to have more than one
possible explanation. The authors of the study designed
their productivity index to make shore cranes more effi-
cient. Therefore, if a ship observed in the study had its
own cranes and used them instead of a shore crane, that in
itself would account for the findilg. The authors point out
that there is another possible explanation of the negative
relationship between handling efficiency and the number of
cranes and it relates to the size economies. As it turned
out, the number of cranes was found to have a high correla-
tion (r = .7) with the length of the ship and therefore the
variable may just represelt length. This can also be
expected from normal design limitations such as the fact
that hatches may not be opened through all the six walls of
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a hold so that as holds and hatches both increase, the
volume which must be accessed from any given point in the
hatch is increased. As noted earlier*, the CS ships in
current use are considered self-sustaining and consequently
are forced into "inefficient" operations when appropriate
shore cranes, including fixed, floating, or gantry types,
are either not available or not used.
The ratio of the number of hatches to holds, the
fourth factor, also has implications for the handling effi-
ciencies for CS ships. The results of this analysis
suggests that general cargo liners with twin hatch designs
do allow for easier access for the hooks, with fewer atten-
dant setting-up operations within the hold. The Clipper
Class ships currently in the CS inventory do have a twin
hatch design for holds in the mid-section of the ship. This
type of configuration should be encouraged within the frame-
work of tradeoffs with potential other utilization of deck
space.
The fifth and final significant factor was the
proportion of tonnage carried in containers. As expected,
containerization does clearly improve handling efficiency.
The variable was significantly positive for the conventional
cargo ship as well as for the all-ship sample (which
included partial containerships) . The containerized cargo
carried by the CS ships fall primarily in the MSCVAN
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category destined for Diego Garcia, It represents only
about 3 to 10 percent in MTONS of CS cargo depending on the
voyage. Most of the government containerized cargo booked
by MTMC goes via commercial shippers under negotiated
container cargo agreements.
2. Other PQgt QpgcatiQn CQPgJder^tiQng
The CS can be considered of minor importance to port
operations in general. Yet as a significant portion of the
MSC controlled fleet breakbulk capacity, it does impact
certain ports. For instance, the MOTBA owns and operates
Pier 7 (East and West) which has as its primary purpose the
providing of services to ships carrying MSC booked cargo.
Most of the functions, including stevedoring operations as
well as crane operations and maintenance, are contracted
out. This is typical of military cargo handling operations
as directed by MTMC at ports or piers under their hurisdic-
tion. The number and size of stevedore companies hiring
unionized longshoreman have contracted as longshore labor
requirements have dwindled due to containerization and other
automated cargo handling techniques. Table V-IV shows the
decrease in longshore labor just over the past ten years.
The occupation has become so stagnent that entrance into the
union in many cases depends solely on nepotism.
Of concern in this thesis is whether or not the
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Considered "normal" work force with a total of 88,000 - 95,000
actually available for work.
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Service and how the existence of regular military breakbulk
operations impacts the longshore industry. If one looks at
the number of longshoremen employed (or unemployed) and the
skill levels required, it appears that the military keeps a
significant portion of the longshore work force at certain
ports employed that would otherwise be laid off. The work
force appears to be readily available, at least into the
near future, if breakbulk shipping requirements increased.
The group that is perhaps more significant to the Combined
Service are the carpenters who actually secure the cargo in
the holds using dunnage. These people are much more highly
skilled and the availability of their services could be in
jeopardy if breakbulk shipping continues to decline. These
services are also contracted out at military terminals.
A side issue relates to the availability of suitable
portside cargo handling equipment for normal breakbulk
operations. For breakbulk cargo, there should be cranes,
forklifts, dunnage, wire rope and chains for securing, and
adequate covered storage for cargo. As containerized cargo
requires quite different port support, it is important that
breakbulk capabilities be kept available and maintained in
good condition in designated stateside and overseas ports.
A reasonably cost-effective way of ensuring continued
capability is to productively employ the facilities by
regularly routing breakbulk shipping to these ports.
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Another side of peacetime breakbulk operations that
often gets overlooked is the availability of breakbulk ships
for military training. The Navy has only eight Reserve
Cargo Handling Battalions that are under the jurisdiction of
the Navy Cargo Handling and Port Group (NAVCHAPGRU) at
Chetham Annex in Williamsburg, Virginia which has approx-
imately 145 active duty personnel. The Reserve units are
made up primarily of Storekeepers and Boatswain's Mates with
some SEABEE ratings and administrative support ratings. The
Army, on the other hand, has five active duty units called
Terminal Service Companies assigned to major military ports.
Each Company is authorized eight officers and 28 8 enlisted
personnel. There are, in addition, eight Reserve Companies
with similar numbers and types of personnel that regularly
drill at their assigned mobilization ports. The Companies
are oriented by their cargo handling equipment to either
breakbulk or containers but can do both if necessary. They
are equipped to move 1000 short tons of breakbulk cargo
per day or 40 0-60 containers [Ref . 53]
.
C. MSC OVERSIGHT OF CONTROLLED DRY CARGO SHIPPING
1. Operating g«i<3Qnge
Over the years, the MSC has developed numerous
instructions to guide dry cargo operations and establish
consistent policies for the three primary categories of dry
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cargo vessels; the MSC Nucleus Cargo Ships (USNS) , the
Time-Chartered Ships of which the CS is a five-ship subset,
and the General Agency Aereement (GAA) Ships under MARAD
custody that are rarely used in peacetime. Those COMSC
instructions which apply solely to dry cargo ships were
incorporated into COMSC Instruction 3120.17; "Dry Cargo Ship
Operating Instructions (CARGOPINS) " dated 24 January 1983.
In addition to CARGOPINS guidance, a list of related COMSC
instructions applicable to time charter breakbulk ships is
included as Table V-V. The terms under which the chartered
ships come within MSC control are contained within the
respective charter parties that are entered into between MSC
and the ship owners. The standard MSC Dry Cargo Time
Charter Party (MSC Form 4330-2) is included as Appendix B.
2. flQnitQyipg <?f Cpgtg
As indicated in Chapter II, there are numerous
givens that MSCPAC must factor into its CS cost function.
That does not mean, however, that all fixed and variable
costs cannot be monitored on a regular basis. Data can be
extracted and/or summarized to support periodic management
reviews that can result in decisions that improve effi-
ciency. The major fixed cost is the contracted time charter
cost that is made up primarily of manning and subsistence
costs, vessel maintelance costs, insurance, and a management




COMSC INSTRUCTIONS APPLICABLE TO CHARTER SHIP OPERATIONS
[Ref. 53:2-5]
COriSCI NST SWJSCT
2000. IC Procedures for Communicating with MSC MARISAT-
Equipped Ships by Telephone
3000. IC Ship Movements on the Outbreak of War or Upon
Future Declaration of Emergency
3120, 5C Responsibilities of Subordinate Commands in
Handling MSC-Chartered and General Agency
Agreement (GAA) Dry Cargo Ships
3120. 12B Automated Mutual-Assistance Vessel Rescue
(AMVER) System
3120. 16A Standards of Appearance
3121. IE Operational Control Procedures for MSC-
Controlled Ships (less tankers)
3121. 5D Voyage Description in Shipping Articles
3123. 5G MSC Movement Report Instructions
3123. 6C Prearrival Messages by MSC Voyage-Chartered,
Time-Chartered and GAA Dry Cargo Ships;
submissiol of
3123. 7C Casualty Reports by MSC Voyage-Chartered, Time-
Chartered and GAA Dry Cargo Ships; submission of
3123. 8A Suez Canal Transit
3123.9 Panama Canal Transit
3130. ID Assistance-At-Sea Missions Performed by MSC
Ships; report of





3160. 2C Classified Nautical Chart and Publications for
MSC Contract-Operated Tanker (USNS) , MSC
Chartered Ships, and GAA Ships
3840. IC Information Collection by MSC Ships in Support
of National Interests
4020. 2E Bunkering Instructions
4355. 2C Delivery r Redelivery and Joint Survey of MSC
Time-Chartered Ships (except tankers);
reports on
4610. 29B Operating and Administrativg Procedures for MSC-
Controlled Bulk Carriers (Coal Ships)
4610. 32C Cargo Ship Location, Status and Utilization Sub-
System (CALSTAT) Reporting Instructions
4610. 33B MSC Cargo Ship In-Port Status Report
4650. 2B Passenger Booking and Reporting Procedures
4650. 5B Observers; Definition and Assignment of Aboard
MSC Ships
4700. ID Cleaning of Cargo Spaces in MSC Controlled
Ships; MSC Policy Governing
4700. 7B Ships Permanently Assigned to MSC; Material and
Machinery Operation Standards for
5112. IB Mail for Merchant Crews Aboard Ships Operating
for the Account of MSC
5420. 2E Salvage of Controlled Shipping; responsibility
for
5440.1V MSC Command Organization
5440. 2H Boundaries of MSC Area and Subarea Commands





5800. 2D Waiver for Navigation and Vessel Inspection Laws
and Regulations; procedures for
5840. 2C Procedures for Clearance of Ships with U.S.
Customs
5890. ID General Average and Salvage
6240. 4C MSC Environmental Protection and Enhancement
Program; Policy, Procedures, and Assignment of
Responsibilities for
80 23. IF Safety Regulations Governing the Handling and
Transportation of Ammunition and Other
Hazardous Cargoes
9010. IE Ship Characteristics Cards; preparation and
submission of
9170. IE Testing of Cargo Gear
12410. 3E Small Arms Training
187

primarily made up of fuel charges, port charges, and canal
tolls. An example of a voyage cost analysis including both
fixed and variable costs is included as Appendix C. Other
variable cost considerations involve off-hire periods, ROS
periods, and voyage margins for delays due to weather or
other unpredictable occurances.
On-Hire/Off-Hire procedures exist to account for
times when a vessel on time charter fails to perform in
accordance with its contract, A vessel's mechanical
equipment sometimes breaks down, whether it be the
propulsion or electrical power generating units or the cargo
handling gear. Diversions, for reason of medical necessity,
such as to put an ailing crewmember ashore in an emergency
are considered a failure to perform. Failures in hull
structure, such as a crack in the vessel's bottom, often
requires drydocking. During the period off the assigned
task, the vessel is considered in a status of failure to
perform. Certain information is required of the vessel's
Master by the Dry Cargo Ship Operations Branch, in order to
properly place the vessel off hire. Needed are actual times
of the commencement of the failure to perform and the number
of barrels of fuel aboard at that time. Likewise, times of
return to normal assigned activity and the amount of fuel on
board at that time are also required [Ref . 54] . Off-hire
time is monitored very closely as even a prorated reduction
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of per diem charges for a few hours off hire can result in
significant dollar savings. The opportunity to put a
time-charter ship in ROS when appropriate can also reduce
costs. As noted earlier, after FY85 these reduced costs can
no longer be charged to a CNO readiness account, but must be
absorbed in an MSC readiness account.
3. Operational Initiatives to Improve CS Efficiency
As noted in the previous section, opportunities for
the Combined Service to improve efficiency are tied to
either changing the fixed costs (i.e., changing the number
or type of the ship in the CS fleet) or changing the
numerous variable costs. If one takes as a required mission
performance standard, the requirement for a relatively con-
sistent route structure and port call frequency of approx-
imately 30 days, then there are various combinations of ship
numbers, sizes, speeds and route structures that can meet
minimum performance standards. The Combined Service manager
since its inception has monitored cargo flows in and out of
all the CS ports, noting not only overall utilization, but
significant origin-destination pairs for certain categories
of cargo. Analyses have been regularly performed to
consider more cost effective routes and/or schedules.
Additionally, analyses are performed by the Military Traffic
Management Command under its functional responsibility as
single manager for military traffic land transportation.
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Some of the ongoing analyses with potential impact
on CS operations are MSCPAC analyses of the effects of
deleting the East Coast and/or Gulf Coast segments of the CS
voyage. These analyses address identifiable costs specif-
ically but also attempt to factor contingency requirements
into a rational decision. MTMC is performing a series of
studies called "CSM Ship vs Line-Haul." This series, still in
draft form, compares costs of various scenarios to determine at what
point minibridge options become more cost effective than the
oceanborne shipping option. MTMC is also reviewing several
other port mixes to best determine if reduction of port
calls on the East Coast and the West Coast with more cargo
sent by truck or rail to the ports remaining on the route
would be cost effective. Reviewing for content these draft
comparative cost analyses is beyond the scope of this thesis
but it is appropriate to note that unless analyses of this
nature are done as a truly joint MSC/MTMC venture, they will
probably get lost in the political crossfire.
On a much smaller scale and with more immediate
results, the CS schedule can be planned and executed incor-
porating minor changes within fairly short time horizons.
There is flexibility to include mobilization exercise
requirements in th^e schedule as well as to consider the
shipping companies' overhaul and maintenance requirements.
Opportune lifts can be made if cost effective or otherwise
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Irequired, and cargo can be diverted to another port for
similar justification. The schedule is currently developed,
monitored, and changed in a manual mode which makes it
difficult to evaluate the secondary and tertiary impacts of
a schedule change.
4. Mgg initigtivgg tp Exp^n<^- Pry C^rgg g^pag^ty
When President Nixon came into office in 1968 he
called for a massive ship construction program to rebuild
the aging and dwindling U.S. merchant fleet. The parameters
of this program were reasonably well established:
a. Three hundred ships were to be built in ten years,
averaging thirty ships per year.
b. Ships would be of standard design for multi-ship,
multi-year procurement,
c. A minimum of 15 percent of the export- import trade
of the United States would move on U.S. ships.
d. The U.S. bulk fleet would be included in the new
program.
The three hundred ship program was envisioned in three
parts:
a. requirements and ship evaluation,
b. engineering development, and
c. ship construction [Ref. 55:32].
As noted in Chapter IV, this grandiose ten year plan begun
with such high hopes, never really materialized in the form
of substantial new merchant ship construction.
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When it became obvious to military leaders that the
promises of an upgraded merchant marine had turned out to be
just promises, new sealift options began to be formulated
that would reduce reliance on political intransigence.
Three examples of ongoing MSC activities that will directly
support contingency requiranents and, at the same time,
generate revenue and jobs for the U.S. maritime industry are
as follows:
a, a build-and-charter program,
b, A convert-and-charter maritime prepositioning ship
(MPS) program, and
c, the acquisition and conversion of SL~7's [Ref. 22:26],
Simply stated, build-and-charter is a means of
securing needed ships which are built and owned by private
interests. The Navy specifies the type of ships needed
(those not currently available in the merchant marine) and
private investors arrange for construction on the basis of a
Navy committment to charter the ships. Once the ships are
operating, the Navy pays the cost of the service provided at
a negotiated charter rate. The rate covers the cost of
construction and financing, plus a reasonable profit for the
owners. To date MSC has acquired the long-term use of 29
ships this way (28 tankers and one RO/RO) . In January 1982,
MSC issued a Request for Proposal for five new T-5
replacement tankers. These 25,000 to 30,000 DWT ships are
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to be built in U.S. shipyards and delivered to owners for
MSC use under charter in 1986 [Ref. 22:26].
Convert-and-charter is another program by which both
industry and the Navy profit. There are currently 17
chartered merchant ships with civilian crews on station in
the Indian Ocean as part of the Near Term Prepositioned
Force (NTPF) . The Military Sealift Command is currently
replacing elements of the NTPF with an expanded Maritime
Prepositioned Ship Program. Originally MSC had planned to
acquire 12 multipurpose ships through a combination of new
construction and conversion, but budget constraints resulted
in the decision to convert-and-charter. Contracts were
awarded in June 19 83 for construction and/or conversion of
13 ships to RO/RO configuration. These ships will then be
time chartered to MSC for up to 25 years.
The third program, the acquisition and conversion of
SL-7's, began with the purchase of eight large container-
ships from Sea-Land Industries, Inc. in 1981 and 1982. At
33-knots, these SL-7's are among the fastest cargo ships in
the world and, as part of the nucleus fleet, will give MSC
much-needed flexibility. They can carry tremendous amounts
of cargo and after conversion to the RO/RO configuration,
will be able to load or discharge in one day the majority of
the unit equipment (tanks, artillery, wheeled vehicles,
etc.) needed for two Army heavy mechanized or armored
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divisions [Ref, 22:27]. Four SL-7's have been converted and
funds have just been released to convert the remaining four
ships currently in MARAD custody.
All of these initiatives, including support for the
build up of the RRF and SRP, fall under the generic heading
of sealift enhancement programs that are getting much needed
attention. No longer is sealift' s role in strategic
mobility restricted to the long-term reinforcement of
deployed troops. It is now an essential element of all
strategic mobility plans and this has been and continues to
be reflected in funding. There was more money for sealift
enhancement programs in the FY82 budget and programmed by
the Navy in the follow-on four years of the Five Year
Defense Plan than in all the years since World War II
[Ref. 56:3]. Whether or not this increase in both interest
and funding will be sufficient to make up for years of
benign neglect has yet to be seen.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. GENERAL
An effort has been made in this study to put the
Combined Service into context by reviewing this five ship
operation as a component of the MSC capacity for providing
breakbulk shipping. The MSC controlled fleet must, in turn,
be viewed from the perspective of total U.S. flag dry cargo
capabilities and ultimately as a part of world dry cargo
shipping. Issues impacting the CS directly or indirectly
include breakbulk shipping requirements in peacetime as well
as various wartime scenarios and the excess capacity that
MSC in general and CS specifically are expected to provide
to meet surge requirements. Other issues relate to changes
in technology, military strategy, national goals, and
international politics. There is obviously nothing static
about this environment and, consequently, the CS must be
constantly reviewed to ensure its mission remains valid and
its performance meets applicable standards. Within that
review framework, alternatives for moving cargo within and
outside MSC must be considered including all relevant and
related cargo handling impacts,
B. SUMMARY
The Combined Service, as it was established in
June 1979, resulted from a recognition on the part of the
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Commander, Military Sealift Command, and to varying degrees,
his area commanders, that a scheduled breakbulk shipping
operation tying the East Coast, both inbound and outbound,
to the Far East via the Gulf Coast and West Coast would be
beneficial to the shipper services. Based on this
conviction, it was assumed that cargo currently being lost
to commercial shipping would flow to the CS, thus
productively employing existing MSC charter ships and yet
not officially "competing" with the commercial carriers.
COMSCPAC was designated the Combined Service manager and the
MSCPAC Transportation Office (P-3T) was delegated management
authority including the functions of scheduling, monitoring
cargo flows and associated costs, and continuous evaluation
of voyages. As an ongoing operation, problems are
identified and management or operationally oriented
solutions are applied on a regular basis.
Because the CS has been justified in part by its role as
a provider of surge capability (i.e., as part of the "warm"
industrial base), that issue was reviewed. Chapter III
included a brief history of the U.S. Merchant Marine to give
perspective to the condition of U.S. oceanborne shipping
today. The CS represents U.S. breakbulk shipping assets and
it was significant to describe the dwindling U.S. role in
breakbulk shipping although a world market continues to
exist. The continuing requirement to move military
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breakbulk cargo in a mobilization scenario was also
addressed. When considering breakbulk shipping assets in a
full to total mobilization environment, there are world
shipping markets to draw on. However, issues of avail-
ability in another "proxy" war environment (such as Korea or
Vietnam) where this country maintains a "guns and butter"
mentality, was described as more difficult to qualify. The
concern that militarily suitable ships may not be available
when needed was discussed in a section on modern trends in
dry cargo ship design and capabilities. It was stressed
that MSC can influence those designs and better utilize the
newer technologies in support of their mission.
Less tangible influences on decisions concerning the
Combined Service can be as important if not more important
than physical considerations. Chapter IV was used to
summarize maritime politics as represented by major U.S.
legislation, changing international policies, shifting
domestic competetive environments and, more specifically,
major changes in mobilization thinking.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 was chosen as a focal
point because it was a fairly recent and comprehensive piece
of legislation with specific goals that could then be
analyzed ex post facto to exemplify problems typical to the
legislation of progress. This summary was then related to
legislation under current consideration to help anticipate
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potential pitfalls and to glean an understanding of the
economic implications of politically inspired "solutions."
A quick review of the UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner
Conferences was included because breakbulk shipping is a
worldwide enterprise generally associated with the liner
trade. If one subscribes to the syllogism "investment
follows cargo" then the UNCTAD Code that allocates trade vis
a vis a cargo preference scheme is of particular concern to
the U.S. flag fleet. The U.S. has not signed the Code while
major trading partners have just started functioning within
its guidelines. There are sure to be significant shifts in
world flag fleets, not only in number but in the types of
ships that are suitable to support cargo sharing between
specific trading partners. As shipping conferences adjust
their route structures and tariffs, the U.S. may have to
relax its "free trade" posture.
The domestic transportation scene was included as
significant because recent deregulation of the trucking and
railroad industries has impacted their competetive position
with respect to certain oceanborne cargo. Land transporta-
tion options that were not cost effective several years ago
are now being reconsidered. Possible impacts on the CS




Changes in strategic planning with the associated
changes in total sealift requirements, surge versus sustain-
ability capabilities, and the role of prepositioned war
supplies, have dramatically altered concepts of sealift
readiness. The justification of the CS as a segment of the
MSC breakbulk sealift capability must be affected by these
shifting scenarios. Because shipping assets should not be
considered apart from their attendant manpower requirements
and port throughput capabilities, these segments of the
shipping base were included in the discussion of mobiliza-
tion impacts on sealift readiness.
Chapter IV also included a discussion of breakbulk cargo
handling capabilities in a wartime scenario by referencing
the Logistics-Over-the-Shore (LOTS) test and evaluations in
1976. The five LOTS tests and the still ongoing JLOTS II
tests addressed the problem of how to load and discharge
outsized and containerized cargo in an environment where no
port facilities were available and stressed the importance
military planners were placing on the use of containerized
military cargo. One of the primary outcomes of these series
of tests was the decision to procure eleven crane ships
(TACSs - six for the Navy and five for the Army) that would
travel with a container or breakbulk ship to offload its
cargo more flexibly and efficiently than making the ships
self-sustaining with their own cranes or derricks.
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The purpose of Chapter V was to pull together much of
the general material in the previous chapters and relate it
to MSC dry cargo shipping in general and specifically to the
CS wherever possible. The actual cargo carried was
discussed along with special issues such as the CS as a
special lift resource and a provider of not otherwise
available service.
Because breakbulk shipping has unique cargo handling
requirements, the impact of military shipping on military
portSf was discussed. The justification for the
underutilization of military port capacity is comparable to
the historical underutilization of shipping assets; to
maintain a surge capability. Consequently, there exists a
need for constant dialogue between MSC and MTMC to ensure
that the decisions of one have a minimum adverse impact on
the other.
The MSC oversight of the controlled dry cargo fleet was
briefly discussed to explain the administrative environment
and, specifically, the terms under which the chartered ships
come within MSC control. Ongoing operational initiatives to
improve CS efficiency were mentioned to better understand
the current cargo lift options available to CS managers. A
final section on MSC initiatives to expand total dry cargo





Because the purpose of this thesis was to put the
Combined Service scheduled breakbulk shipping operation into
context, or in other words, integrate its operations into
the rest of the shipping industry, it is difficult to point
to specific conclusions. Instead, the conclusions will be
comments on several trends noted during the research. These
trends will then be related to their potential impact on the
Combined Service. The trends fall into five general
categories:
a. the shifting of assets for surge capability;
b. the justification of controlled fleet ships and
route structures based on projected cargo
requironents (utilization);
c. changes in mobilization cargo handling technology;
d. the shifting domestic transportation scene; and
e. the agressive international shipping politics arena.
The first refers to the recent emphasis on the preposi-
tioning of military support equipment at sea. The NTPF will
be succeeded by the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)
Program which will require conversion or construction of
thirteen T-AKX ships. These dry cargo ships will be
stationed in strategic spots around the world. In addition,
the MSC Fast Sealift Program, consisting of the eight
converted SL-7s, will be stationed in the U.S., manned by
civilians, and initially dedicated to lifting Army
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divisions. They can be on station almost anywhere in two
weeks or less [Ref. 56:4]. Coupled with the recent decision
to discontinue putting nucleus ships into Reduced Operating
Status when no cargo is anticipated and the concurrent
support for upgrading the Ready Reserve Forcer the trend
appears to be away from using the time charter assets as a
surge capability.
This leads directly into the second trend and that is
toward justification of both route structures and number of
MSC breakbulk ships solely on projected peacetime cargo lift
requirements submitted annually by the shipper services.
The Combined Service has been justified on the basis mission
accomplishment, not cost. Consequently, utilization has
become the primary criterion for monitoring effectiveness.
The documented fact of low utilization on several segments
of the route has been of continuing concern to the CS
management and will probably result in the dropping of
certain port calls from the regular itinerary. By doing so,
there may be the need to slightly redefine the CS mission or
confront the risk that the entire operation will become more
and more justified on cost alone. This could ultimately
destroy the concept of a scheduled service altogether.
The fact that containerization of military cargo is here
to stay cannot be discounted and this rapid change in
technology is included as a third trend. It is totally
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I unrealistic for the almost entirely containerized peacetime
transport of dry cargo to shift to the breakbulk mode for
sea transport in a mobilization scenario. The studies
beginning with the LOTS series in 1975 and continuing into
the JLOTS II series still ongoing have helped definitize the
problem of discharging containers and establishing the
associated infrastructure necessary for efficient utiliza-
tion of containerized military equipment. Certainly, all
the problems have not been solved but the trend appears
towards accommodating the changing cargo carrying tech-
nologies by developing new concepts in military cargo
handling. However, as military cargo becomes more "contain-
Ierizable," the need for breakbulk ships may decrease but
will never disappear. It is estimated that 10 to 15 percent
of military dry cargo will never be container suitable. New
requirements may also develop for breakbulk ships as they
assist in carrying outsized equipment necessary to establish
container discharge facilities in undeveloped areas.
Another trend impacting breakbulk shipping from a more
routine business perspective is the changing domestic trans-
portation scene. The growth of interraodalism in the rail-
road and trucking industry, particularly the growth in
domestic container ization, can only mean increased competi-
tion for traditionally breakbulk cargo in the intercoastal
and intracoastal trade. The growing sophistication of
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minibridge, microbridge, and landbridge operations with
their convenient single tariff structures will also continue
cutting into the oceanborne shipping market. As these
markets are encroached upon and breakbulk markets decrease
in the U.S. oceanborne trades, the number of U.S. flag
breakbulk ships will probably decrease even more rapidly.
This could soon endanger the pool of ships available for
charter hire.
The final trend relates to the understanding that the
United States functions in a world economy and political
environment. These factors have substantial impacts on
perceptions of oceanborne shipping as either a national
economic and political asset or as a purely commercial
enterprise.
Where other countries have made it clear that their
merchant fleets are part of an overall national policy, the
United States remains dominated by special interest groups
who directly or indirectly interfere with the development of
a strong national oceanborne shipping policy. All the
while, our cargoes are being carried increasingly by foreign
flag vessels including those of state-owned fleets of
potential adversaries. The very ships which would be
employed as a naval auxiliary of an enemy in time of war are
financed by our peacetime cargoes, and allowed to drive our
U.S. flag ships, and the ships of our allies, out of our
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U.S. trades [Ref. 57:17]. There currently appears to be
some serious review of U.S. traditional free trade concepts
that, after consultation with our allies, may result in some
fundamental changes in maritime policy. The long-range
objective is to ensure the availability of cargoes for U.S.
flag carriers, and for the flag carriers of our allies, in
our trades, in order that the trades remain "free."
The implied threat associated with the implementation of
the UNCTAD Code is pushing the U.S. toward the establishment
of bilateral trade agreements. The realization that the
rest of the world is not particularly concerned about free
trade has been difficult for the U.S. to deal with. But
unless decision makers are willing to face the reality that
the U.S. can no longer set world policy but instead must
adapt to it, this country could lose what little merchant
fleet it has left.
These are the five most significant trends that, by
constantly influencing the external environment of the
Combined Service, indirectly impact the performance of its
current and future missions. Decision makers within the MSC
organization must be cognizant of these trends and be aware
of their potential impacts in order to continue to make
intelligent decisions concerning breakbulk requirements in
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TIME CHARTER PARTY FOR MSC DRY CARGO
[From COMSCINST 3120.17 dated 24 January 1983]







CONTRACT FOR: TIME CHARTER OF VESSEL FOR SPECIFIED TIME
This contract is entered into as a result of negotiation pursuant to the
authority of Tltl^-^O U.S. Code 2304(a)(10) ; and any necessary detenrri nations and
findings, or other supporting statement of justification, prescribed by tnat Act
or by the Defense Acquisition Regulation have been made.
The supplies and ser/ices to be obtained by this instrument are chargeable
to the following allocnents, the available balances of which are sufficient to
cover the cost of tne same:
AGENCY: MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND
APPROPRIATION AND SUBHEAD: 17X4912.3302
BUREAU CONTROL NO: 77777/-
AUTHORIZATION ACCOUNTING ACTIVITY: 62387
TYPE: 2E
COST CODE: 5202
THIS CHARTER PARTY, entered Into this day of
19 , at Washington, D.C. by and between THE UNITED STATES OF AMnTLJ~(7ireTnaTTar
sometimes called the "Charterer" and sometimes called the "Government") repre-
sented by the Contracting Officer executing this document, and
,
a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State or
(hereinafter sometimes called the "&*ner" and sometimes called the "Contractor')
.
WITNESSETH THAT
The Owner agrees to let and the Charterer agrees to hire the United
States flag SS/MV , on the following terms and conditions.
ARTICLE 1 . DESCRIPTION OF VESSEL.
The Owner warrants that the vessel has the following characteristics:
(a) Classed: MARAD SS DESIGN TY^E




(d) Engines: Of Normal. Brake.
_^_^___^__




(1) Warranted Speed: Cdcatle of mainczinirg under normal conditions
an average speed of aoout knots in moderate weather wnen fully lacer. , en
an average consunotion of barrels standard diesel or similar grace/
standara grace "C" or equivalent oi 1 fuel per 24 nours.
(2) Warranted Fuel Consumption: (when fully laden in moderate weather)










(f) Net Registered Tonnage: .
(g) Deadweight: Deadweight Capacity of vessel axcludino bunkers, water and
stores: tons (Z2C0 lbs) aeadweight caoacity of vessel inc'udino
buntcers, water anc stores: tens (of 22^ lbs) on assignee su-nrer
mean draft of feet
_____^ incnes in salt water corr-socnding to a load
line sumrer freeDo^irs of feet
___^_^__
incnes under present inter-
national load line regulations. The vessel's load line is marked and so placed
as to acnit of her being safely loaded to <uc*i draft.
(h) Bala Cubic Capacity:
Clean/available gen'l. cargo spaces:







Total ccmoined bale capacity
________
cubic ft.
Number of tanks: Total deep tank capacity cubic ft.
(i) Amount and location of permanent ballast carried:
(j) Permanent bunker capacity, of about barrels.
(k) Number of hatcnes and size of hatch openings; and numoer and location
of 'tween oecks:
(1) Number/location of winches, derricks, booms, and cranes with caoacity
of each:
(m) Navigational Equipment:
The Vessel is equiooed uocn comnencement of the charter witn ;he
following navigational equipment and such equipment will be maintained in
prooer order at all times during the period of this charter.
(1) Radar
(2) Loran
(3) Radio direction finder
(',] Gyro comoas:
(5) Automatic Steering Device
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• (n) Communication J Capability:
The Vessel is op will uoon deliver/ be equipped with the minimum
communications capaoili'y as set forth in Annex A.
ARTICLE 2. PLACE MiO DATE OF DELIVERY AND REDELIVERY, ETC.
.
(a) Place of Delivery:
_______________^
(b) Data of Delivery:
(c) Cancellation Date:
(d) Place of Redelivery:
(e) Charter Hire: S per diem.
(f) Fuel on board at time of delivery, as required by
ARTICLE 3. SUBGHARTER.
Charterer may, without the prior written consent of the Owner, subchapter,
or agree to subcnarter, the Vesse>linder any fora of charter co a party wno is
and will remain during the subcharter period a citizen of the United States
within -the meaning of Section 2 cf the Shipping Act, 1915, and qualified to
engage in the United States coastwise trade within the meaning of said Section
2. If Charterer shall enter into any such charter. Charterer shall nevertheless
refnain liable for the due performance of this Charter. Any such subcnarter
shall include a provision that it is subject to the provisions of tnis Charter.
ARTICLE 4. DELIVERY OF THE VESSEL.
(a) The Vessel shall be delivered to the Charterer at the olace stated in
paragraph (a) of Article 2 on or between the dates stated in paragr vhs (b)' and
(c) of Article 2. The Vessel shall tender with all heavy lift equipment rigged
and in operating condition. The heavy lift ecuioment snail be craaled unless
otherwise required by the Charterer. The Owner snail absorb all expenses relating
to tne rigging and securing of all gear.
(b) The Vessel shall be placed at the disposal of the Charterer at the
aforesaid port of delivery in such dock or at such ttmrf or place (wnere she may
safely proceed to, lie at and depart from, always afloat, at all times of tice,
except at such places where it is customary for similar size vessels to lie
safely aground) as the Charterer may direct. Vessel on delivery shall be, insofar
as due diligence may make her so, seaworthy, tight, staunch, strong, properly
manned and in every way suitable and adequately fitted for, with all cargo gear
approved by regulatory bodies, and in all respects ready to receive and transport
lawful cargo; provided, that the Owner is not required to have the Vessel fitted
with extra fittings or special gear required for a special trade or unusual cargo,
unless Owner herein specifically assumes such obligation, but the Charterer shall
have the use of any extra fittings or special gear aboard. (See Article 33(a))
The Owner noon tendering warrants that the vessel meets all current safety and
health rc^jlations of the appropriata regulatpry authorities.
(c) Vessel will be equipped with a full sat cf cargo battens and clios at
Owner's time and expense.
(d) Upon delivery the Charterer may require a joint on-hire sur/ey of the
Vessel.
(e) When the Vessel has arrived at the port cf delivery in accordance with
paragraph (a) of this Article and is :n the berth designated by Charterer, and
in the condition described in paragraph (b) of this Article, the Owner shall
tender a notice of readiness by letter or telegram to the Contracting Officer or
his representative at the port of delivery on a working day (Saturdays, Sundays,
and holidays shall not be considered as working days). If proper notice of readiness
is received by the Contracting Officer or his representative between OSOO and
1200, acceptance will be mad^ within 4 hours after receiot of sucn notice. If
proper notice of readiness i; received between 1201 and 1700. the Charterer shall
not be required to accept the Vessel until 0800 of the next working day. If,
however, the Contracting Officer elects to receive the notice on Saturday, Sunday.
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cr 3 noliaay, or after 17CD en a wor'<irg cay. the Vessal snail be accscstad before
neon of the next working day, unl'tss the Contracting Officer or hii reoresentati ve
at the port snail elect to acceot earlier delivery. If the Veisel nas arrived at
tne port of delivery in accordancs- with oarjgraon (a) of this Article, and is in
zht condition described in paragr; pn (b) of this Article, and Is not in the
designated berth because such ber^.n is -lot available, notice of readiness iray be
tendered in accordance with this laragraon in the same manner as if the Vessel
were in the designateo berth, and acceptance snail be made in accordance with the
provisions of this paragrapn.
(f) If the Vessel should ar-ive at the place of delivery stated in paragrioh
(a) of Article 2, prior to the first date stated in paragraph (b) of Article 2,
and is in the condition described in paragrapn (b) of this Article, the Contracting
Officer or his representative may. at his election, receive the notice of readiness
and may theraftar accept delivery of the Vessel at any time prior to tne first
date stated in paragraoh (b) of Ai-ticle 2. However, if the notice af readiness
is received prior to the first da:e stated in paragraph (b) of Article 2, as
hereinbefore described in this pa*agraoh, and the Contracting Officer, or his
representative does not elect to icceot delivery of the Vessel prior to the first
date stated in paragraoh (b) of Article 2, the Vessel will be accepted before
noon of tne first date stated in paragrapn (b) of Article 2, without furtner
tender of notice of readiness provided the Vessel is at such time In the condition
desrribed in paragraph (b) of this Article.
(g) Should the written notice of readiness not be tendered in accordance
with tne provisions of this Article prior to IfiOO of the date stated in paragraph
(c) of Article 2, Charterer shall have the privilege of cancelling this Charter
at any time not later than the day of tne Vessel's tender of readiness. In the
event tne Charterer aoes not exercise its privilege to cancel as provided by tnis
paragraph and suosequent to the cancellation date the Charterer accepts delivery
of the Vessel, such acceptance shall net be deemed to be a waiver of any rights
the Charterer may have for damages suffered as a result of tne Vessel not being
delivered to the Charterer by the latest date specified in Article 2(c).
ARITlCt 5. PERIOD CF THE CHARTE."?.
(a) This Charter shall be for a period of fron about months/
years to aoout months /years from tne time of delivery of me Vessel or
to the tenmnation of cne voyage then current. Charterer's option.
(b) Options: Optional periods unless otherwise agreed shall be in direct
continuation.
ARTICLE 6. INSURANCE AND INDEMNITY.
(a) During the period commencing with the acceptance and terminating with
the redelivery of the Vessel, the Owner shall secure the customary full form
marine insurance coverage on this Vessel including Hull i Machinery, P i I, War
Risk Hull and Machinery including P i I, and Second Seaman's War Risk Policy.
Except as prov^dec in paragraphs (b) and (c) below, the expense for sucn in-
surance coverage shall be for the Owner's account and shall be deemed to be
included in the charter hire paid under this Contract.
(b) Trading limits of this Vessel shall be worldwide, but Charterer agrees
to notify the Cwner as soor as oracticaoie, if the '.'esseT is sent beyona the
limits of .^erican Insticuia Trace warranties anr to reimburse t.-e Owner for the
actual extra cost of marine insurance car-ied by the Owner or. the date zf this
Charter Party that is occasioned by the Vessel's tracing beyond such limits.
(c) With respect to tne oeriod commencing with the acceptance and terminating
with the redelivery or une Veisel, tne Charterer shall reimourse the Owner for
any increase actually incurred in premiums or charges over those oayable as of
tne oata of this Charter Party for the cost of the following Insurance coverages
wnicn are required by Article 5(a):
(1) War risk Insurance on hull and machinery oased upon the aggregate
valuation of the Vessel stated in the marine risk insurance policy, policies or
binders carried by cne Owner on the date of this Charter Party, or if no marine
insurance was carried on that date such valuation as shall be agreed upon by the
Owner and the Contracting Officer.
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(2) War pislc insurance on the lives of or for injuries to officers and
crew and loss or damage to their personal effects, including sextants of declc
officers, in the form of Second Seaman's war Risk Policy.
(3) War risk insurance on leased eauioment on board for which the
Owner is resoonsible, on slop chests, on the actual value of the Vessel's unused
consufltable stores, bunker fuel and on cash carried on board not in excess of
55,300 unless otherwise agreed.
(4) War risk protection and indemnity insurance for the benefit of the
Owner and Charterer as their interests may apoear, including Owner's liabilities
to officers and crew until repatriated, in an amount not in excess of 50 percent
more than the aggregate valuation of tne Vessel stated in the marine risk insurance
policy, policies or binders carried by the Owner on the date of this Charter
Party.
I
(d) The (V*ner shall not b« reimbursed by the Charterer for excess premiums
paid by the Owner for obtaining a waiver of the 48-ftour termination provision of
war risk insurance and the granting of an extension in lieu thereof in the event
of tne outbreak of war.
(e) Notwithstanding Article 6(a) above, the Owner may elect to be a self-
insurer, in wnole or in part (including deductible provisions in any insurance
policy actually carried) and the charter hire paid under this Charter snail oe
deemed to include a sum eouivalent to a fair cormerclal oremium for the insurance
coverage required by Article 5(a).
(f) In the event all or any part of the insurance required by Article 6(a)
which has been placed by the Owner, shall become vitiated, susoended, lapsed, or
terminated from any cause arising out of or as a result of orders, acts or omissions
of the Charterer or any persons acting for the Charterer, the Charterer shall
indemnify the Owner against any loss, damage or expense suffered or sustained by
It as a result of such vitiation, suspension, lapse, or termination; provided,
however, that the Owner shall credit the Charterer with any savings in respect of
such premiums from the time of such vitiation, suspension, lapse, or termination.
The value of tne Vessel shall be determined as set forth in Article 5(c)(1).
•
(g) The Charterer shall indemnify and hold harmless the Owner, the Master
and the Vessel from, the losses, expenses and liaoilities proximately caused by
coffloliance with any orders or directions of the Charterer, its agents, representatives
or employees except those properly chargeable to the 0<ner under other provisions
of this Contract or which are recoverable under any insurance carried by the
Owner or would nave been recoverable under insurance required by Article 6(a) if
the Owner had not elected to be a self-insurer in whole or part. The Owner
snail, as far as may be practicable, keep the Charterer, through the Contracting
Officer, currently informed in writing as to any oral orders (involving substantial
delays, exoense or risk to the Vessel or her cargo) which have not been promptly
confirmed in writing by the person giving such orders. The Charterer's total
liability shall not exceed 150 percent of the fair market value of the Vessel at
the time of the loss less whatever amounts are recovered from the underwriters or
other parties. The fair market value shall be determined by the Contracting
Officer, but if the Owner does not agree with the amount determined by the
Contracting Officer to be the fair market value, such disagreement shall be
deemed to ae a dispute as to a question of fact within the meaning of the ciause
entitled "Disputes".
(h) In the event all or any part of the war ris*; insurance described herein,
expires wnether by reason of the automatic termination clause of the policies or
otherwise, and the Owner is unable to obtain comoarable coverage either from the
Government or commercial underwriters; the Charterer agrees to indemnify the
Owner against any loss, damage or exoense incurred by the Owner or tne Vessel
which, but for the expiration of such insurance, would have been covered thereby;
provided, however, that the Owner shall credit tne Charterer with any savings in
respect of such preimums from the time of such expiration.
(i) In the event of loss or damage to the Vessel caused by ice which would
be recovered under the terms of a full form marine hull insurance policy, but
which is excluded from such policy by the provisions of the American Institute
Trade 'Warranties, such loss or damage shall be made good by the Charterer but
only to the extent not covered by insurance.
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(j) £;cc20t as otherwise specifically provided in :nis Charter Party the
Chartsrsr snail not be liable for any loss, dar.age, exoensa. cost or liaoility
wnatsoever and nowsoever incurred oy the Owner or vessel wnicn is recoverable
under any insurance carried Oy tne Owner or would nave been recoverable under
insurance required by Article 6(a) if the Owner had not elected to be a self-
insurer in wnole or in part.
ARTICLE 7. CARGO.
(a) The Vessel shall be used in transporting any lawful cargo excluding the
carriage of livestocic, but Charterer shall have tne privilege of shioaing a small
number of livestocic on d'eclc at Charterer's risk. All necessary fittings and
other requirements for the carriage of livestock on aeCx. shall be for Charterer's
account.
(b) Cargo may include gasoline and diesel engine vehicles all preloaded
with cargo and with batteries connected and fuel tanks 3/4 filled.
(c) The Charterer (except as to matters affecting only the stability and
seaworthiness of the Vessel) shall be exclusively responsible for prcoer loading,
stowage, and discnarge of goods of an inflanwable, explosive or danagerous
nature, and snail ccnoly with all applicable regulations ano fumisn any necessar:'
fittings.
(d) The Charterer will ootain all necessary Coast Guard waivers and pemits.
ARTICLi 8. LOADING ANO DISCMARGING.
(a) The cargo or cargoes shall be laden and discharged at any dock or any
wharf, place or open roadstead that Charterer may direct, proviaed the Vessel can
lie always safely afloat at any time of tide except at such places wnere it is
custpmary for similar size vessels :o lie safely aground. If the Charterer
directs tne Vessel to any berth wnicn tne Charterer :<ncws or snould know is
unsafe and the Vessel is damaged as » direct result tnereof and through no fault
of the Owner, Master, crew or pilot or error of navigation, the repairs snail be
for the Charterer's account.
(b) The Charterer shall pay all expenses directly connected with the
loading and discharging of the cargo including steveooring, wnarfage, cler'<ing
and tallying, wincnmen, heavy lifts, dumping, stowing, securing anc trimming, and
removal of strongbacks with snore eouipment where the use of shore ecuipment is
not necessitated by a structural or mecnanical defect in the Vessel unless that
defect is caused by tne fault or negligence of the Charterer. Unless otherwise
provided nerein the Charterer shall provide necessary dunnage and sni^tmg boarcs,
also any extra fittings or materials recuisite for a special trace or unusual
cargoes, but the Owner shall allow the Charterer the use of any dunnage, shifting
boards and other fittings or materials already on board the Vessel. The Charterer
shall have the privilege of using shifting boards for dunnage, but if the Vessel's
shifting boards are used as dunnage, the Charterer shall make good any carnage td
or shortage of such shifting boards on redelivery of tne Vessel. If the Charterer
elects or is requested by tne Owner to remove dunnage and fittings placed on
board by tne Charterer, the cost of removal and discna.'^e shall oe borne by the
Charterer.
(c) The Charterer shall have the use of the Vessel's wincnes and other
aooropnate gear actually on ooard, and tne Owner snail provide sufficient ocwer
to ooerate all the Vessel's wincnes simultaneously. The Vessel snail work nignt
and day, if required by the Charterer.
(d) Any damage to the Vessel or its eouioment which occurs during loading
or discharging operations caused by tne negligence or failure of the eouipment of
tne Charterer, its agents, emoloyees or contractors in performing tne Charterer's
cuties 0- loading and discharging the Vessel, or in preparation for sucn loading
or discnarging, shall be repaired at tne Charterer's expense and zhe Owner
agrees to assign to the Charterer any rignts, causes of action, or other claims
which the Owner may have against third persons, except Owner's undanxriters , with
respect to such damages.
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(e) The Charterer shall not be liable for the reoair of any damage under
Article 8(a) or (d) or any other provisions of this Charter unless written
notice specifying sucn damage, and, if obtainable, the name of the party or
parties causing sucn damage, snail have been given to tne Charterer or its
autnorized representative within a reasonable time (reasonable time for purposes
of this paragraph shall be deemed to be within Z«> nours (i) after the alleged
damage occurs or (ii) is discovered, or (iii) could have been discovered by the
exercise of due diligence by the Owner, Master, Officers or crew of the Vessel).
(f) Lighterage, if any, will be at the risk and expense of the Charterer.
(g) Cargo shall be loaded, stowed, trimmed, secured and discharged by the
Charterer under the Master's supervision and the Master shall be responsible for
such activity as it pertains to the seaworthiness of the Vessel. The Charterer
shall not be liable for any losses caused by shifting cargo unless resulting frxxn
a latent defect in the cargo.
(h) In no case shall the cargo exceed what the Vessel can reasonaoly stow
and carry, in the Judgment of the Master, over and above the soacs and burtnen
necessary for Vessel's officers and crew, her cabin, tackle, apparel, furniture,
provisions, fresh water, stores, necessary ballast and fuel. The amount of the
deck cargo shall be at the discretion of the Master and the loading, carriage and
Giscnarge tnereof shall be at the risk of the Charterer. Any material reouired
for securing aeck cargo is to be fumisned by the Charterer and for its account,
but Charterer may have the use of any deck lashings aboard the Vessel.
(i) If by reason of the Owner's failure to use due diligence as orovided in
Article 21(a) to keep the Vessel in a thoroughly efficent state of hull, machinery,
equipment, personnel, and other particulars relating to the seaworthiness of the
Vessel, the Charterer incurs cost of stevedoring detention or stancby time in
connection with the loading or discharging of cargo, such costs shall be for the
account of tne Owner; provided, however, the Owner shall not be liable for such
costs unless the period of detention or standby exceeds 20 minutes. The Charterer,
within 24 hours after tne period of detention or standby commences, shall give
tne Owner or its representative written notice of t.".e detention or standby time.
(j) The Charterer shall not be held responsible for losses sustained by the
Owner or the ship through the negligence of pilots, or tugboats or any other
error of navigation auring docking or undocking.
ARTICLE 9. CLEANiriG.
(a) Upon delivery in accordance with Article 4, all holds and those aeep
tanks specified in Article 1(g) snail be cleaned and ready to receive lawful
cargo.
(b) Any cleaning of the Vessel's holds or deep tanks during the period of
the Charter shall be for the account of tne party ordering the last previous use
of such holds or deep tanks during the period of this Charter; provided, however,
that where the ballast is carried in cargo deep tanks after use by the Charterer
for fuel, sucn ballasting shall not be deemed the last use of sucn aeeo tanks for
tne purposes of this subsection.
(c) Upon redelivery of the Vessel in accordance witn Article 30, the holds
cf the Vessel and those ceeo tanks the last use of wnicn was made by the Charterer,
snal' be sweot clean witn refuse removed, unless during ihe aeriod cf this Charter
:he Vessel nas carried in these spaces cargo witn respect to wnicn cusucm requires
more complete cleaning, in wnich case the Charterer shall give sucn spaces the
required cleaning.
ARTICLE 10. OVERTIME, PENALH TIME AND OTHER ADDITIONAL EMOLUMENTS.
All overtime, penalty time, and other additional emoluments payable to the
Vessel's crew for any reason whatsoever including tnose arising from compliance
witn any orders or directions of the Charterer, its agents, reoresen'ratives . or





The Charterer snail be at liberty co install any eouioment or defensive
amament (including <2ernag::2ti:ation by installed ecuioment or other orocess,
e.g., degaussing, wioing or oeoerming) , to make alterations ana additions
incidental to the service in which tne Vessel is to be used, and to install any
additional gear or equipment for loading, carrying or discharging cargo beyonc
tnat on board at the beginning of this Charter. Such work shall ae done at tne
Charterer's expense and en its time, and shall not be such as to affect the
seaworthiness of the Vessel or the safety of tne crew, or as to be in contra-
vention Tjf any applicable law of the United States or regulation Tiaae pursuant
thereto. Such equipment, amament, materials, and gear so fitted are to be tne
Government's property; and the Charterer shall remove the same together with any
sucn alterations and additions at its expense before redelivery, and shall restore
tne Vessel to her condition prior to such changes (ordinary wear anc itaar excepted),
ARTICL- 12. ECONOJ^IC PRICi AOJUST?i£NT.
(a) The Contractor warrants that the charter hire rate does not include any
contingency allowance to cover the possibility of increased cost of oerfomance
resulting from increases in (1) the manning scale anc ratings constituting the
Vessel's ccmoiement as set forth in Scnecule A, py reference incarporated nerein,
or (2) to total wages payaole to tne Vessel's conolement as set fortn in '='-*?ecuie
A; or (3) t.he cast of suosistenca as set forth in Scnecule 3, by refsrencd
incorporated nereir; or (4) the cost of t.ne Vessel's stores iS set fortn in
Scnecule B. The Charterer and Contractor agree that increases or decreases in
cost of performance for all periods tne Vessel is on-hire snaH be subject to
economic orics adjustment upward or downward as set forth in (c) througn (d)
oelow. It is agreed that economic orics adjusdent shall not become effective
until and that the base date for calculation of economic price
adjus'snent snaii pe
,
the Contractor paying for any increases in"
items wOvered by econcmic price adjustsient prior to no matte*'
when such increases are actually incurred as a debt or paia. Scnecules A and 3
nferr»i ta aoove shall be suomittad by tne Contractor snowing costs on
(b) "or the purpose of this clause (i) the tern "total wages" includes but
is not limited to basic wages, pension and welfare costs, vacation pay, and any
ptner fringe benefits or otner payments paid as a result of collective oargaining
agreements and overtime at the agreed percentage of cf base wages
vice actual overtime for each department of the Vessel ana related taxes, all as
set forth in Scnecule A; provided, however, tnat if a revision of any sucn agreement
makes an acjustment in overtime hours as a result of a change of tne work week or
in fringe cenefits and by reason thereof, the Contractor pays total wages in
excess of or less than tnose sat forth in Schedule A, "total wages" shall include
all overtime actually incurred solely by reason of such adjustnent and further
proviced tnat nothing nerein shall obligate tne Government ta pay any increase in
actual overtime unless such increase is a result of a cnange In collective
oargaining agreements as herein proviaed; (ii) the term "stpres" means the stores
of tre Deck, Engine, or Steward's Ceoartment of tne Vessel; (iii) the term
"subsistence" means tne provisions used in subsisting tne crew members.
'c) In the event that after
___^ the price for stores
and subsistence snail be in excess cf or less tnan tne onces shown in Scnedule
3, for the period commencing upon tne effective cate, payment will be nade by the
Charterer or creaits py the Contractor for adjusOTents upward or downward curing
tnat period, in accorffance with the proceaures set fort.h in Scnedule 3.
(d) In the event that after^ , the Contractor, as a
result of collective bargaining agreements, s"a'. ; oe recui red to pay total wages
to the Vessel's ccmolement in excess or less tnan those snown in Scnedule A for
the pe'"iod commencing upon the ef'^ective date, payment will be inade oy the
Charterer pr credits by tne Contractpr for adjustments upward or downward during
tnat period, not less frequently than every tnree mcntns.
(e) At twelve montn intervals from the effective cate of ecpncmic price
idjustment tne Charterer and Contractor may agree en a lumo sum iCjust-nent ta
include any payments or credits known to be aue at that date under this Article
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(f) Failure of the parties to agree uocn an adjustment as orovided in this
clause shall be deened to be a disoute as to a question of fact within the
(T.eamng of the clause entitled "Oiioutas."
ARTICLE 13. CARGO RECEIPT.
(a) The Charterer shall preoare a manifest which shall list the cargo
loaded on the Vessel. The Master snail sign this manifest in acknowleagement of
the receipt of cargo said to have been loaded by the Charterer without responsibility
as to quantities, mixture, mar<c, numoer of oacHages, weights, etc., or the aooarent
condition of the cargo, it being understood that' it is the Charterer's resoonsibility
to tally the cargo and to check the condition thereof upon loading and discharging.
(b) Any receipt signed by or on behalf of the Master or Agent shall be
without prejudice to the terms, and conditions and exceptions of this Charter and
subject to all of them. The Charterer hereby agrees to incermify anil noid harmless
the Owner, the Master, and thi Vessel of and from all consequences or llabln'tles
that may arise from any irregularity in the papers supplied by the Charterer or
^is agents, or from any inconsistency of sucn papers, including bills of lading,
with this Charter.
(c) In the case of any loss or damage to or In connection with goods
exceeding in actual value 5500 lawful money of tne United States, per paOcage, or
in the case of goods not. shipoed in oacxages, oer measurement ton, the value of
tne goods snail be deemed to be S50C per oacicage or per measurement ton, ana the
Owner's liability, if any, shall oe detarmineo on tne oasis of the value of S5Q0
per package or oer measurement ton, unless the nature of the goods and a valuation
higner than S500 shall have been declared in writing by the Charterer uoon loading
and in such case, if the actual value of the goods per oacicage or per measurement
ton shall exceed such declared value, the value snail nevertheless be deemed to
be the declared value.
(d) The terms of the Contract snail apply to any shioment made by the
Government wnether or not bills of lading are issued.
ARTICLE U. CHARTER HIRE.
(a) Except as otherwise provided 'lerein, the Charterer shall pay for the
use and hire of the Vessel at the rate stated in paragraon (e) of Article 2, per
24-nour day or pro rata part thereof frcn tr.e time of ner delivery and acceptance
by the Charterer in accordance with Article -i to the time of her redelivery in
accordance with Article 30. However, hire snail cease at noon of the cay the
Vessel Is lost or becomes a constructive total loss. In the event of damage, the
Vessel shall be a constructive total loss unaer this Charter wnen the expense of
recovering and repairing the Vessel shall exceed its repaired value regardless of
the insured value of the Vessel. The determination as to wnether or not the
Vessel is a constmctive total loss shall be made by the Contracting Officer as
soon as practicable upon receiot of notification that the Vessel has suffered
suostantial damage. If the Vessel is missing hire shall cease at noon of the
last day the Vessel was heard from. Charter hire under this suboaragraon snail
be based on elapsed time measured by Greenwich MEAN time.
(b) If, because of the car-iage of "oenalty cargoes" or explos-'ves as
defined in prevailing wage agreements, the Owner is reauired to oay additional
wages to the crew, tr.e Charterer shall reimourse the Owner tne amount of sucn
additional wages orovided such adoitiona'' wages do not exceed the amounts set out
in applicable agreements with recogiiiec laoor unions.
(c) The Charterer shall reimburse the Owner for crew return transportation
expenses, other than those which are reimoursaole to the Owner under its insurance
policies, wnere sucn transportation expenses are incurred by the Owner during the
currency of the Charter in accoraance with applicable laoor agreements unless
Such repatriation was the result of the willful fault of the Owner, Master, or
crew.
(d) The Charterer snail reinburse the Owner for its actual out-of-oocket
expenses including all taxes with respect thereto for which the Owner is re-
sponsible by reason of aoclicable collective bargaining agreements or by compliance
with orders of any duly authorized agency of the Government for (i) any war risk
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bonuses, extra wages tsased op the areas to be traversed during, or tne oorts of
call of, any voyage Hereunder ; (ii) any recuirsd oaymenrs to tne officers or cr«<*
of the Vessel necessarily incurred by reason of oroers or dir«ction of the
GoverTmient wnicn reouire the Owner to breach existing Articles of the cre>» or
contracts with the Officers, proviaed such Articles cotroly with the instructions
of the Charterer; (iii) all wages, overtime, subsistence, bonus of extra officers
and men beyond the normal comolsment of tne Vessel as of the date of the Charter
Party, who are emoloyed, because of tne special regu i ronents of the Vessel's
service under this Contract, including all oersonnel necessary to proviae for
persons carried at the r«guest of the Charterer; (iv) all wages and overtime oaid
to security watchmen provided in comoliance with any written security reQuirenents
of the Charterer or port authority, and all overtime or additional wages paid to
the officers or crew standing watch by reason of canoliance with sucn requiremen ts;
(v) all wages and bonuses payable in case of loss of the Vessel, incTbding constructive
total loss, though tne data of loss is unknown but only to the extent not covered
by insurance.
(e) The Contractor agrees that any insurance payments, refunds, rebates,
credits or other amounts (including any interest thereon) accruing to or received
by the Contractor under this Contract snail be paid by the Contractor to the
Government to the extent that they are prooer'iy allocable to costs, exoenses or
reimoursements for wnicn the Contractor nas been reimourttt by tne Government
unoer the terns of tms Contract.
ARTTCLI IS. MrrrfOO OF PAYMENT AND ACCCUNTING INFORMATION.
Payment of hire as earned, port charges, canal tolls, if any, and any other
Charges for Charterer's account as proviaed herein, shall be maae uocn suomlssion
of properly certified invoices or vouchers in accordance with aopli cable billing
instructions. Invotcss or vouciers may be suomitted by tne Owner every fifteen
days to Military Sealift Catmanc, Oeoarcnent of tne Navy, Washington, O.C. 20390,
Attention Code: M-56.
ARTICL£ 16. PORT CHARGES AND EXPENSES.
(a) ExcBDt as otnen»<ise provioed herein Charte'^r shall pay all dues, taxes
and similar oort charges imposed oy ouolic authority including consL'l;.r charges
(except those pertaining to tne Master, Officers and crew), incyrrec oy the
Vessel in ports visited pursuant to Charterer's direction. The Charterer snail
also pay all exoenses incurred by the Vessel in the aforesaid ports wnici, although
not imooseti in tne instant case by public authority, are usually imposed by
public authority, sucn as wharfage or docxage. The Charterer further agrees to
pay all exoenses necessarily incurred by the Vessel entering or leaving the
aforesaia ports (including agent's and custom broker's fees). The Charterer
Shall also pay for (i) pilotage of the Vessel wnere sue oilotage is customary,
or where the Vessel is required by tne Goventnent to enter or transit a nazardous
or restricted area or oody of water; and (ii) pilotage or towage in connection
with the bumtenng or ballasting of the Vessel, or in shifting the Vessel in
accoraanca with the oraers of tne Government. Nothing herein shall be construed
as reouiring the Charterer to pay expenses incurred by the Owner of the Vessel
for ser/ices renoered for the convenience of the 0»*ier. the Vessel or its Master,
Officers or crew or m connection with the Owner's business such as fees of
unoerii/nters
, or expenses in moving the Vessel about the port to obtain stores or
provisions or in connection with the maintenance of the Vessel. All of the
Charges and expenses wnich are incurred for Charterer's account as aforesaid will
be paid by the Owne*", wno shall be reinoursed by the Charterer upon presentation
of properly certified vouchers and supporting receipts.
(b) All fees of agents apoointed by and used by the Owner to husband the
Vessel, including the ftts of agents apoointed for canal transits and at bunicering
Borts , Shall be for tne account of the Charterer at ports at which tne Vessel
touches, pursuant to the instructions of the Charterer; orovided that such fees
shall not exceed those customarily charged commercial vessels for similar services.
The Chartej-sr snail reimourse the 0>*ner for postage and petty exoenses incurrea





If fumigation is ordered because of cargoes or passengers carried for
Charterer's account, or because of ports, wnarves or ^ocks visited oursuant to
Charterer's instructions, the time so lest as a result of the fumigation ana
•the cosr incurred thereby sha.l be for Charterer's account. If the fumigation
is ordei-ed for any other reason, the time lost thereoy and the expenses incicent
thereto shall be for Owner's account.
ARTICLE 18. FUEL.
(a) Upon delivery of the Vessel the Owner shall present to the Contracting
Officer a statement certified by the Owner or his authorized agent showing the
amount and grade of fuel on board at the time of delivery with such additional
verification as the Contracting Officer may require and the Charterer shall pay
the Owner for such fuel based upon cost of fuel at the last refueling point. The
Owner shall provide additional bunkers as may be reauired by the Charterer prior
to the acceptance of the Vessel by the Charterer and the Charterer snail reimourse
the Owner all costs directly connected with the bunkering of the additional fuel,
including but not limited to lighterage, dockage and similiar charges, and related
taxes thereto, except crew overtime, penalty time and other additional emoluments.
(b) The Charterer shall reimourse the Owner the cost of all fuel procured
by the Owner and loaded in the Vessel curing the perioa of this Charter. However,
the Owner shall not oe reimoursed any amount in excess of the lowest current
market price of sucn fuel at tne place of loading plus all reasonable expenses
incurred by the Owner in loading said fuel on ooard tne Vessel. If during any
three (3) month period the vessel consumes in excess of 105i of the fuel consumotion
rate warranted at any of the speeds listed in Article I.e. (2), such excess will be
for the account of the Owner. The title to all fuel for the cost of wnich the
Owner is entitled to be reimoursed nereunder shall automatically pass to and vest
in the Charterer upon delivery to tie Owner or upon the haooening of any other
event by wnicn title passes from t^e vendor or supplier thereof to the Owner, in
the case of any such fuel which is purchased for the performance of this Charter.
The Charterer shall be aforaed all benefits of Owner's contracts for its fuel
requirements.
(c) The Charterer may supply or causa to be supplied any or all of the fuel
required by tne Vessel during tne oerioa of t.ie Charter. The grade of such fuel
is to be as specified in Article Ud). If the Owner loads sucn fuel on the
Vessel at his own expense, the Charterer shall reimourse the Owner's reasonable
costs of sucn loaaing.
(d) If the Vessel should go off -hi re during the oeriod of this Charter, tne
Owner shall present to the Contracting Officer a statement certified by him or his
authorized agent snowing the amount of fuel on board at tne time the of*-nire
oeriod coffinenced and the amount of fuel on board wnen the off -hi re oeriod ended.
The Charterer shall be credited for the cost of the fuel consumed during the off-
hire oeriod and also reasonable exoenses incurred in loaaing such fuel, such costs
to be based upon costs at the last refueling point.
(e) Upon redelivery of the Vessel the Own«r shall oresent to the Contracting
Officer a statement certified by tne Owner or lns authorized agent showing the
amount of fuel on board at tne time of redeli.ery with such additional verification
as the Contracting Officer may require and the Charterer shall be credited for
such fuel based on the cost of fuel at the last refueling point.
(f) The term "current market price" as used in this Article, shall mesn a
price not in excess of the Contractor's own bunner contract orice, or the supplier's
posted or established selling price for the aate of the particular loading,
wmcnever is less, and such taxes necessarily incurred on the fuel or lubricating
oil wrich the Contractor is reouuired to pay.
(g) The tern "reasonable exoenses". as used in this Article, shall mean all
reasonable costs, except crew overtime, oenalty time or othe** additonal emoluments,
which were necessarily incurred in loading fuel on board tne Vessel, sucn as
exoenses incurred at tanker terminal, loading fuel from lighters, barges, or otner
craft used as lighters, including lignterage, lighter demurrage or detention
incurred, cost of shifting lighters for :ne convenience of the Vessel, handling
lighter lines, and such similar exoenses which the Contracting Officer shall find




(h) The Charterer agrees to rsimourse t.ie Owner for all expenses mcurrefl
by him under oaragraons (b) and (c) of tms Ai-ticle upon certification to and
verification by tne Contracting Officer of tne original receipted invoicas
covering such cnarges or other documents as the Contracting Officer may require.
ARTICL£ 19. "OFr-HIRE.
{i) In the event of loss of time from deficiency of men including but not
limited to misconduct, illness, strikes and lockouts; or deficiency of stores,
breakdown of machinery or eouipment; colli son; stranding; fire; detention by
authorities; average accidents ta ship or cargo; repairs; inspections or by any
other cause whatsoever not due to the fault of tne Charterer; preventing the full
worKing of the Vessel, the payment of hire, overtime and escalation shall cease
for all the time thereby lost until the Vessel is fully available for Charterer's
service; provided, however, when the period of time lost to the Charterer on any
one occasion is less than twenty-four (24) consecutive hours, hire snail not be
reduced for such period unless 1t exceeds twieve (12) hours, in whiM case sudi
penod shall be counted as one day.
(b) All port charges, pHotages, and other expenses incurred during any
period the Vessel is off-hire, and consequent upon tne putting into any port or
place other tflan to wnich the Vessel is bound, shall be borne by tne Owner.
(c) If uoon any passage the Vessel fails to make the speed warranted in
Article 1(d), or her fuel consumption exceeds that warranted in Article 1(d) due
to a defect in or breakdown of any Dart of her null, macninery, or eouipment,
casualty, or inefficiency of Master, Officers, or crew, or their failure to
proceed with utticst disoatch, the Vessel is delayed mors than twelve hours; the
hire for tne time lost and cost of extra fuel consumed, if any, shall be oome by
the Owner. Any delay by ice or time spent in quarantine shall be for Charterer's
account, except delay in quarantine resulting from the. Master, Officers or crew
having coBwuni caci ons with the shore at an infected port, wnere the Charterer has
given tne Master adequate notice of the infection; which shall be for Owner's
account.
(d) At all U.S. ports, including territories and possessions, the Vessel
shall also be off-hire for all time lost oecause cargo cannot be loaded or
discnargec by reason of a strixe, locx-out of any class of woriqnen essential to
tne loading or discharging of cargc, disputas between Master and men, jurisdictional
dispute between unions, or any otner cause due to labor dissension oeyond tne
control cf the Charterer, or if the Vesse' is unable to enter or leave a berth
due to a strike, or disputes between Master and men, jurisdictional disoute
between unions, or any otner cause due to laoor dissension beyond the control of
tne Charterer.
(e) In the event of detention of the Vessel by authorities at home or
abroad in consequence of legal action against the Vessel or Owner wnereoy the
Vessel is rendered unavailaole for Charterer's service for a period of 10 cays,
unless brought about by the act or neglect of the Charterer, the Charterer, by
written notice, snail have an option to cancel this Charter or to suspend same
until tne service can again be resuned, without prejudice to any rignt of claim
for damage whici the Charterer may have. Payment of hire to cease during, time
the Vessel may be out of Charterer's service by tne cause mentioned in the clause,
unless tne time out is less than 12 hours, in which event tnere is to be no
interruption in hire payments.
(f) If the loss of time resulting from any strikes or lockouts exceeds ]2_
days, the Charterer shall have an option to cancel this Charter or to suspend
same until the service can again be resumed, without prejudice to any right of
claim for damage which tne Charterer may have.
ARTICL: 20. TIME LOST.
Any time lost by the Vessel during this Charter Party (including all options.
If exert: $ed) due to breakdown of macninery, interference by author! r/, colli son,
stnnamg, fire or other accidents or damage to tne Vessel , or repairs, inspections
.
ovemau'i and alterations, preventing tne full working of the Vessel shall be
aooec to t.*ie cnarter period (including all options, if exercised) at Charterer's
option, aeclarabie at least 30 days prior to the expiration of the Charter. The
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aoolicable hire rata shall be that in affect when the time was lost. If total
time lost involves more than one hire rate, the hire rate for the time lost
period shall be comouted on the basis of a weignted average of all rates involved.
The foregoing aoolicable hire rats orovision for lost time shall not affect the
application of Article 12 (Economic Price Acjustment) . If the time lost option is
exercised, economic price adjustment sayments during that optional period shall
be made at the economic price adjustment rate applicable during the optional
period and not at the applicable rate in effect wnen the time was lost.
ARTICLE 21. OWNER'S OBLIGATION.
(a) Except as other/»ise specifically provided in this Charter, the Owner
shall during the period of the Charter pay for the wages and consular shipping
and discharging fees of the crew, the insurance of the Vessel, 4nd he shall
provide and pay for all provisions of the crew, necessary stores, including
boiler water and ballast, but the aforesaid provisions and stores carried during
the period of the Charter at no time shall exceed one and one-half percent of the
deadweight capacity of the Vessel, allowing a maximum of 250 tons, without prior
approval of the Charterer, or unless under existing circumstances the seaworthiness
of the Vessel requires a larger amount. The Owner shall use due diligence to
maintain the aforesaid class of the Vessel, and to keep the Vessel in a thoroughly
efficient state in hull, machinery, eouioment, aersonnel , and other particulars
relating to the seaworthiness of the Vessel. The Owner shall pay for all expenses
incurred in the navigation and management of the Vessel, except as otherwise
specifically provided nerein.
(b) Owner as Agent : Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 16(b) the
Contractor agrees to act as an agent of the Government from time to time to
arrange for stevedoring services for aischarge of the above named vessel at ports
designated by the Government. The Government shall reimburse the Contractor for
all cargo handling and related costs following submission of properly certifed
invoices supoorted in accordance with applicable billing instructions. In the
event that paid receipts &re not available, a copy of tne cancelled check jr oank
wire transfer may be submitted in lieu of the receipt. Reimbursement shall be
limited to expenditures actually mace by the Contractor, its agents or sub-agents
for such cargo handling ana related expenses.
The Government shall notify the Contractor of a requirement for agent services
as soon as possible prior to the vessel's arrival at the designated port or ports.
Said notice shall be verified in writing, or by telex and snail specify the port,
arrival date, and description of cargo to be handled (specifying all explosives or
hazardous cargo) and such otner information as necessary or appropriate for
Contractor to arrange for requested services.
(c) The Owner shall provide fuel used by the Vessel during the period of
this Charter in accordance with the provisions of Article 13.
(d) The whole reach of the Vessel's holds, decks, and usual places of
loading, including the deep tanks specified in Article 1(g) shall be at the
Ch-rterer's disposal, reserving only proper and sufficient space for ship's
naster. Officers and crrtt, tackle, apparel, furniture, provisions, stores and
fuel.
(e) The Owner, through his agents, employees and servants shall cojnnence
and prosecute the voyages made pursuant to the Charter with utmost disaatcn and
shall render all customary assistance with the ship's crew and boats.
(f) The Owner shall have maintained on board the Vessel comolsta deck and
engineroom logs. The Owner shall make the rougn ana smooth logs of she Vessel
availaole to the Charterer and shall upon request of the Charterer furnish the
Charterer with true copies of tne rougn or smooth logs of the Vessel. The Owner
shall also furnish to the Charterer upon request an abstract of the daily entries
in such log showing care given the cargo, courses steered, distances rjn on each
course, noon oosition, distance made good each day from noon to noon, consumption
of fuel, and remainder of fuel in tne bunkers at the end of each day. Such
abstract shall also contain appropriate meteorological data including the cond'tion
of the sea and a report of any marine casualty which results In damage to the
cargo or in delay of the Vessel.
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(g) The CCirtsrer snaT! have :Me pnviiege cf car-ying oassengers , of
assigning officers ano/or enlisted men aooarc the Vesse-1 for Juty purposes and
shall have permission to aoooint a supercargo as 'ar as accommoaations and
United States Coarst Guard cartifi cation allow Charterer oaying an amount of
S8.00 per day, per person, covering all exoerses including accommoaations.
victualling, any steward's department e.xtra rerr^uneration and overtime, penalty
time, acconoanying fringe benefits, and taxes incurred, in accordance wi tn tne
terms of Owner's labor agreements, incurred as a result of carrying such persons.
Owner shall victual pilots and Customs officers, and also, when autnor-rzed by
Charterer, shall victual tally clerics, stevedore's foremen, etc. Charter-r shall
pay S2.00 per meal for all such victualling.
(h) In addition to the carriage of personnel noted in (f) above. Charterer
shall have the right to assign other .-nilitary personnel aboard the Vessel. Such
personnel not to require victualling, oerthing, or sanitary facilities from the
ship unless reouested by the m: "itary canmanQer aboard, in which case the Owner
will be reimbursed out -of-pocket exoenses not ta exceed the amount per person per
day set forth in (f) above. Charterer will suooly life floats and jaclcets for
tne use of such military personnel car-ied aboard the ship during the chartar
period. Such itents to be removed by Charterer at termination of Charter.
(i) The Charterer shall be liable to the Owner for any loss of the Vessel's
fittings or »"purtenances or any damage to the Vessel, t)er fittings, or aoourtenances
caused by the act of passengers, supercargoes, evacuees or military personnel in
the embarication, carriage or asbarcation of passengers, supercargoes, evacuees or
military personnel to the extent such loss or aamage is not payable unoer the
Vessel's insurance policies; proviced tne Charterer shall not be liable for suc^i
damage unless written notice soeci-ying such camage, and if obtainable, the name
of the party or parties causing such damage shall nave been given to the Charterer
or its atuhorired representsr; ve within a reasonaole time.
(j) The Vessel shall be ecuiooed and rigged with tent gantlines and blocJcs
prior to arrival at ports wnere, because of climatic conditions, the use of natch
tents is customary.
(k) The Vessel shall provide sufficient cargo lights to equip working
hatcnes with four portaoie lignts, plus sufficient number of replacaments in
event of damage.
ARTICLE 22. THE MASTER. OFFICcRS AND CRrw.
(a) The Master, Officers and crew of this Vessel shall be aooointed or
hired by the Owner and shall be deemed to be the servants and agents of the Opener
at all times except as otherwise soecified in this Charter. The Master of
Vessel, shall be under the direction of the Charterer as regaras tne emoloyment
of tne Vessel, but shall not be unoer Charterer's oroers as regards navigation,
care and custooy of the Vessel and care of the cargo. The Master, Officers, and
crew, in supervising the loading, stowage, mnming, securing, or discnarging of
cargo shall be deemed the agents of the Charterer except insofar as sucn supervision
pertains to the seaworthiness of the Vessel.
(b) The Master, Officers and crew shall use due diligence in caring for and
ventilating tne cargo.
(c) The Chartere- snail furnish the Masta- witn all requisite instructions
and sailing directions, in writing. Should the Charterer elect to change these
instructions or sailing directions after the Master has acted upon them in a
reasonable and prjdent manner, and the Owner incurs extraordinary exoenses
thereby, the Charterer shall -eimourse tne Owner for such exoenses as were the
direct result of change in such instructions or sailing directions.
(d) If the Charterer shaT! have reason to be dissatisfied with the conduct
of the Master, Officers or crew, the Owner shell, on receiving particulars of the
complaint, investigate it, and if necessary make a change in personnel.
(e) In the event shore liberty is not oemitted. the Master of the ship
will be advised promptly in writing of this restriction by the snore commander.
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ARTICLE 23. STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS.
(a) This Contract is subject to all the terr.is and orovisions of and all the
exemptions from liability for damage to cargo from the time the cargo is loaaed
until the time it is discharged from the Vessel contained in Subsections (1), (2)
and (3) of Section (4) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of the United States,
approved April 16, 1936. For the ourposes of this Contract, the term "Carrier" as
used in said Act shall mean the "Owner" and the term "Shipper" shall mean the
"Cnarterer".
(b) Any provision of this Charter to the contrary notwithstanding, the Owner
and the Vessel shall have the benefit of all limitations of and exemptions from
liability for damage to cargo accorded to the Owner or demise charterer of vessels
by any statute or rule of law for the time being inforce.
I
(c) Neither the Owner nor any corporation owned by, subsidiary to, or
associated or affiliated with the Owner shall be liable to answer for or make good
any loss or damage to the cargo occurring at any time and even though before
loading on or after discharge fron the Vessel, by reason or by neans of any fire
whatsoever, unless such fire shall be caused by its design or neglect.
ARTICLE 24. EXCEPTIONS.
The act of God, enemies, fire, restraint of princes, rulers of people, and
all dangers and accidents of the seas, rivers, machinery, boilers and steam navigatior
and errors of navigation througjiout this Charter Party always mutually exceotea.
The Vessel shall have the liberty to sail witn or without pilots, to tow and to be
towed, to assist vessels in distress, and to deviate for the purpose of saving
life or property, or to go into dry dock or into ways with or without cargo on
board.
ARTICLE 25. LIBERTIES.
The Owner, Master and Vessel shall have- liberty to comply with any orders or
directions as to loading, aeoarture, arrival, routes, ports of call, stoooages
,
iiscnarge, aestination, lelivery or otherwise howsoever given by the Government of
any nation or aeoartment tnereof or any oerson acting or purporting to act with
tne ?utr!ority of such Government or of any department thereof, or by any corrmttee
or person naving, under the terms of the war risk insurance on the Vessel, tne
right to give such ortaers or airections, and if oy reason of or in compliance with
any sucn orders or directions anything is done or is not done, such snail not be
oeemed a deviation or breach of oraers or neglect of duty by the Master or the
Vessel. Delivery or other disposition of the goods in accordance with such orders
or airections shall be a fulfillment of the contract voyage. The Vessel
nay carry contraband, explosives, munitions, warlike stores, hazardous cargo, and
may sail armed or unarmed ana with or without convoy.
ARTICLE 25. WZWZD JASON CLAUSt-
In the event of accident, danger, damage, or disaster, before or after
commencement of the voyage resulting from any cause whatsoever, wnether due to
negligence or not, for which, or for the conseouence of wnich, the Owner is net
.'esponsiole, by statute, contract, or otherwise, the cargo, shipoers. consignees,
or owners of the cargo snail contribute with the Owner in general average to the
oayment of any sacrifices, losses, or axoensa of a general average nature t.iat may
be maae or incurred, ana snail ?iy salvage and special charges incurred m rescect
of tne cargo. If a salving vessel is owned or operated by the Owner, salvage
shall be paid as fully as if such saivmg vessel or vessels belonge<l to strangers.
ARTICLE 27. Gc.ME?.AL AVERAGE CLAUSE.
General average shall be adjusted, stated and settled, according to Vork-
Antwerp Rules 1974, at such oort or olace in the United States as may be selected
by tne Owner, ana as to matters not provided for oy t.nose Rules, according to the
laws and usages at the port of New York. In sucn adjustment, disbursements in
foreign currencies snail be exchanged into United States money at the ""ate ore-
vailing on t.he dates made and allowances for damage to cargo claimed in foreign
currency snail be converted at the rate orevailing on the last day of discharge at




All salvage moneys eamed by the Vessel during the oeriod of this Charter
shall be divided eoually between the Owner and the Charterer after aeducfing
Master's. Officers' and crew's shares, legal expense, hire of tne vessel ourini;
the time lost as a result of the salvage service, value of fuel consumes, r«oeirs
of damage, if any, and other extraordinary loss or exoense sustained as a result
of the salvage service.
ARTICLE 29. OrTENTION.
(a) Except to the extent that loss of time is caused by the fault, negligence
or failure of the CX*ner, Master, Officers or crew, to exercise due diligence to
keep the Vessel woricing and to prevent loss of time, payrnent of hire shall not be
reduced because of:
I
(1) The hapoening of any event listed in Article 19(a) of- this Charter
caused by the fault of t.he C^iarterer or caused or contributed to by war or warlike
acts, sailing in convoy, ooerating (contrary to peacetime custcm) without lights
or pilots, navigating or mooring in (contrary to oeacetime custom) unlighted,
unbuoyed, or overcrowded waters, excessive usage (because of war or warlike
conditions) of machinery or equipment, navigating (contrary to peacetime custam)
under the direction of naval, military, coast guard or ot.ner govermnental authori-
ties, discnarging alongside ships or into smos exceot lighters, or ice.
(2) During any loss of time for which the Owner receives full hir«
under this Article it shall be the duty of the Owner to credit any savings to the
Charterer. Savings, for tne ourpose of this oaragraoh. snail have the same
meaning as that set forth in Aj-ticle 30(c) of this Charter.
(b) If a general average situation arises and the Owner becomes entitled to
recover in general average from hull underwriters, cargo, or otner interests in
the adventure for sacrifices of wages, stores, or other like exoenditures wnich
would otherwise be for the account of the Owner under this Charter, tne Charterer
shall be credited with any amounts recoverable by the Owner in resoect of all suci
expenditures incurred by the Owner during any period wnen the Charterer is liable
to the Owner for hire under the terms of this Article.
ARTiaE 30. REDEUVERY.
(a) Unless lost, the Vessel shall be redelivered in accordance with paragraph
(d) of Article 2. The Charterer shall give the Owner not less than 20 days notice
(confirmed by telegram or letter, if oral) of the Vessel's expected date and range
of redelivery and 10 days notice (confirmed by a telegram or letter) of the
Vessel's actual port of redelivery. It shall be the duty of tne Owner to mininnze
his expense during any period while the Vessel is in port subseauent to tne receipt
of the notice of redelivery and prior to tne actual redelivery, crediting to the
Charterer any savings.
(b) It shall be the duty of the Charterer to perform prior to redelivery of
the Vessel, all repairs except for ordinary wear and tear and depreciation,
removals and other work whicn under the terms of this Contract ar^ for the account
of the Charterer; hoi^vtr, the Charterer may elect to redeliver the Vessel without
perfomnng such were. In which case the Owner will be given not less than 10 days
notice of such election and the Charterer snail relmourse the Owner for (i) tne
cost of performing such work and repairs less a deduction for ordinary *«ar and
tear and deoreciation, tnil (ii) charter hire and fuel cost for the time lost for
such repairs oeyond the time which would otherwise nave been used for the reoairs
of Owner, less any estimated savings the Owner should nave been able to effect
during such time. Shoula the Owner elect to defer making such reoairs the
Charterer may pay to the Owner sums to be agreed between the Ontner and Contracting
Officer representing tne estimated cost of performing such work and repairs ]eis a
deduction for ordinary wear and tear and depreciation; exceot, however, if the
Vessel will not be repaired because it is lost after the term nation of this
Charter or shall be scraoped or sent to a lay-uo fleet no payment for estimated
repair costs will be made. In the event the Charterer elects to redelivery the
233

Vessel without perforning the work for its account this Charter shall be amended
to reflect the amount of the payments tc &e made under this Article. Any failure
to agree with respect to the amounts to oe oaid hereunder shall be deemed a dispute
and settled in accordance with the "Disputes" Article. Storage of any Govemm(»nt-
owned property removed oy the Ovmer under this Article shall be at the risk and
expense of the Government.
^. (12) consecutive hours or less shall be disregarded and any period
exceeding twelve (12) consecutive hour? but less tlian twenty-four (24) hours shall
be counte<l as one day.
ARTICLE 31. CHARTER NOT A DEMISE.
Nothing herein contained shall be construed as creating a demise of the
Vessel to the Charterer, the Owner under this Charter retaining complete and
exclusive possession and control of the Vessel and its navigation.
ARTICLE 32. REDUCED OPESATIONAL STATUS.
(a) The Charterer may at its option and uoon notice to the Owner In ac-
cordance with the provisions of subparagraoh (c) place the Vessel in reduced
operational status. During any sucn period the Charterer shall pay for tne use
and hire of the Vessel at the rate stated in paragraph (e) of Article 2, per 24-
hour day or pro rata for part thereof less any actual savings as proviaed in
Article 30(c).
(b) During any such period of reduced operational status the Charterer shall
have t.he privilege of performing repairs or other worfc for its account and the
Owner shall have the privilege of performing voyage repairs or maintenance work
for its account. If, however, during such period the performance of any such
repairs or work for Owner's account requires dry-doclcing the Vessel, the payment
of hire shall cease during the time the Vessel is in dry dock and during the time
required to nove the Vessel to dry dock and return to the point where she was
placed in reduced operatlxinal status.
(c) The Charterer shall give the Owner written or telegraphic notice or in
the event notice is given by telepnone. written or telegraphic confirmation of
, exercise of the option specified in subparagraph (a) above. Such notice shall
specify the time at which the period of reduced operational status is to coninence,
which time shall not be less than 43 hours, subsequent to the receipt of sucn
notice by the Owner or his representative. The Charterer snail give the Owner
written or telegraphic notice, or in the event notice is given by teleonone,
written or telegraphic confirmation of termination of the period of recuced
operational status. Such notice shall specify the time at which such period shall
terminate, which time shall be at least 72 hours (Saturdays, Sundays and holidays
excluded) subsequent to the receipt of iaid notice by the Owner or its repre-
sentative; provided however, that by jgreement between the Owner and the Charterer
the Vessel may be returned to full operational status before the time specified in
the notice of termination of the reduced operational period.
(d) During periods of reduced operational status, Owners will reduce the
crew on board to tne least niinber of men consistent with practical .Tiaintanance
standards. The number of personnel remaining on board during ROS periods will
be subject to the approval of the Contracting Officer.
(e) With respect to any period covered by this Article the Charterer shall
reimourse the Owner for all exoenses actually incurred by the Owner by reason of
his agreements to provide return transportation for any Officers or members of the
crew signed off Articles during any such period (but not in excess of the amount
set out in applicable agreements with recognized laoor unions). The Chartarer
agrees to reimburse the (X»ner for all expenses necessarily incurred in accordance
with the Owner's labor agreements for obtaining crew replacements it the time of




(a) The vessel shall be suSject to the Government's insoection as -.0 suit-
aoility for tne reouirec service as stated in Article 4(b) pnor cs aelivery.
If, m tne opinion cf the Government mssector, me vessel is inaceauate for the
intenoed service, the Govemmenr reserves tne rignt to reject tne vessel, and In
that event, tnis cnarter shall oe null- and void. The decision of the Contracting
Officer regarding the adequacy of tne vessel based on tne inspection snail be final.
(b) The vessel shall be subject to subsequent inspections at reasonable
intervals and at such times as oeficier.cies exist to aeterwine the continuino
suitability of the vessel- for the rec-ired service as well as to deterrine wnether
the material condition of the vessel will prevent effective operation during oasic
and optional periods of the contract. Such inspections snail incluoe in addition
tc tne items enumerated in paragrapn Z, but not be limited to:
(1) Condition and tigntness of natch ooenincs/cargo spaces
(2) Condition and tigntness of hull and aecic plating
(3) Condition of cargo nandling gear
(A) Conwuni cation and Navigational eauipment
(51 General condifon ana maintenance of vessel (s)
(£< Conciticn and availability of general safety and firefighting
eauipment
(7) Engineering soacss ana equipment
(c) The Government furthe"^ resen^es the right to have the vessel/ s) surveyed
at any time by an inaeoenoent surveyor.
(d) If, in the opinion of Government Inspector, deficiencies exist that
precluoe the adequacy of the vessel (s) 'or tne assignee service, 2 notice for
correction will be issuec. In the event that the stataa aeficiencies are not
corrected in a reasonable pe-iod of time and in tne opinion of tne Contracting
Officer based upon tne recommendation of tne Government Inspector, ana/or the
inoepenaent surveyor the vessel(s) is inadequate for tne intenced service or unable
to operate for tne renaming period of the contract as a result cf these deficiencies
tne Government -eserves tne rignt to. cancel tns contract at any tiriS curing tne
term of the cnartsr.
ARTICLE 3A. £VE^^^S Or DEFAULT.
(a) If the Owner fails to perform any of its obligations contained in this
Charter anc such failure was not due to the fault of tne Chartere** or any ctner
representative of tne Government acting in an of'icial capacity and within the
limits of nis authority or such failure is not excused by Article 24 and if as a
result of such failure, tne Charterer is aenied the full use of the Vessel, then
for any period exceeding twelve (12) hours that the Vessel is not available for
tne Charterer's use, tne Owner shall pay to Charterer at Charterer's ootion and on
demand an amount equal to tne cnarter hire ana economic pries adj us'anent in
effect for tnat period of time lost. This amount shall not be paic if the Vessel
was off-hire unaer Article 19 during that oenod, and the amounts oavable by tne
Owner pursuant to this Article 33 are payable as liauidatec damages land not as a
penalty) agreed to by the parties hereto as tne fairest measures of Charterer's
actual damages wnich an difficult if not impossible to ascertain; and. accordingly,
it is agreec that Charterer shall be under no duty or ooligation to mitigate or
otnervise recuce tne amount of such liouiaated aamages.
(b) No remedy herein conferred ucon the Zharztn^ is intendec to be exclusive
of any otner remedy, but every such remedy shall be cumulative anc sna'l be in
adaition to ever/ ctne- remedy herein conferred or now or hereafter existing at
law or in equity or oy statute.
(c) The Government may, by written notice of default to the Contractor,




(1) Whenever, in any given six (5) nonth period for any reason wrtat-
soever, more than 12 days are lost, the Contractor. sha 1 1 oe deemea to be in default
in itrformance under the Contract and pursuant to which the Contracting Officer
may at his discretio.-. terminate for default; or
(2) If the Contractor falls to perform any of the other provisions of
this Contract, and does not cure such failure within a period of 10 days (or such
longer period as the Contracting Officer may authorize in writing) after receipt
of notice from the Contracting Officer specifying such failure.
ARTICLE 3S. WAIVER OF CUIMS.
All claims whatsoever for moneys due the Owner under this Charter must be
submitted in accordance with the applicable billing instructions within two years of
the date of redelivery of the Vessel. All claims not submitted within the two-year
limit shall be deemed to have been waived by the Owner.
ARTICLE 36. GOVERNMENT CUUSES.
Government clauses attached as Annex B to this Charter ir^ incorporated
herein by reference and are made a part of this Charter.
ARTICLE 37. SPECIAL* PROVISIONS.
, The provisions of this Article shall prevail over any other provisions herein
inconsistent therewith.
(a) In addition to the characteristics specified in Article 1 of this
Contract, Owner warrants that:
(1) vessel has a satisfactory means of securing all access scuttles to
vessel's holds and spaces as well as means for securing access to cargo comoartTnents
through ventilation ducts or any other openings providing access to such compartment:
or spaces , and
(2) in addition to communications/navigational eauioment described in
Annex "A" and in Article ' of this Contract, vessel has MARISAT communications
equipment in good operating condition for linKage with world wide MARISAT system.
(b) In the event that the Charterer directs the vessel to engage in coastwise
trade and as a result of each coastwise employment tne Owner must reimourse MARAO
for a specified percentage of tne Construction Differential Subsidy provided to
build the vessel, the Charterer will reimourse the Owner for such repayments made
to the Maritime Administration.
(c) The Charterer agrees to reimourse the Owner for necessary communication
expenses incurred in the operation of the vessel excsot when such expenses are
the Owner's obligation or are incurred for the convenience of the Owner, the
vessel, its Master, Officers or crew.
Each of the povisions of this Charter ?ir*y shall be deemed severable, if any
provisions, or oart thereof, should oe held to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable
the remaining provisions, or part thereof, shall continue in full force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the pa 'ties hereto have executed this Contract as of the
day and year first aoove written.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
3Y BY
Contracting Officer
(TITLt) Military Seal i ft Command





r. cert-ify that I am the of the coraoration
namec as Contractor ner-in; tna: wnp signet: tm-; Contract on
benalf of tne Contractor was then ^of saia coroorstion ; that
said Contract was duly signed for anc in oena'if o* saic corooration sy authority
of its governing body and is within the scooe of its corporate powers.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. I have hereunto affixed my hand and the seal of said





Conmunications Capability . The Owner represents that the vessel is equipped with
the following minimum communications capability and further agrees to install
additional radio crystals as may later be required by the Charter.
(1) A radiotelegraph station as outlined in Subpart R, Part 83 of the Federal
Conmunications Commission Rules and Regulations as evidenced by a current Cargo
Ship Safety Radiotelegraphy Certification and/or FCC Station License.
(2) One radio receiver, high frequency: Minimum frequency range 2-24 MSC, A-l/A-2/
A-3j emission. (SEPARATE FROM MAIN RECEIVER)
(3) One radio transmitter, high-frequency: Minimum frequency range 2-24 MCS, A-1
emission, capable of meeting the requirements of Articles 83.317 and 83.319 of the
FCC Rules and Regulations (SYNTHESIZED FREQUENCY CONTROL)
(4) One HF radiotelephone transmitter/receiver: Minimum frequency range 2-30 MCS, 2.8
A-3j emission. Synthesized frequency control for all marine band frequencies. (MINIMUM
TRANSMITTER RF POWER OUTPUT 100 WATTS)
(5) Crystals for operation on the following output frequencies: (ALTERNATE MEANS OF





(6) HF radio teletype transmit/ receive system (Fl emission) with selective calling de-
vice (SELCALL) and error correction device (SITOR) installed in the system. Minimum
frequency range 2-30 MHZ and minimum transmitter RF power output 1000 watts.
(7) Maritime satellite (Marisat) system with bridge voice remote unit.
The above requiranents are not intended to restrict the utilization of the installed




VOYAGE COST ANALYSIS FOR FY83 VOYAGE #010 OF THE
AMERICAN MONARCH COMMENCING IN BAYONNE, NEW JERSEY
ON 28 MARCH 1983 AND ENDING IN NORFOLK, VIRGINIA
ON 30 JUNE 1983
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